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WORKING PAPER 43

PEACE FOR LEBANON?
Obstacles, Challenges, Prospects

A report of an international research project and series of workshops carried out in Ottawa from September 1990 through November 1991

by

Deirdre Collings and Jill Tansley

May 1992

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PREFACE

Working Papers, the result of research work in progress or the summary of a conference, are often intended for later publication by the Institute or another publisher, and are regarded by the Institute to be of immediate value for distribution in limited numbers -- mostly to specialists in the field.

The opinions contained in the papers are those of the participants and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute and its Board of Directors.

Deirdre Collings is a research fellow at the Institute, and head of the Institute's project on Lebanon.

Jill Tansley is a programme officer at the Institute with special interest in Middle East affairs.

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We would also like to thank Mr. Bechara Tarabay for his extensive help in arranging consultation meetings in Paris, the Oxford Centre for Lebanese Studies for providing background documents for workshop participants, Dr. Paul Salem (Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies, Beirut) for designing the map contained in this report, and Marcia Rodriguez, editor of the report.

Finally, many thanks to Institute staff who gave generously of their time and energy, especially for the public events. Very special mention goes to Doina Cioiu (project administrator), Marcel Langlois, Roger Hill, Cecile Sicard, Sue Connell and Hélène Samson.

LEBANON
Strategic Situation as of March 1992


SYRIA
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TYRE
ISRAEL
SOUTH LEBANON ARMY
LEBANESE ARMY
UNIFIL
ISRAELI ARMY
SYRIAN ARMY

Source: Adapted from map provided by Paul E. Salem (Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, Beirut).

FOREWORD

In May 1989, a delegation of twelve Lebanese Canadians, representative of the various Lebanese communities, along with the director of the National Council on Canada-Arab Relations, met with then Secretary of State Joe Clark to express with one united voice their collective concern for the deteriorating situation in Lebanon. Partly as a result of the interest expressed by Mr. Clark, the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security decided to undertake a major research project on the conflict.

This project was initiated in August 1989 under the direction of Dr. Norma Salem, a Research Fellow at the Institute. Unfortunately, Dr. Salem passed away suddenly in 1990. The project was not abandoned however, and was re-initiated in August 1990.

Planning of the project involved long and careful consultation with international experts on Lebanon and the Middle East, in order to determine how to most constructively address the myriad of difficulties facing Lebanon and the Lebanese. As a result of these consultations, the Institute decided to undertake four distinct but interrelated workshops, organized to reflect the political, economic, social and human aspects of the conflict, and to assess the impact of the domestic, regional and international environment.

The workshops assembled a carefully selected group of analysts (from Lebanon, Canada, United States, France, United Kingdom, Jordan and Kuwait) whose task was to work together to examine the issues and to think constructively about avenues for action. Participants changed from workshop to workshop (according to expertise), but all workshops were interdisciplinary -- participants included academics, political actors (past and present) and opinion leaders with different perspectives and viewpoints.

This report summarizes the results of this two-year long research endeavour. The first workshop, **Why No Peace? Attempts to Settle the Conflict Since 1975**

(September 1990), examined the reasons for failure of the various settlement attempts since 1975, and also examined the current Ta'if process. The second workshop, **War and Reconstruction: Current Conditions and Future Needs** (December 1990), analyzed the major social and economic consequences of the war and explored various avenues for constructive action. The third workshop, **Peace for Lebanon? Obstacles, Challenges, Prospects** (June 1991), considered Lebanon in regional context, focussing on the past and present impact of the Palestinians, Israel and Syria. The final seminar (November 1991) drew on the discussions of the first three workshops to examine **The Lebanon of the Future**. In all, seventy-two formal presentations were prepared for the project, and participants engaged in over 120 hours of vigorous discussion.

Two public events were held in conjunction with the project. The first **Lebanon: Hope From Within** featured two prominent Lebanese humanitarians and was attended by approximately 200 concerned Canadians. The second, **The Lebanon of the Future**, was held in conjunction with the final seminar and was attended by approximately 250 members of the interested public*.

Obviously, this report is unable to reflect fully the richness of the discussions and debates. Not all participants will agree with the entire contents of this summary, although considerable effort was made to include the major points of consensus as well as some of the dissenting views. As a general rule, only those comments made during formal presentations are attributed.

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* Analysis in this report generally focusses on events through the end of 1991.

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Our struggle is not for Lebanon's polity or economy, it is for the human being -- for social justice.

Monseigneur Grégoire Haddad
Ottawa, 27 September 1990

I BACKGROUND TO THE WAR

On 12 April 1991, President Elias Hrawi proclaimed the "first year of peace" in Lebanon, marking what was hoped to be the end of a war that has ravaged the country since 1975. Recent developments suggest that stability may be returning to most of the country, although the situation in South Lebanon is still critical. The consequences of the war have been devastating. Gross indicators of the human, social, and economic destruction include: over 150,000 dead, 700,000 wounded, 40,000 handicapped, one-third of the population displaced from their homes, disruption of livelihoods, accelerating rates of emigration, destruction of educational and medical facilities as well as industrial enterprises, severe impairment of basic services, billions of dollars in property loss, and a shattering of the once "miraculous" Lebanese economy.[1]

Lebanon's violent eruption involved a highly complex interplay of domestic, regional and international factors. Attempts to explain the conflict often invoke simplifications that obscure understanding of the underlying issues. Workshop participants were especially dismayed at the lack of sophisticated analysis by the international media.

Television images that focussed on "newsworthy" levels of destruction portrayed an entire society engaged in its own unravelling. This focus, however, ignored the vast majority of Lebanese -- the unarmed civilians who did not partake in the violence, but who were its silenced victims. The steadfast resistance of Lebanese civilians against the domination of their society and state by armed groupings was rarely reported.

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[1] Many of the socioeconomic statistics cited in this report are estimates, some of which conflict. These disparities are the result of the immense methodological difficulties in completing "scientific" studies in a war zone. All dollar amounts, except those relating specifically to Canada, are quoted in US currency.

Print media also resorted to "shorthand" reporting, using generalized identity-group labels to identify the protagonists: "Christians versus Muslims" or "Maronites," "Shi'ites," and so on.[2] Workshop participants called for greater subtlety in this regard, decrying the popular clichés used when describing the conflict: "It is too simplistic to label all Arab nationalists as Muslims and all Lebanese nationalists as Christians. Furthermore, the so-called Maronite establishment is not representative of the entire Maronite community; there were Christian supporters of both the Palestinian and National Movements, and there was a definite class aspect to the crisis, which transcended the sectarian divide." As Georges Corm stressed, there was a fantastic rivalry among competing groups **within** the so-called Christian block, and **within** the so-called Muslim block: "Quarrels within the movements have been much more intensive than the Christian-Muslim problem." There also tended to be enormous dissent within a sect, as attested by the prolific amount of intra-sectarian fighting. Participants agreed that especially at the beginning of the crisis, there was **not** a strict line of intersectarian division. After the violence erupted, however, group identity became an increasingly divisive issue, principally because of militia actions: the warlords engaged in considerable sectarian-based violence, compelling Lebanese civilians to take refuge, both psychologically and physically, in sectarian ghettos that were "protected" by same-sect militias. In this way, militia leaders appropriated the mantle of "legitimacy" through the appearance of popular support. The international media reinforced this perception by focussing on the views of authorized militia leaders, rather than giving time to non-militia voices.

This report will give a brief overview of some of the principal issues that inflamed the nation on the eve of 1975. These issues include domestic disagreement over Lebanon's identity and role in the region; socioeconomic imbalances; the political system; and pressures imposed by regional players (notably the Palestinians and Israel).

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[2] Double quotation marks indicate citations from workshop discussions or words used in an ironic sense. In addition, these marks alert the reader to words or terms that have often been abused in discussions about Lebanon. Marked terms indicate the need for subtle qualifications that, for space reasons, are not possible to repeat every time.

Lebanon's First Republic: The 1943 National Pact and Different Visions of Lebanon

Prior to Lebanon's proclamation of independence and the articulation of the National Pact in 1943, parts of the political establishment held different visions of their state. Certain elements of Lebanon's "Christian" population preferred the continuation of the French Mandate because they believed that French colonial protection was still needed vis-à-vis the large Muslim population of the region, and because they wished to retain their relatively privileged status under the mandate. By 1943, however, most of these Christians accepted the formalization of the Lebanese state, considering it a vehicle by which they could guarantee their collective security and independence in a Muslim-dominated region. On the other hand, a large segment of the population -- the majority of Muslims as well as pro-independence Christians -- welcomed independence, viewing it as a step toward Lebanon's integration into the region. The National Pact managed to reconcile these two visions of Lebanon, but the pro-West versus pro-Arab orientations continued to divide the Lebanese on the question of their country's regional identity: "Is Lebanon Arab or not?"

Some participants interpreted the National Pact as if it were a marriage built on a "double divorce": " 'no' to close alliance and protection from France, and 'no' to merger with a larger Arab entity. It outlined what policies were not to be followed without indicating what policies were to be followed."[3] Paul Salem argued that the pact's vagueness was one of the prime reasons for the instability of Lebanon's foreign policy since independence. Furthermore, regional events began to overtake the pact's foreign policy provisions: "The conflict between pro-French and pro-Arab orientations soon became outdated with the collapse of French colonial power; this 1943 arrangement had nothing to say about the Arab-Israeli conflict after 1948, the US-Soviet Cold War, or the various inter-Arab Cold Wars."

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[3] Not all participants agreed that the National Pact was this nebulous. Raghid el-Solh argued that the pact did outline a foreign policy direction for Lebanon: independence from France and all other foreign domination; brotherly relations with Syria based on equality; membership in the Arab League and the international community. The pact's intent was to encourage Lebanon's active participation within the Arab collective system, to promote Arab cooperation and interrelations. A confused interpretation of the pact equates Lebanon's "Arabness" with its closeness to Syria: "Drawing closer to Syria means Lebanon is Arab; drawing away from Syria means that Lebanon is not Arab." el-Solh completely rejected this interpretation.

In addition to perceiving Lebanon's regional role differently, the Lebanese also held divergent views of Lebanon's raison d'être. Charles Rizk suggested that one reason for "Muslim" allegiance to the new Lebanese state hinged on elevated political status, which was more acceptable than it had been under the French Mandate. The confessional political system instituted power-sharing based on the demographic weight of each confessional community.[4]

Because of their enhanced status, many Muslims -- especially the predominant Sunni community -- saw national allegiance to Lebanon as a means of ensuring their rights and political participation. As already mentioned, the conservative Christian elements pledged allegiance to Lebanon for "security" reasons. These differing perceptions of the purpose of the Lebanese state sharpened in the years leading up to the war. For reasons that will be discussed later, the early war years found conservative Christian protagonists preoccupied with the question of Lebanon's sovereignty and security, whereas "progressive" protagonists were concerned with issues of political reform. In fact, one of the primary reasons for the failure of conflict-settlement attempts in the early years stems from the inability of Lebanese elites to agree on whether security or reform should take priority.

Socioeconomic Imbalances: The Seeds of Discontent

Although the free-enterprise economy was highly successful, Lebanon's "miraculous" growth benefitted neither all Lebanese nor all of Lebanon. Participants discussed four sources of socioeconomic discontent: an absence of "social content" in Lebanon's economic successes (exacerbated by lack of government planning except during the administration of President Fouad Shehab);[5] the centralization of economic activities in the Greater Beirut area to the neglect of the regions; the economy's focus on trade and services; and uneven development among and within Lebanon's communal groupings.

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[4] Under the French Mandate, Christians enjoyed the status of a political majority; whereas Muslims were the political minority. The confessional system, with its emphasis on the sect, blurred this Christian-Muslim political divide (that is, Maronite Christians came first, followed by Sunni Muslims, Shi'ite Muslims, Greek Orthodox Christians, and so on).

As Ahmed Sbaiti pointed out: "The lack of social improvements was most manifest in the public sector's stature and spending on social infrastructure – health, education, housing, and sanitation. Even electricity and water reached rural areas only recently. The government built infrastructure only to the extent and where necessary to support existing private economic activities."[6] Certain services that should have been provided, or at least regulated, by the public sector were controlled by private-sector enterprise. This meant that many essential services were offered as consumer commodities to be sold on the open market.

The absence of publicly provided essential services was even more evident in the rural areas outside of Beirut. As Hassan Charif reported: "One of the major imbalances of prewar Lebanon was the predominance and primacy of Greater Beirut. In 1975, Beirut accounted for more than half of Lebanon's population, over two-thirds of economic activity, two-thirds of overall employment, the entire state administration, all of the country's higher education, and 95 percent of its banking activity."[7]

Centralization of activities created great regional imbalances within the country.[8]

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[5] Following the 1958 civil war, President Shehab undertook a major programme of socio-economic reforms.

[6] This tendency continued even after 1975: between 1977 and 1987, the percentage of public expenditure on infrastructural development equalled 89 percent, whereas social service expenditures amounted to only 11 percent.

[7] Charif is quoting from a 1991 working paper produced on behalf of the American Task Force for Lebanon.

[8] Charif noted that Lebanon's neglect of its regions stems from the country's creation in 1920, when the mandatory powers "added" the rural provinces to Mount Lebanon: "The ruling circles in Mount Lebanon failed to develop social and economic structures that would integrate these 'annexed provinces' into the life of the country. Even the officially adopted version of the 'national history of

(continued...)

Government policies restricted expenditures to building infrastructure such as communications networks, trade routes, ports, airports, and warehouses. As both Atif Kubursi and Charif noted, the government's bias towards the development of the trade and services sector, centred in Beirut, led to the de facto neglect of traditional subsistence agriculture and sharecropping. Small rural farmers became bankrupt as cash-crop agriculture -- based on more modern techniques, and owned and managed by urban dwellers -- expanded and Lebanon began increasingly to export its agricultural goods. This transformation of the rural economy, in combination with the lack of alternative employment and the underdeveloped social and physical infrastructure in the regions, caused the relocation of thousands of sharecroppers and farming families to the urban slums around Beirut (the "Belt of Misery") in the 1960s and 1970s: "By 1975, more than 40 percent of the Lebanese rural population had left the countryside."[9] Sbaiti observed that Beirut's periphery became a festering ground of discontent, with residents prime candidates for militia recruitment once hostilities broke out.

Charif considered the concentration of life in Beirut one of the major factors leading to the eruption of war in 1975: "Some analysts attribute the devastating destruction of Beirut, to some extent at least, to the revolt of the periphery against the centre, and to the revenge of the displaced rural population against their deep misery in Beirut and against their earlier agony and neglect in their original towns and villages." Kubursi stressed that Lebanon's bias in favour of trade and services contributed to both inequitable distribution of income and rising unemployment. Others also noted the economy's failure to provide employment opportunities for Lebanon's growing number of well-educated youth.

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[8](...continued)
Lebanon' reflected this neglect. The 'annexed provinces' never existed except through their intermittent and transient relations with the history of the Mountain."

[9] This process of internal migration to the centre escalated during the 1970s, as Israeli bombardments in the south caused villagers to flee to the "safety" of Beirut.

In addition, participants discussed the prevalent perception that Lebanon's economic imbalances were reflected in uneven development among the country's communal groupings (for example, the Maronites were perceived as the most affluent, the Shi'ites the most impoverished). Corm rejected the accuracy of this perception, noting, for example, the affluence of Shi'ite feudal landlords in the south. Participants agreed that there were upper, middle, and lower classes in each community, but that overall socioeconomic indicators demonstrated inequities. Samir Khalaf attributed this uneven development, in part, to different rates of exposure to modernizing forces (Maronite exposure began in the seventeenth century, whereas Shi'ite modernization was a much more recent phenomenon). Nevertheless, these intercommunal gaps were closing before the war began. Noting the socioeconomic levelling effect of the war, Richard Norton recommended reevaluating previous conceptions about sectarian and regional economic imbalances in light of new realities.

The Consociational System: Preservation, Reform, or Deconfessionalization?

A major point of contention among the Lebanese concerned the "fairness" and representativity of the confessionally based system. On the eve of the war, Lebanon's leaders were divided: some (especially conservative Christian elements)[10] were committed to the preservation of the system and its confessional ratios for power-sharing; others (traditional Muslim leaders in particular) lobbied for reform so that the ratios better reflected demographic changes.[11] Yet others -- a "counterelite" composed of both Muslims and Christians -- called for the deconfessionalization of the system, asserting their political disaffection with sectarian quotas. As Hani Faris noted: "Large segments of the population were neither motivated nor felt represented by a confessional identity. While providing for the political representation of each religious community, the system does not provide representation for those Lebanese whose primary identification is not confessional." This issue of "security" versus "political participation" is the subject of heated debate. Whereas some analysts see Lebanon's confessional system as a wonder of democratic representation, others consider it the root of all Lebanon's suffering -- responsible for encouraging a weak government, perpetuating sectarian identification, politics, and agendas rather than encouraging national allegiance,[12] and rendering Lebanon ripe for external interference.

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[10] These leaders viewed the existing preferential status of the Maronites, especially as embodied in the considerable power of the president of the Republic (who was to be Maronite) as the only way to ensure the "security" of their community. Dissenters argued that Maronite privileges resulted in Maronite control of the state (to that community's advantage).

[11] Differential rates of population growth among Lebanon's communities had resulted, by 1975, in a clear Muslim majority composed particularly of Shi'ites. Questioning the justification for the continuation of Maronite political privileges given the new demography, Muslims began to call for constitutional reform. This aggravated the fears of some Christians who considered "reform" a ploy aimed at instituting Muslim domination.

These different interpretations of Lebanon's political system are related to the larger sociological question of the "true" social reality of Lebanon's population. As el-Solh explained, some see Lebanon as a "confederation of sects rather than a nation," and, as such, the confessional system is the most democratic form for political participation. Others consider Lebanon's political obsession with its sects a historical fabrication and a function of traditional sectarian leaders' manipulation of identity in order to hold onto their respective power bases.[13] This latter perspective is supported by the magnitude of intrasectarian fighting throughout the war: more Lebanese were killed as a result of intrasectarian rivalry than of intersectarian violence. In addition, as Corm argued, the consociational view of Lebanon ignores the tremendous differences within each community: "What do we mean when we use the term Maronite establishment, which speaks of a monolith of unified opinion within a sect, and tells nothing of intrasectarian dissent?"

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[12] As Faris stressed, because of Lebanon's internal political divisions many Lebanese factions made foreign alliances in order to further their domestic agendas. And because of regional and international polarization, these factions found willing foreign sponsors.

[13] Participants agreed that manipulation of identity by sectarian leaders became particularly acute during the war: "Is it not true that the confessional and religious establishment backed the militias early in the 1970s as a means to increase their own power base?" Most participants concurred that many of the militias enjoyed a certain amount of popular support at the beginning of the war because they were seen either as agents of change (for those unhappy with the system) or defenders of the status quo. But, as the militias established violent hegemonic control over the political and social life of Lebanon, their popular support dissipated. As'ad Abukhalil pointed out, however, that in the south, almost every Shi'ite identifies with either the Amal or Hizballah militias. He stressed that the domestic reasons for the appeal of these group identifications should not be ignored.

Participants agreed that whatever the "true" reality of Lebanese society, Lebanon's rigid political organization contained the seeds of instability that contributed to the outbreak of hostilities and the protraction of the conflict, namely, its sectarian quotas, its inability to allow for peaceful change within the system,[14] and its tendency to promote identification with the sect rather than with the state. These factors, along with regional inequalities inside the country and a weak government, left Lebanon wide open to factional exploitation by outside powers, and dragged it into the centre of various regional conflicts. The high level of internal dissatisfaction, in combination with historical links between Lebanon's communal groups and outside powers, caused many of the sectarian and political groupings to look for foreign sponsors to assist them in their struggle with domestic groups. The result was a proliferation of sub-state foreign policies that embroiled outside powers in Lebanon's domestic turmoil, and entangled Lebanon in wider regional conflicts.

Regional Strains

Participants agreed that the weaknesses of Lebanon's internal political structures made the country extremely vulnerable to external influences. The Palestinians' impact on Lebanon has been particularly acute because of the many refugees resident in the country (currently estimated at four hundred thousand). As one participant remarked: "Lebanon, one of the smallest Arab countries, received the largest number of Palestinian refugees. This great influx would have created difficulties for any state, but was especially problematic for Lebanon because of its sectarian-based political system."[15]

Ziad Hafez noted that the 1975 crisis was preceded by the 1974 regional crisis that resulted in Arab recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. At this time, PLO headquarters were in

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[14] In 1975, some of the factions saw war as the only way to change an "unfair" political system that could not accommodate change from within.

[15] The majority of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are Sunni Muslim and, as such, would have upset the "balance" of the Lebanese political system had they been granted citizenship status.

Beirut and, by the eve of 1975, the large and increasingly militant Palestinian presence in Lebanon became a central issue dividing the Lebanese. Palestinian latitude of action in Lebanon played directly into the debate of 1943: Lebanon's identity and role in the region and the extent of its regional obligations. By the 1970s, however, this previously ideological debate assumed very real consequences as the PLO developed a "state-within-a-state" in Lebanon and Lebanese territory became an arena for Israeli "retaliatory" raids.

Conservative Christian elements -- most notably those groups in the Lebanese Front -- considered Palestinian actions as a threat to Lebanon's security and sovereignty. Other Lebanese -- in particular those groups of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) -- aligned themselves with Palestinian organizations. The domestic debate polarized and, as the regional situation turned increasingly volatile, every *fedayeen* action from and Israeli reprisal onto Lebanese territory became confessionally exploited.

While not denying the domestic problems that contributed to the war, many participants pointed out that external actors also played a major detrimental role right from the start.[16]

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[16] For example, one participant said that Sulieman Frangieh was advised by conservative Arab states to create and finance Lebanese militias to fight the Palestinians: because the Palestinians were considered to be the embodiment of Arab nationalism, no Arab government could declare support for Lebanese government actions against the Palestinians. But they could support the idea of Lebanese groups fighting the Palestinians (because the struggle would be cast in popular terms).

II ATTEMPTS AT CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Since 1975, there have been numerous initiatives aimed at settling the conflict. These proposals have been launched by a multitude of internal actors as well as external "mediators" or "sponsors," including Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United States, France, and the Holy See. The latest initiative was signed in October 1989 in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, and, following an initial increase in hostilities, has been somewhat successful in allowing for the restabilization of large parts of Lebanon.

Participants analyzed the reasons for failure of some of the principal attempts to resolve the conflict prior to Ta'if, including the National Dialogue Committee (1976), the Frangieh Constitutional Document (1976), the Arab League summits at Riyadh and Cairo (1976), President Elias Sarkis' Fourteen Points for National Reconciliation (1980), the Israeli-sponsored May 17th Agreement (1983), the Geneva and Lausanne conferences (1983 and 1984), and the Damascus Tripartite Agreement (1985).

Many of these proposals and "reconciliation meetings" attempted to deal with the underlying issues that had sparked the fighting, as well as with the complications that occurred as the violence continued. These issues and complications included Lebanon's regional identity and obligations; sovereignty and security; domestic political and socioeconomic reform; the regulation of relations with powerful regional actors (especially Syria and Israel); and the disbandment of the militias. Some of the settlement attempts tried to encompass most of these questions, but others focussed only on certain issues to the exclusion of the rest. The internal issue of "security versus reform" became enmeshed with that of Lebanon's regional obligations. And as the number of internal Lebanese actors increased so did the number of external "patrons." The wars in Lebanon were being fought not only over local issues, but also because of regional power struggles as Lebanon became an arena for proxy warfare. Furthermore, as Lebanon's militia-imposed "war system" consolidated, Lebanese powerbrokers developed a vested interest in prolonging the conflict. Violence perpetrated by the militias emphasized the need for reform, but also heightened sectarian consciousness. This contributed to the polarization of Lebanese society, once again hindering efforts to resolve the conflict.

Faris summarized the discussion by noting that in terms of Lebanon's internal problems, there have been three general approaches to conflict resolution. One approach favours preservation of the status quo (i.e., law and order), whereas a second course views deconfessionalization of the system as a prerequisite to law and order. A third approach, which recognizes that security and reform are inseparably linked, accepts limited reform within the context of the sectarian system, but looks to redefine power sharing among Christians and Muslims.

Major Settlement Attempts Before Ta'if

1975 -- 1976

This period saw two major settlement attempts: the National Dialogue Committee and the Frangieh Constitutional Document. The National Dialogue Committee, formed at the initiative of Syria following an extremely destructive round of fighting in 1975-76, was composed of some prominent figures in the Lebanese establishment and political arenas, as well as militia leaders and a few professionals. The committee faced the problem of having no clearly defined agenda and members who held completely different expectations. According to Faris, veteran Maronite politicians (Camille Chamoun, Pierre Gemayel, and Raymond Eddé) demanded that the committee restore law and order and postpone any real discussion of reforms, all the while denying that a change was required in Lebanon's constitutional arrangements. Kamal Joumblatt, who represented the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), a broad coalition of Muslim and Christian Lebanese, called for the complete deconfessionalization of the political system, and was convinced that conflict settlement depended on prior internal reform.

The "Maronite" group believed that any negotiations with the LNM to alter the political system would not be in its favour unless it was able to end the armed presence of the PLO in Lebanon. Members of the LNM, on the other hand, wanted to exact concessions from the Maronite politicians on long-standing demands for reform. It was suggested that the LNM contingent underestimated the fears of the "Christian" block about security. Faris argued that the success of the committee was dependent on the prior ability to resolve fundamental questions of identity, secularization, and the distribution of power. The committee, dubbed the "dialogue of the deaf" by one participant, ultimately failed because its members were unable to agree on a minimum platform for change.

Participants discussed a long-standing problem that the committee highlighted -- the lack of representative leadership. For example, one participant stressed that the "Christian" politicians were more representative of the status quo elite than of "Lebanese Christians." Abukhalil noted a similar problem with the designated Shi'ite representatives, who were severely out of touch with the needs and realities of their own constituency. A further obstacle to dialogue was the tremendous rivalry within the two main adversarial blocks.[17] In addition, committee members were being asked to solve a crisis that to a large extent they themselves had created. Many committee members (Kamal Joumblatt, Pierre Gemayel, and Camille Chamoun, for instance) were leaders of armed groups that had chosen to settle their disagreements by violence rather than trying to resolve them peacefully. Finally, a major divisive factor, and one that mirrored the views of Lebanese society, concerned the status of the Palestinian community and Palestinian armed groups.

The Frangieh Constitutional Document promoted limited reform of the sectarian system. It came about as a result of military offensives in January 1976 that pitted Maronite militias and the army against a militia alliance of the LNM, Palestinians, and Syrian irregulars (the Palestine Liberation Army [PLA] and Sa'iqa, both loyal to Syria). Maronite leaders, terrified by this open alliance between the LNM and the PLO and concerned about the possibility of alienating Syria, decided to concede to some of the LNM's demands for reform. In return they demanded guarantees from Syria that the

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[17] According to a former member of the LNM: "The Movement doomed itself because it never sorted out its internal problems ... it never sorted out whether it was truly secular or not. For example, they advocated a 'balanced' army -- but if this balance was to be among sects, then they were sectarian."

PLO would respect the terms of the 1969 Cairo Agreement. With the knowledge of Muslim and Christian leaders, Lebanese President Sulieman Frangieh and Syrian Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam worked out a seventeen-point programme, which was presented to the country on 14 February 1976. The plan was a compromise platform that sought to define a new partnership between Muslims and Christians by readjusting the sectarian system of political representation.

The document called for, among other changes, the affirmation of the present sectarian distribution of political posts, an equal distribution of parliamentary seats between Muslims and Christians, the abolition of the distribution of government posts on a confessional basis, and the decentralization of the civil service. As Faris stated: "It was rejected by Kamal Joumblatt, who sought the total secularization of the political system ... [and later] by Bashir Gemayel who wanted to secure a position of unchallenged hegemony for the Maronite community." Although the document never became law, Faris argued that it set the direction for a future compromise agreement. It is notable, however, that the document addressed neither the external dimensions of the conflict nor the role of the Palestinians in Lebanon.

1976 -- 1982

There were two principal attempts to mediate the conflict during the period 1976 to 1982: the Arab League summits (at Riyadh and Cairo in 1976) and President Sarkis' Fourteen Points for National Reconciliation (1980).

Although the Arab League's mediating role began fairly early in the war, it did not gain momentum until Syria, Egypt, and the PLO seemingly reconciled their differences concerning PLO latitude in Lebanon. Syrian presence at the Riyadh and Cairo summits reflected the tacit recognition by Egypt and the Arab League of Syria's predominant role in Lebanon. The decisions approved at the summits included an Arab guarantee of Lebanon's sovereignty, unity, and independence; the creation of an Arab Deterrent Force

(ADF), which was to assist the Lebanese government in reasserting its national authority; a guarantee of the Cairo Accord and a recognition of the Palestinians' right to armed struggle; the formation of a Committee of Four charged with the responsibility of assisting President Sarkis to implement the withdrawal of armed personnel from Lebanon; and the return of public institutions to government authority.

The implementation of the proposals was halted by a serious deterioration in Lebanon's situation, namely, assassinations and ambushes as well as an increased polarization of political attitudes between the LNM and the Lebanese Forces. A proliferation of both internal and external actors further confused the situation. The Arab League failed to guarantee Lebanon's sovereignty, as Israel and its Lebanese allies committed acts of aggression in the south, and the PLO fought with the Lebanese Army and the ADF. Hafez argued that the increase in domestic violence in 1977 was directly linked to regional elements, namely the Camp David peace process between Egypt and Israel. Camp David ended the regional rapprochement between Syria and Egypt, greatly exacerbating tensions inside Lebanon. In addition, the regional conflict between Syria and Israel added to Lebanon's problems.

Following the 1978 invasion, Israel began its long occupation of South Lebanon and the cabinet of Prime Minister Salim el-Hoss resigned. The summits' proposals concentrated on the external rather than the internal dimensions of Lebanon's problems. The Higher Committee of the Arab League held additional meetings to discuss internal and regional security dimensions of the war, but was unable to facilitate implementation of the resolutions reached at the Riyadh and Cairo summits.

In 1980, President Sarkis issued the Fourteen Points for National Reconciliation, a platform that was to complement the Arab League's effort by fostering domestic reconciliation. Among other measures, the plan called for the reestablishment of Lebanese sovereignty, an equilibrated system of power-sharing, close cooperation with Syria, support for the Palestinian cause, and the implementation of UN Resolution 425.[18] For a variety of reasons, largely the continued polarization of players on the left and the right, this programme failed to move the situation closer to a settlement. The Fourteen Points neglected to specify mechanisms that would advance the reforms they advocated. Nafhat Nasr argued that qualified support from Syria and the PLO, as well as Israeli obstruction in South Lebanon added to the stalemate.

Unlike many participants who found both domestic and external reasons for the breakdown of peace settlements, Hafez believed that the failure of all the peace plans proposed between 1976 and 1982 could be traced exclusively to events in the Middle East. He considered these proposals simply knee-jerk reactions to external events rather than serious plans. Most participants agreed that this period represented the consolidation of the war system in Lebanon.

1982 -- 1989 (Pre-Ta'if)

The Israeli invasion in June 1982 and the massacres at the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila in August of that year marked a fundamental turning point. After 1982, the Israeli presence on the ground and the growing power of the militias created tremendous upheaval inside Lebanon. Amal Shamma' described the change at street level: "Before 1982, the dialogue was political and about the political system -- the debate was between those who wanted to change the political system and those who wanted to protect the status quo. But after 1982, the dialogue was less about the protection or reform of the system, and more about the protection of various sects. Instead of representing political platforms, leaders were now representing sectarian groups. The secular tone of reformist discussions was replaced with factional/militia concerns." This period also witnessed an acceleration in the use of Lebanon as a battlefield for foreign powers, the interests of those powers being reflected in the reform proposals.

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[18] Resolution 425 called for the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon and the deployment of a UN force in the south.

The May 17th Agreement was signed between the Lebanese and Israeli governments in 1983 under the auspices of the US government. Abukhalil explained that it was intended to insulate Lebanon from the Arab-Israeli conflict, that is, from the Palestinian question and the state-to-state dimension of the conflict. It called for commitments to Israel that would supersede all other commitments to Lebanon's Arab neighbours, and in particular to the Joint Defence Pact of the Arab League. Other articles of the agreement banned armed Palestinian organizations, nullified previous accords between the Lebanese government and the PLO, and prohibited all "hostile" propaganda.

This agreement did not end hostilities in Lebanon. By September 1983, intensive fighting between the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and the Lebanese Forces broke out in the Shouf. The fighting spilled over into Beirut, and American and MNF positions came under fire. The US Navy retaliated, shelling Souq el Gharb. In October, barracks of the US and MNF contingents were bombed.

The Geneva talks of November 1983 were to focus on Lebanese internal reconciliation, but centred exclusively on the need to nullify the May 17th Agreement. Gemayel was clearly trying to accommodate all viewpoints at the meeting in order to prolong the American military presence. Faced with a Shi'ite/Druze rebellion in February 1984 against his rule in West Beirut, and evidence that the Americans were going to leave anyway, Gemayel finally succumbed to pressure to cancel the agreement in March 1984.

Participants contended that the abrogation of the May 17th Agreement reflected, in part, the reassertion of Syrian authority by 1984. In addition, the agreement was totally unacceptable to a considerable number of Lebanese because it embodied the desires of Israel, completely alienating Lebanon from its Arab context.

In fact, it served to mobilize the Shi'ites and to crystallize support for the rising Hizballah movement. Some participants noted it was obvious that not even Israel was interested in adhering to the agreement -- an Israeli letter dated the same day as the agreement attached conditions that Lebanon found impossible to fulfil, such as the withdrawal of Syrian troops and the restitution of the bodies of Israeli soldiers killed in Syria.[19]

The second set of reconciliation meetings, the Lausanne talks, focussed on reforms, and in particular on the question of identity and the "Arabness" of Lebanon: the nature of its heritage, its place in the region, and the character of its political orientation with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the importance of liberating South Lebanon from Israeli occupation. The talks resulted in the formation of a government of National Unity, which incorporated such militia leaders as Nabih Berri and Walid Joumblatt.

As in all such dialogue, however, there was a gap between rhetoric and practice. The Muslim and left-wing leaders, for example, preached deconfessionalization, but really wanted to turn the system to their advantage. They engaged in "sectarian killings" and the creation of sectarian enclaves. In practice, these "secular" groups were as sectarian as the Christians. The Phalange saw no contradiction between its professed respect for the Arab nature of Lebanon and its maintenance of a military and political relationship with Israel. With the withdrawal of American forces, the Lausanne conference reflected the military ascendency of Syria, and the growing strength of the Shi'ite community. Gemayel's government however, maintained ties to the SLA and Israel. Notwithstanding the professed concern for the situation in South Lebanon, both the Druze and the Shi'ites emerged empty-handed from the negotiations.

In February 1985, Christian Lebanese Forces clashed with the Druze PSP, and with Palestinian and Shi'ite militias in Sidon. Later in 1985, tensions between Amal and the PSP erupted into prolonged and intermittent fighting, and regional tensions between Yasser Arafat and Syria resulted in the "War of the Camps." The Amal-PSP fighting finally ended with the intervention of Syria and the signing of the Damascus Tripartite

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[19] Khatchig Babikian, "La crise libanaise de 1982 à 1989," prepared for CIIPS workshop.

Agreement in December 1985 by leaders of three Lebanese militias: Walid Joumblatt of the PSP, Nabih Berri of Amal, and Elie Hobeiqa of the Lebanese Forces. The key regional element of the accord referred to the "strategic complementarity of Syria and Lebanon," which was intolerable to the Israelis and threatening to certain Lebanese communities. The key proposals for internal reform called for a more equitable distribution of political power and rapid deconfessionalization, proposals that proved too radical for certain armed components of the Lebanese Christian community. The accord was annulled two weeks later when Samir Geagea ousted Hobeiqa as leader of the Lebanese Forces.

It was noted that the Tripartite Agreement demonstrated the inconsistency of the warring factions. On the one hand, the Maronite establishment believed that the sovereignty of Lebanon was protected in the May 17th Agreement, but violated in the Tripartite Agreement. Yet Muslim and leftist leaders, who traditionally opposed allowing an outside power to assume any control of Lebanon, were clearly giving the upper hand to Syria by endorsing the Tripartite Agreement. In fact, both agreements gave the advantage to outside powers. Regional powers played a direct role in pressuring the Lebanese to come up with agreements, and to a great extent formulated the content of the accords.

Obstacles to Conflict Settlement: Summary Observations

An examination of the attempts at conflict resolution between 1975 and 1989 yields a number of general observations about the failure of the various plans.

1. The international arena was not promising. The Cold War was at its height, particularly after 1982, when the United States and Soviet Union were vying for superpower dominance over the Middle East. Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 further contributed to the difficulties in resolving the conflict. Workshop participants recommended that in future agreements, the United Nations should play a larger role.

2. Regional tensions -- both inter-Arab and Arab-Israeli -- inhibited the resolution of Lebanon's problems. Plans tended to oscillate between two extremes and to reflect the power of the ascendant actor outside Lebanon. This was particularly evident in the period 1982 to 1989. The May 17th Agreement represented the Israeli option while the Tripartite Agreement was evidence of the Syrian option. Corm stressed that the arbitrator of an agreement should be separate from the parties to the agreement. He noted that in the past, actors have been both party to and judges of an agreement.

3. Issam Naaman noted that the various reform plans always had to perform a double function: to change the sectarian system and to end the war. "Unfortunately, the requirements of stopping the war have always been the pacesetter for internal reform."

4. As the conflict continued, the number of actors grew, making agreement on a common denominator very difficult.

5. While violence dramatically increased the need for reform, it also heightened sectarian consciousness, which negatively affected both the ability to implement reforms and peace plans.

6. Actors who were involved in implementing settlements generally favoured either security provisions or political reforms - but not both. This contributed to the failure of the agreements since the two are integrally linked. Workshop participants acknowledged that agreements favouring political reform, such as secularization, could minimize regional influences.

7. Peace settlements were generally piecemeal rather than comprehensive, a characteristic that contributed to their downfall.

8. The question of Lebanon's identity within the region remained a confused issue. The real question is how to define Lebanon's identity as an Arab state as well as its role and obligations as an Arab state. This is even more compelling in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, because of the lack of inter-Arab unity.

The Ta'if Accord: Lebanon's Second Republic

Overview

The Ta'if Accord was adopted by Lebanese deputies in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, 22 October 1989, at the urging of the Arab League. It must be viewed in light of two events: Lebanon's constitutional vacuum and General Michel Aoun's "War of Liberation."

When the mandate of President Amine Gemayel ended on 22 September 1988, the Assembly failed to elect a new president, a reflection of the power struggle between the Lebanese Forces and Syria. The country reached a fever pitch as its people argued over the election of a president (that is, whether the president has the right to appoint his successor or whether he must convene Parliament for presidential elections). This polarization led to the existence of two governments: one appointed by President Gemayel and led by General Aoun, Commander-in-Chief of the Army; the other led by Salim el-Hoss, the successor to Prime Minister Rashid Karamé.[20]

General Aoun vowed to recover the sovereignty of the state, angering the militias (who were his first victims). Fierce fighting broke out between Aoun and Geagea of the Lebanese Forces in February 1989. In March 1989, Aoun launched a "War of Liberation" against the Syrian forces in Lebanon, leading to devastating levels of violence, possible mainly because of his diplomatic and military alliance with Iraq, Syria's sworn enemy. Because he focussed on the presence of outside forces, Aoun also succeeded in drawing attention to Israel's occupation of South Lebanon. The internationalization of the problem and the growing violence prompted the Arab League to intervene.[21] Naaman contended that Arab alarm over the role of Iraq was critical in creating the external push for Ta'if: "The agreement can be seen as an act of deterrence performed by the moderate Arab states, with Syria's concurrence, aimed at checking Iraq's increasing influence." Expressing concern, one participant noted that the Arab League Committee felt compelled to suspend its activities temporarily, reasoning that Syria's conception of Lebanese sovereignty was inconsistent with Lebanese independence.

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[20] Karamé was assassinated in August 1987.

In August 1990, after being pressured by various means (including the assassination of an MP) into going to Saudi Arabia, the Lebanese Parliament officially adopted Ta'if's constitutional amendments, and the long process of implementation of the accord's provisions began. First steps were taken to implement the provision calling for the disbandment of the militias. In October 1990, Syrian and Lebanese Army units[22] defeated General Aoun, who took refuge in the French embassy in Beirut. In December, a new government of National Reconciliation (which included most militia leaders or their representatives among its thirty ministers), was formed under Prime Minister Omar Karamé.

The Implementation of Ta'if

What has allowed the Ta'if Accord to be implemented as far as it has been, given the failure of past settlement attempts? Many conditions which hindered efforts at earlier agreements had been removed by the time the Lebanese deputies met in Ta'if. Naaman observed that the most important condition had little to do with Lebanon per se: "Only when regional and international powers reconciled their differences did the Ta'if agreement come into being. Its conventional content could easily have been approved at the start of the war had not external interventions spoiled the political process." Some participants noted, however, that the accord deals with several issues other settlement attempts neglected to address.

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[21] The May 1989 Casablanca Summit established a Tripartite Arab Committee, composed of the chiefs of state of Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Algeria, whose task was to create a comprehensive solution to the Lebanese conflict. After establishing a ceasefire, the committee called upon the Lebanese members of Parliament, who worked together in September 1989 to finalize the draft agreement developed by the Committee. According to Clovis Maksoud, the Arab League deliberately chose to deny political power to the militia leaders by appointing representatives whose hands had not been bloodied by the war. Upon official adoption of this agreement -- the Document of National Understanding Lebanon -- in October 1989, the UN Security Council voiced unanimous support.

[22] Those Lebanese Army units faithful to the government of President Hrawi.

The international arena was much more amenable to a solution in 1989 than it had been during the 1970s and 1980s. The Cold War had finally ended, and with it the USSR's collapse as a superpower. It was no longer able to supply guns and money to Syria, a country that during the Gulf War was even befriended by its long-time enemy, the United States. Maila argued that Syria's push for the implementation of the Ta'if Accord began after the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The United States, the dominant power throughout the Middle East as a result of its role in the Gulf War, became more forceful in seeking a solution to problems in the region. It also decided that it was of primary importance to reduce the volatility of Lebanon.

Regional circumstances favoured a general acquiesence to Syria's predominant role in Lebanon. Domestic conditions were also favourable: the Lebanese were exhausted from the war, and severe intrasectarian fighting among Geagea's militia and Aoun's army units led to their eventual collapse as an opposition force.

The Ta'if Accord is a compromise agreement, and it is vague enough to allow people with different visions at least to stand on the same platform. It also provides a balance between security and reform provisions, making it easier to reach agreement.

Ta'if's Provisions

Ta'if focusses on both internal and external dimensions of the current situation. The accord, or Document of National Understanding in Lebanon, incorporates reform proposals from a number of previous agreements.

- Domestic Reforms -- Joseph Maila noted that Ta'if's political provisions are in fact little more than an extension of the 1943 National Pact along with some new institutional arrangements. The key domestic provisions include a rebalancing of the number of Christian and Muslim members in the National Assembly by allowing for a one-time appointment of deputies; a reduction in the powers of the president; the eventual abolition of sectarianism with an immediate end to communal distinctions in the civil service (except for high-level positions); and balanced economic development, including regional development. As Maila pointed out, the political reforms strengthen the legislative branch to the detriment of the executive branch. Other reforms are planned in the areas of electoral legislation, administrative decentralization, the courts and special jurisdictions, education, and information.

- Security and Sovereignty -- The second part of Ta'if deals with security and sovereignty, the termination of the war, and the disbandment and disarmament of the militias. One year after the adoption of constitutional reforms, the Lebanese government was to have disbanded all militias and strengthened the armed forces in order to extend the sovereignty of the Lebanese government over its entire territory. The accord provides for the Syrians to assist the Lebanese government in reestablishing its authority, and for Syrian troops to withdraw to the Bekaa Valley in 1992, after which their presence in Lebanon is to be renegotiated.

- External Relations -- The third and fourth sections of the accord concern Lebanon's relations in the region. They clearly reject Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory by advocating the implementation of UN Resolution 425. The accord also recognizes a "special relationship" between Syria and Lebanon through the links of "family, history, and common fraternal interests." Syria will undertake to avoid any action which might threaten Lebanon, while Lebanon agrees not to allow its territory to be used to threaten either its own security or that of Syria. The document concludes that Lebanon and Syria should sign bilateral agreements in "all areas." This provision was implemented in 1991, when Lebanon signed a bilateral treaty with Syria -- the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination.

The Syrian-Lebanese Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination

The defeat of General Aoun, the formation of a new government, and the reassertion of control of Lebanese territory were all helpful in paving the way for the Treaty of Brotherhood Cooperation and Coordination. It was signed in Damascus, 21 May 1991, by the presidents of Syria and Lebanon. Its purpose was to put into effect the "privileged relations" already in existence between the two countries as recognized in the Ta'if Accord. Maila suggested that the treaty is a framework intended to structure relations for Lebanon and Syria in broad terms, and at the same time, to outline methods for cooperation in certain specific areas.

The preamble emphasizes the fraternity and identity of interests of Syria and Lebanon. According to Maila, the Syrian leadership views "fraternal ties" as identical to strategic ties. The treaty also calls for "the broadest possible cooperation and coordination" in all areas, and further states that Lebanese-Syrian cooperation will protect the national security of both countries.

The first section of the treaty calls for general cooperation, specifically emphasizing the fields of "politics, the economy, security, culture, and scientific cooperation." Economic cooperation, the second section, encompasses the sectors of industry, agriculture, commerce, transportation, communications, and customs, and includes plans for joint projects and the "coordination of plans for development." The third section repeats the relevant parts of the Ta'if Accord on the undertakings of both Syria and Lebanon with respect to each other's security. Section four provides for the redeployment of Syrian troops in Lebanon but fails to mention any withdrawal. Lebanese and Syrian foreign policy, enunciated in section five, is to be guided by three basic principles: the Arab character of the two countries and their membership in the United Nations, Arab League, and the non-aligned movement; the "common interests and common destiny which the two countries share"; and mutual support for each other's national security and interests. The treaty states that both nations will coordinate their Arab and international policies to "the fullest extent possible." Finally, the treaty provides for the creation of several institutions such as the Supreme Council, a Follow-up and Coordination Committee, a General Secretariat, and three commissions to coordinate foreign policy, economic and social affairs, and defence and security.

Ta'if and the Treaty of Brotherhood: An Interim Assessment

Although Ta'if managed to forestall the constitutional crisis by enabling the election of two presidents, it also provoked an intensification of the Lebanese political crisis. General Aoun was not alone in his objection to Ta'if: both Berri and Joumblatt expressed dissatisfaction, although they did support it as a stopgap, a general framework that could later be improved. Participants pointed out that although Ta'if was designed to promote internal peace, it initially resulted in further internal fighting. Salim Nasr concurred, adding that from January to September 1990, some two thousand deaths resulted from the violence. Following the fall of General Aoun and the relatively successful campaign to disarm the militias however, it appears that the implementation of Ta'if has eliminated the serious possibility that Lebanon would be divided into militia cantons.

There was a general consensus that the Lebanese MPs who approved the accord did not truly represent the Lebanese people since they had held their positions since 1972. Many participants questioned the value of an agreement made by those not fully able to represent the people. However, Clovis Maksoud explained that although the representativeness of the MPs might be in question, their legitimacy, which derives from Parliament's continuity and its international recognition as a state institution, was not. The goal of Ta'if was to restore the state, and unlike the militia leaders, the MPs had maintained their allegiance to the state even when it was completely marginalized. It was also noted that the militia leaders had denied political power to the MPs by using the gun, and that they in turn should be denied power. el-Solh remarked, however, that the MPs were not insulated from the war system: "The process began with the assassination of an MP. The remaining MPs understood this message, and it affected the outcome of the agreement." In fact, most militia leaders were later appointed to the Government of National Reconciliation, much to the dismay of many workshop participants. Worse, the entire process of "appointing" deputies to fill the vacant seats was seen as highly undemocratic.

While no one thought Ta'if would resolve Lebanon's problems, some hoped it would at least solve the most recent crisis and might be a stepping stone to conflict resolution. The majority of participants viewed the accord positively from an economic angle, but expressed reservations about many of its political implications.

Some participants viewed Ta'if as a compromise document, and said that it should be regarded as the founding of the Second Republic: Ta'if is not the end solution, but only the road to Lebanon's Third Republic. One participant noted that the implementation of the accord testifies to an increased awareness on the part of Lebanese politicians that an ideal solution was impossible as long as war raged. His optimism stemmed from the belief that the accord could be the basis of a new solidarity among the Lebanese, as well as a rallying point for the international community. Other participants rejected Ta'if primarily because it fails to address adequately most questions of reform, and ignores other important issues including development, health care, the environment, and the strengthening of the democratic system.

Maila and Corm were critical of the Ta'if Accord for several reasons. They both condemned its failure to guarantee the withdrawal of Israeli forces. Although Maila conceded that Ta'if resolved the constitutional crisis, in no way did it solve the political crisis. Many leaders accepted it but did not agree with it. Corm also deplored the lack of essential reforms: there are no provisions for the election of the president by the people, nor guidelines for the redistribution of wealth through tax reform.

Some viewed the accord's political provisions as a simple renewal of the National Pact "compromise" of 1943. Ta'if came close to mirroring the National Pact even on the question of confessionalism, although the accord is more specific in providing for eventual deconfessionalization. Ta'if also provides for the establishment of a Higher Council to oversee the dissolution of the sectarian system -- a council that has not yet been created. One participant saw this not as a deficiency in the accord but in those who were responsible for executing its provisions. There was general pessimism about the ability to eventually eliminate sectarianism.

One participant noted that despite political reforms, the power of the Maronite president will remain formidable because of the weakness of the party system. This weakness is tied to Lebanon's awkward electoral law: unlike Parliaments of modern democracies, the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies consists of a shaky, loose grouping of competing members divided along parochial issues.

Most participants were pleased with reforms that reduced the number of electoral districts from twenty-six (Caza) districts to five (Mohafazat). As Rizk detailed, the Caza districts created under the 1953 electoral legislation had been generally uniconfessional, tending to reinforce sectarian politics. Michael Hudson noted, however, that the large Mohafazat districts may have the disadvantage of reinforcing the power of the feudal landowners. He, along with Joseph Moghaizel, proposed that a single-district proportional representative system replace the current electoral system.

As noted above, Ta'if has been partially successful in allowing the Lebanese government, backed by the newly reconstituted Lebanese Army[23] and Syrian forces, to reassert its authority in large parts of the country. Beirut is free of militias for the first time since the war began, and some of the militias throughout the country have been disarmed: Amal, the PSP, the Lebanese Forces, and PLO groups loyal to Syria laid down their weapons in April 1991. Pro-Arafat Fatah troops initially refused to accept these terms, but were routed by the Lebanese army in July 1991 near Sidon, with heavy casualties. Three other groups have refused to disarm, namely, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, the SLA, and Hizballah.

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[23] The army was reorganized to include officers and soldiers from all groups and confessions.

With their country freed from the yoke of the warlords, many Lebanese expressed guarded optimism about the future, although they remained pessimistic about Lebanon's ability to withstand regional and domestic pressures and to develop sufficient internal cohesion to uphold the peace. Feeling that the hegemony of the militias has merely been replaced by that of Syria, some participants, in particular those who attended the public sessions of the conference, were highly critical of Tai'f and the treaty, suggesting that the new partnership with Syria compromises Lebanon's sovereignty. They expressed concern over how the Lebanese government could assert its authority over the entire territory or organize free elections. Others, fearing a complete loss of Lebanese sovereignty, remarked that as long as the sectarian system is in place, Lebanon will be incapable of defending itself against foreign intrusion. Still others believed that this alliance was the only option for Lebanon at the time and that the Lebanese must simply learn to work within these limitations for now. Several participants, whether for or against the agreements, recognized that they were necessary products of the reality on the ground, merely codifying relations that already existed between Syria and Lebanon. As one noted: "The treaty may even serve to contain, regulate, or normalize relations with Syria."

Other participants raised the possibility that Syria, having secured a strategic position in most of Lebanon, might loosen its tight embrace. Most, however, expressed concern about the treaty's impact on Lebanon's sovereignty and independence, particularly in light of the Syrian armed presence. As one participant observed: "So long as Lebanon is still divided into a sectarian, composite structure, Syria can still play a dominating role." Another participant reminded his colleagues that Syria had committed itself to an eventual redeployment of troops to the Bekaa Valley, a hopeful sign that Lebanon would eventually achieve a stable and lasting security.[24]

One participant pressed for the implementation of every single provision in Ta'if, arguing that to bypass less desirable provisions might lead the various parties to suspend other worthy clauses. As el-Hoss noted: "Whether you like it or not, all the provisions must be implemented. If they are not, there will be a time when the Lebanese ask the Syrians to withdraw to the Bekaa and the Syrians will say, 'Why? There are many other items in the agreement that have not been implemented. Why are these being ignored, and yet you want to implement the provision for Syrian withdrawal?' " Some participants recommended, therefore, that all elements of the accord be implemented, with required changes made through constitutional amendments.

A number of participants argued that the terms laid out in both these agreements are open to interpretation. The important factor, then, becomes how the terms are to be implemented, which depends not only on Syrian intentions, but also on the regional environment and Lebanese domestic cohesion. In November 1991, Corm noted pessimistically that there had been no progress on the implementation of Ta'if's provisions in the last few months. In particular, he cited a reinforcement of the sectarian system, petty feuding in the collective "troika" leadership[25], the lack of progress towards democracy..."free and fair" elections, the lack of involvement of the Arab Tripartite Committee in Lebanese affairs, and the relative absence of international aid, despite the promise by the international community of the creation of a $2 billion fund for the reconstruction of Lebanon.

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[24] Maila expressed reservations about the implementation of this provision, noting Ta'if's statement that Syrian forces will be redeployed "after the adoption of constitutional reforms." Since the reforms have already taken place and there has been no redeployment of Syrian troops, he speculated that redeployment has been postponed indefinitely.

[25] President, prime minister, and speaker of the National Assembly.

One important omission in both Ta'if and the treaty concerns the status of the Palestinians in Lebanon: no provisions or policy directions are indicated.

Participants basically concurred that final judgment of Ta'if and the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination must await full implementation, but, in the meantime, there are a number of issues that will require close monitoring.

- **Syria's sincerity in dealing with Lebanon as a unified state** -- As one participant stated: "If, for example, the traditional Lebanese allies of Syria commit abuses, will Syria act to restrain them?" Responding to this question, one participant noted that Syria had been actively restraining its allies in Greater Beirut. Others stressed that the Lebanese must ensure the continuation of this process: "The treaty...should assist the reemergence of the state and all its agencies including the Lebanese Police, Army, and Security Forces."

- **The effect of the treaty on Lebanon's traditional freedoms of expression such as political freedoms and freedom of the press** -- One participant pointed out that freedom of expression had been severely curtailed during the war because of the domination of the militias and the cantonization of the country. He hoped that the situation would now improve with the disbandment of the militias and the reintegration of the country. Participants stressed that freedom of expression will depend in part on the Lebanese themselves: "It is up to the Lebanese to try to exercise this freedom of expression, and then to wait and see the results." Abukhalil rejected this scenario, remarking that Syria has "muzzled public opinion in Lebanon. Never during the past sixteen years has Lebanon been controlled as tightly as it is today. For this reason, one has to be very careful when analyzing the current public opinion of the Lebanese." Youssef Takla observed that although in practice freedom had been compromised by the militias, freedoms were and are written in law.[26] It was noted, however, that the 1 September 1991 Pact of Defense and Security between Syria and Lebanon has a provision that "bans any activity or organization in all military, security, political, and **information** fields that might endanger and cause threats to the other country." Corm stated that Lebanese newspapers display a considerable amount of self-imposed censorship.

- **Will Lebanon be able to move closer to a truly democratic process?** -- Participants wondered whether Lebanon would move beyond the traditional political system, which, most agreed, did not embody a truly democratic process, and in what way the treaty would affect this issue. As el-Hoss stated: "Although we had plenty of freedoms in Lebanon, we did not have a real democracy in pragmatic terms.... Democracy means equal opportunity, but there can be no equal opportunity under a sectarian-based political system.... Also, there was no accountability within the leadership -- the same leaders presided throughout various crises in Lebanon, no matter what happened.... One cannot imagine a true democracy permitting the kind of national crisis that Lebanon has endured, because something would have happened within the democratic process to change things: a referendum would have been held, or the cabinet would have been changed, or Parliament would have been dissolved." One participant found it highly ironic that the undemocratic ("even anti-democratic") Syrian government had been given the task of "constructing democracy in Lebanon."

- **Will Ta'if and the treaty help to insulate Lebanon from the impact of external events and conflicts?** -- Maila raised concerns about the regional ramifications of the treaty, since it calls for a judicial association of Lebanon's foreign policy with that of Syria. As a result, Israel may consider the treaty a threat, using it as a pretext to continue its occupation of South Lebanon, and maybe even as a

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[26] Moghaizel noted that there are also laws which require prior authorization by the authorities for publication of any new newspapers or for other forms of publication (communiqués, bulletins etc.), and that these are applied in a "draconian" manner.

casus belli. In addition, Syrian antipathy toward other Arab states may mean renewed turmoil within Lebanon. Yet as el-Hoss remarked: "A funny thing happened in Lebanon as a consequence of the Gulf War -- nothing." Lebanon had usually experienced adverse repercussions from regional events, whether the latter were positive or negative. In this case, many credited Ta'if with helping to insulate Lebanon from regional events. The recent escalation of Israeli incursions, however, is certainly cause for alarm.

- **Lebanon's ability to be an equal partner in these treaties** -- Participants were disturbed that, although the Arab Tripartite Committee had played a key role in the Ta'if process, it had more or less disappeared from the scene, leaving Syria in sole control. For example, Maila noted Ta'if's provision that the Tripartite Committee could assist in the Syrian-Lebanese negotiations over the status of Syrian troops in Lebanon has been dropped in the treaty.

III LEBANON IN REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

The Regional Environment

Lebanon's vulnerability to regional influences has contributed substantially to the complexity and intractability of the war. Participants discussed Lebanon's past and present relations with the three most prominent regional players -- the Palestinians, Israel, and Syria -- who have vied for ascendancy inside Lebanon at different times.[27] The Ta'if Accord, which has facilitated a relative restabilization in large parts of Lebanon, acquiesces to Syrian predominance for the time being. Participants concurred that the recent Gulf War, the largest Western military operation in Middle Eastern history, seriously altered and divided the region. Most agreed that the sheer magnitude of the Gulf crisis will continue to effect substantial changes in the region, changes that will not be fully evident for a number of years.

The Palestinians

Overview -- Palestinian activism in Lebanon has fluctuated over time. Before 1967, it was expressed through the various Lebanese pan-Arab movements. After the 1967 regional war, and the 1969 Cairo Accord, the Palestinians began to develop a "state-within-a-state," a situation accelerated when the PLO moved its infrastructure to Beirut following its expulsion from Jordan during the 1970 "Black September" incident, and the failure of the Lebanese government to protect Palestinian refugee camps from Israeli raids.

In becoming the political centre of the Palestinian people, Lebanon reaped economic benefits, but suffered both political and social disruptions. Internally, Palestinian activism prompted clashes with the Lebanese Army; their movement became the political

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[27] Iran also wields considerable influence in Lebanon, but the Iranian government has pledged to withdraw its ten to fifteen hundred Revolutionary Guards stationed in the Bekaa Valley. Iran's current desire to improve relations with the West may moderate its tendency to interfere in Lebanon's affairs. The release of American hostages is perhaps indicative of this new approach.

(and later military) ally of Lebanese "opposition" groupings. Externally, Palestinian resistance directed at Israel prompted Israeli "retaliation" raids that caused great disruption to both the Palestinian and Lebanese populations residing in south Lebanon. With the 1982 onslaught that resulted in massive destruction in West Beirut and Israeli occupation of large parts of Lebanon, the PLO evacuated its headquarters and fighters from the country. Events in the mid-1980s, however, lead to a renewed Palestinian military presence. Hostilities between large sections of the Palestinian movement and Syria resulted in Palestinian rapprochement with former Lebanese foes and battles with former Lebanese allies.[28]

By the end of the 1980s, most Lebanese perceived the Palestinians as relatively neutral, and they even served as mediators between Lebanese intrasectarian combatants.[29] Although implementation of the Ta'if Accord has resulted in the dismantling of most of the Palestinian military presence in Lebanon, the large resident population remains.

Role and Objectives -- The Palestinian presence in Lebanon has been marked by varying degrees of political and military activism, as well as by shifting alliances with Lebanese substate groupings. In addition, it figured significantly in Lebanon's bloody entanglement in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Rex Brynen pointed out the difficulty of characterizing a Palestinian position towards Palestinian-Lebanese relations because of the movement's factionalization and the frequent shifts in policy and alliances. Nonetheless, he identified three core Palestinian concerns: armed struggle against Israel; security of the Palestinian population in Lebanon; and preservation or promotion of political influence.

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[28] Mainstream Palestinian factions became allied with various Christian militias, including the Lebanese Forces, because they all were hostile to Syria. At the same time, Palestinians found their camps under a brutal seige, the "War of the Camps," by the Syrian-backed Shi'ite Amal militia, once their ally.

[29] In 1989, the Palestinians helped to mediate during the fighting between Geagea's militia and General Aoun's army units, as well as during the intra-Shi'ite fighting between the Amal and Hizballah militias.

- Armed struggle against Israel -- Historically, a central concern has been the right of the Palestinians to pursue armed struggle against Israel from Lebanese territory. Lebanon became an important base after the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan in 1970-71 and the closure of Syria's Golan Heights to guerrilla activity. With the PLO's gradual acceptance of more limited territorial objectives (that is, the West Bank and Gaza) and a corresponding shift from military to political-diplomatic methods, the right to armed struggle decreased in significance for the mainstream PLO groups.

- Security of the Palestinian population in Lebanon -- Another concern is the security of the Palestinian infrastructure and population in Lebanon. Internally, the Palestinian population has faced threats from certain Lebanese actors who were often acting in concert with foreign powers. Externally, they have faced constant danger from Israeli attacks -- air-raids, artillery and naval bombings, commando raids and ground assaults -- and from covert activities by the SLA. Syria also threatened the PLO and Palestinian community from time to time, for example, during the Syrian intervention in 1976, the "War of the Camps" from 1985 to 1987 and most recently in 1988, when Syria backed the Fatah rebels in Beirut. These threats caused the PLO to believe that a sufficient armed presence in Lebanon was essential. A non-military "security" issue high on the Palestinian agenda is the question of their civil rights in Lebanon, for example, the problem of labour discrimination.[30]

- Preservation/promotion of political influence -- This objective is seen as a means of safeguarding the Palestinian community from both external and internal threats. Brynen acknowledged that in some cases this interest "has been sustained by a desire to reshape Lebanese politics, either by promoting revolutionary change...or by advancing the foreign policy agenda of an Arab sponsor." PLO influence in Lebanon grew considerably during the 1970s, when it became a particularly popular (and useful) ally of the LNM. Its military and diplomatic influence suffered a serious blow, however, following the Israeli invasion of 1982 and the subsequent Fatah rebellion of 1983, which resulted in the eviction of mainstream Fatah forces from the Bekaa Valley and Tripoli.

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[30] Rosemary Sayigh detailed some of the pressing socioeconomic problems confronting Palestinians in Lebanon, including displacement and homelessness, employment restrictions, unemployment, decline in living standards, and inadequate educational and health services.

Perspective -- According to Brynen, Palestinian activities in Lebanon have presented major challenges to both Lebanese sovereignty and security. Calls for the reassertion of Lebanese sovereignty over the Palestinian community and armed presence have frequently come from the "Maronite right," and later from the Shi'ite Amal militia. During the 1950s and 1960s, certain Maronite politicians were hostile to the pan-Arab orientation of the Palestinian community, a hostility augmented by the emergence of the Palestinian nationalist movement in the late 1960s, which was perceived as a new threat. Increasing levels of Palestinian "resistance" against Israel resulted in Israeli counterattacks inside Lebanon, the most devastating of which occurred in 1978 and 1982.

To Lebanese opposition groups, the PLO was a useful political ally, but by the 1980s the close ties began to fade. This was due to two factors: the human and economic cost imposed on the Lebanese as a result of Israeli retaliation against Palestinian military and political activities in Lebanon; and Lebanese resentment of the Palestinians' growing power in Lebanon. By 1985, the Palestinian refugee camps were under siege by their former Lebanese allies -- the Amal militia -- who were backed by Syria during the "War of the Camps."

Although most parties officially support the liberation of Palestine through armed struggle, they do not currently advocate it. Brynen argued that the majority of Lebanese political actors agree in a broad sense on the need to reduce PLO involvement and influence within Lebanon and to reassert some degree of state authority over the Palestinian presence. Concrete action was taken when the Lebanese Army was deployed to parts of South Lebanon and, after heavy fighting, the PLO signed a peace accord with the government on 4 July 1991. This accord confirms PLO agreement to dismantle its power base in Sidon and ship its heavy arms abroad.

Despite the reduction of the Palestinian armed presence, some four hundred thousand Palestinians remain, most of whom probably would not or could not move to a Palestinian state, if and when one is created. There were varying views expressed on the potential of a Palestinian state to absorb all Palestinians not currently living in the Occupied Territories. As Don Peretz stated: "Even the most optimistic estimates [which assume generous international assistance] place the economic absorptive capacity of a Palestinian state at one million additional Palestinians ... meaning that hundreds of thousands of Palestinians would remain outside the state, probably in Lebanon."[31] Sayigh raised an additional problem: "The likelihood that Palestinians from Lebanon will be able to resettle in an eventual state in the West Bank are minimal. One of the main obstacles will be that the Israelis will likely insist on strict limits -- perhaps zero immigration -- as part of the deal." She added that most of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon do not originate from the West Bank or Gaza, but rather come from the Galilee and coastal regions.[32] Even with the creation of a Palestinian state, therefore, a very large number of Palestinians will remain in Lebanon.

Both Sayigh and Charif noted that one of the problems of South Lebanon is related to the three hundred thousand Palestinians who live there -- at least half this number in camps. As Sayigh explained, they are considered "aliens" with no legal entitlement to work. Another participant commented: "These [Palestinians] are potential bombs. Their plight needs to be urgently addressed by the Lebanese government. The government can no longer avoid this situation by saying, 'It's not our problem.' It is a problem, and one that is faced every day by the residents in the south."[33]

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[31] Kubursi, drawing on his work for the UN, said that with a $600-million-a-year investment, the West Bank and Gaza could sustain 2.5 million Palestinians.

[32] One participant suggested that these Palestinians would rather remain in Lebanon than resettle in the territories occupied in 1967.

Most participants agreed that the Palestinians deserve the right to a decent life and that both short and long-term socioeconomic strategies must be developed. The ramifications of the continued Palestinian presence in Lebanon are legion, since their political integration would affect the balance of power within the country, and their economic integration could well be detrimental to native Lebanese. Nevertheless, this problem must be addressed before it becomes a source of renewed strife. Furthermore, the PLO leadership should begin to think beyond the creation of a Palestinian state, and to formulate a plan of action to deal with all Palestinians. While such a view may run counter to the current Palestinian bargaining position, it is a pragmatic necessity.

On an optimistic note, Corm pointed out Lebanon's accrual of substantial economic benefits from the Palestinian presence prior to 1982:[34] "If there is peace -- if there is a Palestinian state -- there will be the capacity in the region for the Palestinians to prosper. The percentage of population to square kilometres in the Middle East is still far lower than that of Southeast Asia. If there were a better distribution of wealth in the region and less spending on armaments, there would not be a major economic problem."

One participant suggested sharing some of the money currently directed towards maintaining the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza with other Palestinian communities. Another commented that the international community bears responsibility for the plight of the Palestinians in Lebanon, and should be called upon to help.

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[33] A number of participants were disturbed at what they perceived as a strong hatred of Palestinians by some Lebanese. Others described it more as a political hatred that would eventually dissipate with a normalized political situation. For example, the percentage of Shi'ite recruits in the ranks of the Palestinian resistance before 1982 was greater than the number of Palestinians: "The enmity between these two communities is very recent and, currently, a more relaxed relationship between Shi'ites and Palestinians is returning."

[34] Prior to 1982, the Palestinian economy in Lebanon was estimated at 15 percent of Lebanon's gross domestic product (GDP). Some participants contended that the post-1982 dismemberment of the Palestinian economy in Lebanon contributed substantially to Lebanon's economic crisis in the 1980s.

The Palestinian situation in Lebanon (as well as the question of peace in Lebanon and the region) is intimately linked with the resolution of the Palestinian problem as a whole. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was suggested as a possible "peace-making" model. This kind of framework would recognize the interrelatedness of all dimensions of the conflict and the need to deal with them on a linked basis. In addition it would avoid trying to address all aspects of the problem simultaneously -- economic, humanitarian, and security -- while avoiding the incrementalist approach of which many Arabs are suspicious.

Israel

Overview -- Israeli intervention in Lebanon has taken many forms, from the financial and military backing of various Lebanese subgroups[35] to military bombardment and occupation. Israel's military interventions have been linked to its desire to control and deter Palestinian activism, its regional hostility with Syria and its desire to influence developments in Lebanon.

In 1968, Israel attacked the Beirut airport in "retaliation" for a Palestinian attack in Athens, an action that demonstrated Israel's intent to counter Palestinian operations world-wide through aggressive retaliation in Lebanon.

By the 1970s, Israeli incursions into Lebanon caused significant casualties and displacements, both Palestinian and Lebanese, in South Lebanon. In 1978, the first large-scale invasion to destroy Palestinian commando bases resulted in Israeli occupation of the south up to the Litani River. International pressure forced Israel to withdraw, but it maintained an active presence in a self-declared "security zone" along the border.[36]

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[35] In addition to creating the SLA, Israel has provided support to various Lebanese militias including the Phalange, the Tigers, and most recently Geagea's Lebanese Forces in its confrontation with General Aoun (1989 90).

[36] This zone was placed under the command of an Israeli-controlled proxy militia, which later became the SLA.

Following this invasion, the United Nations Security Council adopted two resolutions: Resolution 425 and Resolution 426, which defined the role of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

In 1982, Israel initiated a devastating invasion, "Peace for Galilee," which went all the way to Beirut in an attempt to eradicate the PLO's military and political infrastructure in Lebanon. Although this invasion pulled Syria into the fray, Israel's overwhelming military might resulted in the evacuation of PLO forces from Beirut and a (short-lived) treaty between the newly elected Lebanese government of Amine Gemayel and Israel. A number of factors, including the intensity of Lebanese resistance to the Israeli presence, caused Israel to withdraw in stages between 1982 and 1985. Israel refused to relinquish its presence along the Lebanese border, however, expanding and consolidating its "security zone," and placing it under the control of the SLA.

To date, Israel has shown no willingness to comply with Resolution 425, although this issue is to be the focus of Israeli-Lebanese bilateral talks during the post-Gulf War peace process. In the interim, the Hizballah militia (as well as some Palestinian elements) continues resistance attacks in the zone. Likewise, Israel continues to "retaliate" against targets in Lebanon. Attacks and raids in the south increased dramatically in the winter of 1992, following the Israeli assassination of the Hizballah leader, Sayyid 'Abbas al-Musawi.

Role and Objectives -- Participants discussed four main reasons for Israel's involvement in Lebanon: designs on territory and resources; border security; regional strategy; and ideology.

- Designs on territory and resources -- Peretz cited a number of occurrences that suggest Israeli designs on Lebanese water resources. In 1919, the Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann appealed to the Supreme Allied Council at the Paris Peace Conference to include the Litani River and its headwaters within Palestine, arguing that without the Litani, Palestine could not be economically independent, whereas the river "was of little use to the well-watered Lebanon."[37] When the tripartite[38] attack was being planned against Egypt in 1956, an Israeli representative suggested that Israel's border be extended to the Litani. During the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, one of the first things the Israelis did was to seize the plans for one of the two water networks in the south. Currently, there are those within the Israeli political leadership who still promote Israeli designs on the Litani.

Israel needs additional water resources because of the centrality of water to its economy and because its water use exceeds its internal capacity by a significant margin. This need is bound to increase, especially in light of the great influx of Soviet Jews into the country and the substantial increase in the salinity of Israel's current water resources. Participants noted that the Litani is particularly attractive since its waters are low in salinity. One participant drew attention to the publication of an article by the Israeli Ministry of Water in May 1991 outlining the water crisis in Israel, and suggesting that the resources of the occupied territories are vital to the security of the Israeli water supply.

Nonetheless, there does not yet appear to be tangible evidence of large-scale water extraction from the Litani. Engineering for water pipes has been undertaken and some ditches have been dug, but no pipes actually laid. Reports of Israeli trucking of water across the border have been confirmed, but the amount of water has been minimal. One participant suggested, however, that the implementation of large-scale plans for water diversion could be accomplished in a relatively short time. In addition, the longer Israel remains in the south, the greater will be the temptation to exploit its resources. Noting the shortage of concrete evidence about Israeli practices in South Lebanon, one participant suggested that the Lebanese government commission a full-scale investigative report to present to the United Nations: "What has been reported to the UN has been rather piecemeal to date, and it is difficult for the international community to focus on this problem without more adequate facts."

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[37] Don Peretz, "Israeli Foreign Policy Objectives in Lebanon," CIIPS Workshop Paper, 1991, citing Frederic C. Hof, *Galilee Divided: The Israel-Lebanon Frontier*, 1916-1948 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1984): 11-13.

[38] The tripartite allies were Israel, France and Britain.

Other participants noted a general acceptance (especially in the United States) that Lebanon will be forced to share its water resources. One participant urged the Lebanese to transcend their paranoia about Israeli designs and to exploit the Israeli interest in the Litani economically and politically: "Use it as a bargaining chip." Most participants, however, argued that the Litani, an entirely Lebanese river, has no excess water to yield to Israel, especially if South Lebanon and the Western Bekaa are to be developed. Moreover, "the Lebanese fear that Israel, because of its own strategic development requirements, will lay claims to Lebanese water irrespective of Lebanon's needs."

In addition to resource requirements, several participants observed that Israel's occupation of Lebanon seemed to fit within the scheme of "Greater Israel" advocated by certain sectors within the Israeli political landscape. Peretz concurred that this is a possibility, but cautioned against sweeping generalizations that ignore the great diversity of opinion within Israel. Norton contended that it is probably incorrect to conceive of Israeli policy in the south as based on well-defined, long-term plans: "Much of Israeli policy in South Lebanon has been incremental and much of it has been a mistake." It is unlikely that Israel would attempt to annex South Lebanon: "There are major deterrents to such ambitions ... one is the experience of the 1982 war, which demonstrated the exceedingly high cost of such ventures, in terms of manpower, Israeli public opinion, and Israel's international standing." In addition, Israel knows that the United States will not support another Israeli venture into Lebanon. Some participants were highly skeptical of this perspective, noting the increasing number of Israeli raids into Lebanon.

- Border security -- A primary Israeli security objective has been to prevent incursions across its northern border by Arab nationalist and later Palestinian guerrilla factions based in South Lebanon. After the 1967 war, this issue became particularly pressing. Israeli strategy became one of "retaliatory" and "preemptive" strikes at Palestinian and Lebanese targets in Lebanon.

  In 1976, when Palestinian *fedayeen* temporarily moved north to fight around Beirut, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin initiated a "pacification" programme for South Lebanon, the "Good Fence" policy. This programme included humanitarian relief for Lebanese residents of southern villages (which called for employing "safe" Lebanese in Israel), expulsion of all non-Lebanese military forces, and the establishment of a pro-Israeli south Lebanese militia under the command of Sa'd Haddad to help keep out the *fedayeen*. Armed, clothed, fed, and trained by the Israelis, the militia's function was to alert Israel to the presence of hostile elements.

  Israel contends that its continued occupation of South Lebanon is essential to its own border security, hence its refusal to comply with Resolution 425. According to el-Hoss, however, Israel has subverted several attempts by Lebanese troops to secure the area.

- Regional strategy -- Israeli policy towards Lebanon also involves Israel's regional strategic relationship with Syria. The two regional rivals carved out zones of influence in Lebanon: Israel in the south and Syria in the north and east. The 1976 "Red Line" understanding between Israel and Syria (brokered by the United States) was concluded at the time of Syria's military entry into Lebanon, and was an attempt by the two countries to avoid direct confrontation in Lebanon (although in 1982 Israel engaged Syrian forces on Lebanese soil).

  In the early 1980s, Israel's policy towards Lebanon was only a small part of Prime Minister Menachem Begin's design for a military and diplomatic role in the region, which also involved relations with Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians. This design included the annexation of the Golan Heights in 1981, further integration of the West Bank and Gaza, the elimination of the PLO as a military and political factor, and promotion of the "Jordan is Palestine" solution to the Palestinian problem.

In Lebanon, Israeli Defence Minister Ariel Sharon's plan was to advance on Beirut, completely destroy PLO operations, force Syria out, and place Bashir Gemayel, the leader of the Lebanese Front, in charge of the government".[39] Although the 1982 invasion proved disastrous for the Israeli government, Sharon persisted in pursuing part of his original plan through an Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty that was concluded on 17 May 1983, but aborted shortly thereafter. Broadly speaking, the operation entailed "converting Lebanon into a quasi-satellite under Israeli military control." In this regard, Israel's regional strategy failed largely because of the combined resistance of both Lebanese players and Syria.

- Ideology -- Some participants suggested certain ideological reasons for Israeli involvement in Lebanon. This argument posits that the Israelis viewed the different communal groupings of the Middle East as discrete and cohesive "nations," some of which could be cultivated as useful allies (thereby weakening the opposition of pan-Arab nationalists to the Jewish state). For example, Israel attempted to align itself with leaders inside the Christian Maronite community, seeing this community as a natural ally against Arab nationalism.[40] Participants agreed that this ideological perspective was indicative of Israeli stereotyping of

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[39] This plan was based on the premises "that a large-scale operation in southern Lebanon was unavoidable, that Israel could afford to act only once on a large scale, that the problem in the south could not be solved without solving the wider Lebanese crisis, that a solution to that crisis was possible, and that it could be the key to a significant change in the politics of the whole region" (Peretz, 1991, citing Itimar Rabinovitch, *The War for Lebanon, 1970-1983*, Ithaca & London, Cornell University Press, 1984, pages 132-33.

[40] Israel's "Good Fence" (see page 44) policy principally targeted Christian enclaves in the south.

Lebanese society: "Somehow [the Israelis thought that] as soon as they entered Lebanon, all Maronites and Christians would rally to their support, as would the Shi'ites....To the Israelis' surprise, after a short lull, the Shi'ites became their major opponents and the Maronites divided with many completely opposing collusion with Israel." It was not until after the experience of 1982 that the Israelis realized their knowledge of Lebanon was insufficient and outdated.

Perspective -- Some participants considered it unlikely that Israel would do anything more than continue to "play Lebanon as it is" (that is, to "play all sides against each other") and that Syria's undisputed influence in Lebanon may push Israel to attempt to destabilize the fragile peace that is emerging in most of the country: "Israel now perceives Lebanon through the optic of a Syrian security threat, a perspective that could lead to Israeli insistence on remaining in the south until Syria leaves Lebanon."[41]

Because the Israeli occupation of the south is considered one of the main obstacles to consolidating the peace in Lebanon, participants discussed at length the prospects for Israeli withdrawal (in accordance with Resolution 425). Norton argued that it would be highly unlikely for Israel to withdraw, because of three Israeli perceptions: the Lebanese Army is Syrian dominated (see discussion of regional strategy, above); the security zone works; and UNIFIL is completely ineffective and cannot guarantee the protection of Israel's northern border.

The Security Zone -- Norton observed that the security zone's success has convinced Israeli security managers that the violence directed against Israel from Lebanon can be contained: "The attacks on the zone by the Lebanese resistance prove the value of the zone. Also, the declining attacks in the zone prove its success.... To the extent that Israeli policy in the zone is perceived as a success in Israeli security circles, this judgment probably is shared in spades in Washington.... The United States government has committed itself to the principle of the implementation of Resolution 425 and the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty, but pragmatically the sense is that Israeli policy is working and there is very little prospect for changing that situation in the near or mid-term."

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[41] Israel responded to the signing of the Syrian-Lebanese Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination by increased military pressure on South Lebanon; Israeli incursions continued and escalated even as the Madrid peace process was in motion.

Norton also pointed out that maintenance of the zone is not so painful for Israel because its proxy, the SLA, absorbs most of the "damage" from resistance attacks: "The Israelis have learned from their past experience in Lebanon.... They have significantly decreased the exposure of the Israeli soldiers and they have significantly improved the quality of the SLA.... It is a situation where the SLA soldiers have traded their lives for Israeli security." Israel managed to effect this arrangement because of a web of financial incentives offered to SLA members. As a result, Israeli soldiers are rarely the victims of attacks in the zone. In fact, according to Norton, the general Israeli public no longer even thinks of Israel as occupying Lebanon: "From the standpoint of the Israeli public, Israel left Lebanon in 1985. What remains is a kind of technical detail." It is unlikely, therefore, that there will be much mobilization of Israeli public pressure to relinquish the zone.

On a brighter note, Norton described the zone as a somewhat permeable area, with Lebanese travelling back and forth. Except for the principal leaders of the SLA, militia members would probably be capable of reintegration into a normal life in the south should the zone be dismantled. Somewhat less optimistically, Charif noted the integration of the zone with the Israeli economy and system.[42] He argued that if Israel were to withdraw, many of these activities would need to be reconsidered.

Resolution 425 -- James Jonah stated that one of the aims of Resolution 425 was to isolate Israel's occupation of the south from the larger Arab-Israeli conflict: South Lebanon should not be held hostage to settlement of the regional conflict. The Lebanese government has been pushing for the implementation of the resolution, a particularly relevant stance given the stated reasons for the Gulf War and the rejuvenation of the United Nations. Jonah noted, however, that despite the issue of "double standards," the United Nations was not in a position to force Israeli compliance. In addition, insisting on compliance at this time may compromise the delicate spirit of the Madrid process.

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[42] This "integration" includes Lebanese residents crossing into Israel to work, connections of various services to Israeli systems (including electricity, water, and telephone), building roads into Israel, and blocking roads that link the security zone to other parts of Lebanon.

Participants realistically acknowledged, however, that implementation of 425 will be held hostage to the Israeli-Syrian dialogue. Norton pointed out that the Syrian-Lebanese treaty has only complicated the intractability of the Israeli position: "An informed Israeli source told me that the treaty will probably result in an increase of active Israeli presence in Lebanon rather than a decline."

One participant stressed that the Israelis have set their own standards for ensuring the security of their northern border, namely, a strong central Lebanese government that is not subject to Syrian hegemony and a guarantee that the Lebanese army is stronger than any other militia in the country, including the Palestinians. And it is the Israelis themselves who will decide whether these conditions have been met.

el-Hoss emphasized the international community's responsibility for implementing 425: "The non-implementation of 425 is a failure of international legitimacy and the UN system. It is also a failure of big-power politics. [Resolution] 425 was passed by the Security Council thirteen years ago but was never implemented.... Implementation does not depend on Lebanon. Rather, Lebanon has a large claim over the United States and the United Nations in this regard, especially following the recent events in the Gulf."

Ghassan Tuéni advocated the urgent need for Lebanon to develop a strong and credible army: "The Lebanese may not be able to secure the area with sufficient credibility to deter both 'friends' and 'foes' alike from impinging upon Lebanese sovereignty." Jonah agreed, but added that Resolution 425 calls for UN assistance in taking control of the area.

UNIFIL -- Jonah described the continued presence of UNIFIL as a demonstration, at least symbolically, of the United Nations' commitment to the preservation of Lebanon's sovereignty: "In 1978, the UN thought that UNIFIL would only remain in Lebanon for one year. Since then, there have been many pressures to withdraw UNIFIL, but the Secretary General has worked very hard to maintain this presence -- not because UNIFIL will solve Lebanon's problems, but because its removal would create a terrible, destabilizing vacuum."

Because Israel defends its refusal to relinquish the security zone by invoking concerns about border security, participants discussed possibilities for the reinvigoration and expansion of UNIFIL. Some participants saw the United Nations' renewed profile as a possible impetus for reconsidering UNIFIL as one of several parallel tracks to be pursued in a comprehensive peace plan for the region.

Although agreeing that UNIFIL should be revived and renovated, Norton was somewhat pessimistic: "Historically, decisions have been made that have had the cumulative effect of rendering UNIFIL a much less effective force than it might have been. For example, there are forces deployed in UNIFIL acting on national instructions that they are not, under any circumstances, to fire their weapons. This is a certain impediment when one is on a security mission.... Basically, what can be done with UNIFIL is only at the margins."

Norton suggested that one such "marginal" but highly relevant change would be to move all UNIFIL activities to Lebanon: "This move should be demanded by the Lebanese government. Currently, most of its administrative and logistical activities are housed in northern Israel, not in southern Lebanon. This exposes UNIFIL to all kinds of pressures, not to mention espionage." A second approach would be to renew the demand of a previous proposal calling for partial Israeli withdrawal in return for a suspension of attacks against Israel and the security zone. This proposal could target areas with the fewest number of problems and the least resistance activity (for example, the western sector of the south).

Noting that Washington is unlikely to pursue actively the question of reviving UNIFIL, one participant proposed that the contributing forces take the lead:

> Agitation by the contributing countries to UNIFIL could be effective. At one time there was a proposal for contributing countries to meet to develop ways in which their mandate could be expanded or better implemented. Security Council members other than the United States could be persuaded to take a more active interest in the implementation of 425, which could create a momentum that would be welcomed in Washington.

In order to engage the international community's interest, however, the Lebanese government must be able to demonstrate that it is seriously addressing some of the problems in the south, including the involvement of Palestinian residents in the society, economy, and juridical system of Lebanon.

After Madrid? -- In light of the current peace initiative, Tuéni cautioned that the Lebanese as well as the Arab states should be aware of the change in Israel's regional strategy. Israel considers its future security more in terms of economic development than in terms of territory: "Israel is preparing for regional peace, but a peace of economic and technological domination. When they look to the twenty-first century, they see scientists. Arab governments are not prepared for peace; their societies have been geared to war. When peace comes, these regimes will face coups d'états." Salem also raised the threat of Israel's future economic dominance in the region: "If all the barriers are brought down, Lebanon may lose its advantage in services and products that it currently enjoys in the Gulf and other parts of the Arab world."

Syria

Overview - Since Lebanon's independence, Syrian-Lebanese relations have oscillated between a close, even suffocating embrace to outright hostility. As Mahmud Faksh outlined, Syria's involvement in Lebanon has been both direct (military intervention) and indirect (diplomatic influence).

In 1976, Lebanese Christian militias invited Syrian intervention to help them in their struggle with the LNM and the PLO. Syria retained its presence throughout the Greater Beirut area from 1976 to 1978, when confrontation with its former Lebanese allies caused it to withdraw. Syria remained in West Beirut until the Israeli invasion of 1982, returning in 1987, and re-entered East Beirut in 1990 after the defeat of General Aoun. Throughout the conflict, Syria has pursued shifting strategic alliances with numerous Lebanese substate groups.[43]

Syria has also exercised considerable influence during a number of the attempts to settle the conflict in Lebanon. For example, its urging of the Lebanese to accept a constitutional reform document (1976); its backing of the Lausanne Conference (1984); its sponsorship of the Tripartite Agreement (1985); its support for the Ta'if Accord (1989); and its current efforts to support the Lebanese government in the implementation of the accord's provisions. The latest developments in official bilateral relations are the Syrian-Lebanese Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination, signed in May 1991, and the Joint Defence Pact, signed in September 1991.

Role and Objectives -- Participants discussed three principal "explanations" for Syria's role in Lebanon: "expansionist" designs; geopolitical strategy and regional stability; and "raison du régime."

- Syrian "expansionist" designs -- According to this view, Syria has a strong desire to annex Lebanon, based on the historical ties linking the two countries. This argument is often invoked by right-wing Christian parties, partly because it fits in with the traditional view of the leaders of the Maronite "establishment." According to Abukhalil: "[They] ... refuse the idea that there was a genuine domestic opposition movement in Lebanon, arguing instead that the conflict was all part of an external plot." Participants agreed that these anti-Syrian groupings seem to forget that they extended the initial invitation for Syrian intervention in Lebanon. As Najib Saliba noted:

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[43] For example, in the late 1970s and 1980s, Syria supported the Palestinian rejectionist front; in 1983-84 it supported the PSP and the Amal militia against Amine Gemayel; from 1985-87 it backed Amal in the besiegement of the Palestinian camps; in 1988-89 it backed the PSP against Aoun's forces; and in 1989-90 Syria supported the Lebanese government in its campaign to oust Aoun from East Beirut.

> Syria did not rush into Lebanon, but rather tried to reconcile the Lebanese first by drafting the 15 February 1976 document for reconciliation. This peace proposal, however, was rejected by both the Lebanese right and left. The Syrians then sent in the Palestine Liberation Army, which is under Syrian command but is not a Syrian Army. When the PLA failed to stop the fighting, Syrian forces finally entered Lebanon on 1 June 1976. Also, we must remember that Syria was invited into Lebanon more than once. Were these invitations because of Syrian designs or because various Lebanese factions desired an external power to assist them with their internal power struggles? And if it were not for the Syrians today, the Lebanese would still be fighting each other.

Although participants agreed on Lebanese responsibility for inviting Syrian troops into Lebanon, most said that this does not excuse the Syrian government from its share of responsibility for the destruction of Lebanon, from the bombardment of camps and residential areas to assassinations of "unfriendly" Lebanese political figures.

- Geopolitical strategy and regional stability -- Proponents of this view think that Syrian policy in Lebanon is driven by Syria's regional and strategic interests, specifically the Arab-Israeli conflict and Syria's political ambitions within the Arab world.

Salem noted that Syria takes its security very seriously, investing immense resources in defence against external aggression and internal sabotage. Lebanon, Syria's "soft underbelly," is a potential security threat: "A political vacuum in Lebanon is menacing to Syria, as is the alignment of internal groups with Israel, Iraq, or any other of Syria's opponents." Damascus will never tolerate a neutral, let alone hostile government in Lebanon.

Participants acknowledged that Syria often intervened in Lebanon to uphold the status quo, that is, to act as the "balancer" in the various power struggles between right and left-wing forces (*la-ghalib wa la-maghloub;* no victor, no vanquished). Some linked this motive to Syria's fear of Israeli interference in Lebanon. For example, Syria intervened in 1976 on behalf of the "Maronite" forces because it suspected Israel would not tolerate a leftist (LNM and PLO) victory in Lebanon. This strategy partly explains Syria's shifting alliances among the many Lebanese players throughout the conflict.

In a discussion on inter-Arab rivalry, Corm pointed out that Syria is not an oil-rich country. When other Arab states became more powerful through oil-wealth, Syria had to find alternative ways to redress the balance. One strategy was to attempt to control the PLO: "Syrian objectives in Lebanon, especially in 1975-76, were not aimed at the control of Lebanon, but at the control of the Palestinian resistance movement in order to increase Syrian regional importance." This participant maintained that the increase in Syria's regional power and influence since the early 1970s has been largely achieved through its intervention in Lebanon.

- "Raison du régime" -- Advocates of this view think Syrian policy is driven by the interests of the undemocratic minority government (President Hafez al-Asad's Alawite-dominated regime). The Syrian government, therefore, would oppose any change in Lebanon which would endanger the power of the ruling elite in Syria.[44]

Participants concurred that Syrian behaviour in Lebanon was often motivated by a combination of the above reasons, some of which have changed over time: "Syrian policy in Lebanon has been very fluid. Furthermore, Asad is not an idealogue, but a tactician; he has demonstrated that he is capable of changing approaches and policies based on his reading of international and regional balances of power."

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[44] **In support of this explanation, one participant noted a speech made by Asad on 23 July 1976 in which he attacked the programme of the LNM because it advocated secularism.**

Whatever Asad's ultimate goals, the Syrians used Lebanese sectarianism to full advantage, doggedly making inroads into every community. Most participants agreed that overall, Lebanese attitudes to Syria have not been constant. It is not uncommon for a Lebanese grouping to have cooperated strategically with Syria at one point, only to engage later in anti-Syrian battles (for example, the Phalange).

Perspective -- Most participants agreed on Syria's historic achievement in Lebanon; after sixteen years of war, the Lebanese have developed a grudging consensus that peace and long-term stability in Lebanon cannot be achieved without Syria. This acknowledgement has filtered through even to those groups which are highly critical of Syria and its interference in Lebanon. As Abukhalil pointed out, even the Phalange and the Lebanese Forces had to acquiesce to Syrian preeminence because of a combination of factors: the Syrian "victory" in the Gulf, the defeat of their potential ally (Iraq), their shared desire to defeat General Aoun, and Israel's reticence to become entangled yet again in Lebanon's domestic affairs.

Syria currently enjoys a certain measure of support in almost every communal grouping in Lebanon. The Maronites are divided: the camp led by President Hrawi and Sulieman Frangieh relies strategically on Syria, but there is a strong pro-Aounist opposition.[45] This latter group rejects Syrian influence but has no viable strategic ally to support its protest. Within the Sunni community, there is a staunchly pro-Syrian wing led by Prime Minister Omar Karamé, although there is also a pro-Saudi current (symbolized by the significant influence of the Lebanese-Saudi businessman Rafiq Hariri) as well as a pro-PLO faction. The Shi'ite pro-Syrian wing is led by Amal's Nabih Berri and the House Speaker Husayn al-Husayni, although the pro-Iranian Hizballah still command a considerable Shi'ite following.[46] The Druze are primarily aligned with Syria, although they maintain important ties with the Druze community in Israel. The Greek Orthodox have a pro-Syrian wing, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, as well as pro-US and pro-French orientations.

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[45] Although Aoun is now exiled to France, he still maintains active links with his supporters.

Participants supported the contention that "good relations with Syria are axiomatic," but these close and responsible relations must be built on the basis of Lebanese strength and sovereignty. There was considerable discussion on whether the current bilateral agreements embodied, or could yield, enhanced Lebanese strength. Lebanon's current official relationship with Syria is "based on particular internal and external conditions that could change and hence render the relationship unstable."

The most important internal condition for Syrian ascendancy in Lebanon was the bloody infighting among traditional Christian right-wing opponents (that is, Aoun and Geagea), permitting Syria to play powerbroker and increasing its influence accordingly. Salem cautioned: "Large sections of the Christian community viewed the Syrian entry as a conquest and are likely to try and shake off the Syrian alliance when the opportunity presents itself." Other participants confirmed that despite initial euphoria about the ceasefire, there is growing discontent with the heavy Syrian presence. As Khalaf observed: "One can see the beginnings of reaction of an occupied people: griping about Syrian checkpoints, about the flow of traffic in one direction [to Damascus], about the dependence of the Lebanese leaders on Syria."

Participants agreed that the Lebanese will eventually rebel if the Syrian government becomes repressive. If relations are handled in a constructive manner however, the Lebanese will want to sustain the alliance.

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[46] Hizballah is not necessarily opposed to Syria, especially because of Syrian support for Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. Hizballah objects strongly, however, to Syrian (Lebanese) participation in the international peace conference.

The external condition that facilitated Syrian ascendancy was its turnabout in policy towards the West. As Hisham Melhem observed, Syria joined the American-led coalition against Iraq for a number of reasons: the changes in East-West relations, the greatly diminished importance of the Soviet Union in the Middle East (formerly Syria's number-one backer and supplier), the fall of dictators in Eastern Europe, the severity of Syria's internal economic situation, and the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war (in which Syria had sided with Iran).[47] Many participants questioned the durability of the American-Syrian partnership: although it appears that Syria is playing by Western rules now, not all were convinced the transformation is permanent.

Participants acknowledged that Lebanon's new closeness with Syria may be challenged -- perhaps violently -- by either internal Lebanese resistance or by changes on the regional and international level.

Finally, there was general agreement that the Lebanese bear particular responsibility for shaping future relations with Syria. Salem argued that, as a first step, the Lebanese must understand Syrian security fears and try to address them: "This is not done ... by merely pledging fealty to Syria; it is done by building a strong Lebanese army in control of its territory and by playing a role that promotes both Lebanese security and Syrian security, not a role hostile to Syria.... [Through] Lebanese strength and sovereignty ... we will build the foundations for a strong and lasting friendship." Related to this first step is the need for a strong government: "Syria does not want a weak Lebanese government. To date we have been grovelling. The Lebanese must be more Lebanese in order to pursue a stable alliance with Syria." Participants agreed that Lebanon's domestic cohesion (and coherent government) is integrally linked to the development and enhancement of participatory democracy, such that inside actors will be less likely to seek external patrons.

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[47] Melhem continued: "Asad knew that Saddam would chase him -- in Lebanon. So he tried to prepare for this by resurrecting the so-called triangular relationship of Damascus-Cairo-Riyadh, and by attempting to improve relations with the United States."

The International Environment After the Gulf War: US policy

The Cold War between the USSR and the United States often served to exacerbate the conflicts in Lebanon, as regional surrogate wars were fought on Lebanese soil. Participants thought that the end of global superpower competition contributed substantially to the successful negotiation of the Ta'if Accord. The Gulf War firmly established the United States as the preeminent power not only in the Gulf region but throughout the Middle East.

Michael Varga outlined the three principles underpinning US policy toward Lebanon: support for Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity; support for the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces; and support for the dissolution of armed militias. The United States views the Ta'if Accord as a good framework for moving toward the achievement of these goals and for building legitimate and credible institutions. While it does not consider Ta'if the final blueprint for Lebanon, it contends that all of the accord's provisions must be fully implemented prior to any amendments. The United States also expects Syria to support the spirit of the accord, and will closely monitor Syrian adherence to the principles of Lebanon's independence and sovereignty. Varga mentioned that the implementation of Resolution 425 will require the security concerns of both Lebanon and Israel to be assured. The United States considers the Iranian-backed Hizballah militia to be a major obstacle in this regard.

At the time of the workshop, American hostages were still captive in Lebanon. Varga stressed the severity of this situation from the US point of view, stating that until the hostages were freed, US aid monies would be affected, there would be "no business as usual," and the travel ban would remain in place. As of 4 December 1991, the last American hostage was released. The degree to which American policy will change remains to be seen.[48]

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[48] One remaining obstacle for the US administration is Lebanon's production of narcotics, now estimated at 32 metric tonnes of opium annually (1 percent of world production) and 100 metric (continued...)

In response to Varga's presentation, Hudson remarked that the current US position on Resolution 425 is somewhat curious, because it considers Israeli incursions against Lebanon to be on par with attacks against Israel and its proxies inside the security zone: "This neglects the whole point of 425 ... that Israel is an occupying force." Other participants pointed out that acts of resistance against an occupying force are permissible under international law.

Participants said that the non-implementation of Resolution 425, when considered in light of the Gulf War, indicates an international "double standard." Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the United Nations applied international law "with the greatest harshness and immediacy" by deploying troops to the Gulf to uphold UN Resolution 678. Israel, on the other hand, has never been "compelled" to obey international law with respect to its occupation of South Lebanon, the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights. It also was alleged that the international community tacitly accepts Israel's "reprisal right" against the civilian Lebanese and Palestinian populations in Lebanon.[49]

International support for the action against Iraq was justified in part by the idea of a "new world order." Although this concept remained fuzzy, optimists thought it meant a reinvigorated role for the United Nations and a new process of international conflict management and resolution based on the principles of international law and order.[50] Theoretically, the United States has the power to implement Resolution 425 by force, but

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[48](...continued)
tonnes of hashish (15 percent of world production). Participants contended that Lebanon's share in the drug trade is part of an international cartel, and is protected by non-Lebanese actors currently allied with the United States. As such, the trade is beyond the control of the Lebanese government. Furthermore, the Lebanese farmers who produce the contraband crops will require an economic alternative if they are to cease production.

[49] Israeli incursions into Lebanon are estimated to have caused some twenty-five thousand deaths, whereas the number of Israeli victims from Palestinian attacks since 1968 does not exceed two hundred.

[50] Faris commented that the way in which events unfolded in the Gulf indicated the "Western agenda" for the Middle East was driven not by concern for Kuwait's territorial integrity, but by more vital interests namely, "the control of oil resources, the destruction of potential Arab military power, and the security of Israel."

this will never happen in practice because there are too many constraints. The alternative avenue for conflict settlement, therefore, is diplomacy.

Hudson suggested that because American hegemony is firmly established, the United States should be in a position to organize, together with Israel and Syria, a regional solution for Lebanon. Participants doubted, however, that the United States would be able to transform its postwar gains into effective conflict-resolving diplomacy because it lacks a comprehensive vision for achieving peace in the Middle East. At the risk of being overly pessimistic, one participant commented: "After the Gulf War, the US administration had an opportunity to construct a grand design for Middle East peace, which was equal in dimension to the level of action in the Gulf. And they failed. Instead, they collapsed into the same kind of incrementalist, step-by-step approach that has condemned American policy in the Middle East for more than a decade."[51] American ambivalence was evident in recent actions: as the Secretary of State arranged a peace conference, the Secretary of Defense negotiated new arms sales.

Participants recognized the vigorous efforts of the US administration to convene an international peace conference on the Middle East. Although most were skeptical about the outcome, at least one participant believed that the regional dimensions of Lebanon's conflict can be settled only by such a conference. The Lebanese-Israeli talks conducted through the Madrid process are to focus on the conditions for Israeli withdrawal and the full implementation of Resolution 425. Salem noted, however, that the peace process initiated in Madrid is one of negotiation and compromise: "Will it be possible to achieve our sovereignty in this way? Is there a flaw in the process?" Tuéni cautioned that Lebanon's interests may be sacrificed to the interests of the regional players and regional peace, although Jonah stated that the United Nations would speak out vigorously if the talks compromised Lebanon's sovereignty in any way. Participants pointed out the dangers of the international conference: if it does not lead to peace, it will probably lead to war. Lebanon would likely become embroiled in a regional war for two reasons: a war between Israel and Syria would clearly involve Lebanon; and failure to achieve peace will encourage extremist elements to challenge regimes throughout the Middle East. The unresolved situation in South Lebanon provides a fertile environment for such extremism to flourish.

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[51] This participant continued: "I don't think that their motives are malevolent. Rather incrementalism is the policy culture of this administration and the previous administration. And the metaphor that captures this is the emphasis on 'ripeness', that diplomacy will not succeed until a situation is sufficiently 'ripe'. What the administration doesn't realize is that ripening is a participatory activity. Instead, many policy makers consider it to be a spectator activity, where one waits for the ripening to occur and then moves."

Finally, Corm observed that a question of particular relevance for Lebanon is whether the United States will push for democracy in the Middle East. Participants noted with dismay the lack of progress on this front in postwar Kuwait. Varga said the United States was hopeful that the Lebanese would soon be able to choose their political leadership through free and fair elections. Participants wondered what action, if any, the United States would take, noting that despite both UN and US endorsement of Ta'if, there has been no follow-up international presence in Lebanon and no planning for internationally supervised elections.

IV WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION: CURRENT CONDITIONS AND FUTURE NEEDS

The Pre-War Lebanese Economy

Prior to the outbreak of civil war in 1975, the Lebanese economy was characterized by financial stability, a strong private sector, and a predominance of service sectors,[52] including banking and finance, tourism and trade. The government pursued policies that attracted foreign capital, encouraged domestic investment, and fostered Beirut as a strong banking and commercial centre. In addition, the government favoured an extremely liberal free-market system and rarely intervened in the economy except to maintain orderly market conditions. Kubursi claimed that the success of the economy was partly due to a young, dynamic population that had invested heavily in education and infrastructure.

The government's "hands off" policy, together with Lebanon's central location, encouraged the development of the country's importance in the region. Lebanon's economic success was furthered by a number of regional factors including the enhanced importance of Beirut Port after the events of 1948;[53] the influx of Arab capital and trained professionals during the 1960s because of Lebanon's relatively more open and stable environment; the demand for Lebanon's services from the oil-rich, but service-poor, Gulf countries;[54] the decision by major multinational and international firms to locate their regional headquarters in Beirut. In addition, Lebanon reaped substantial economic benefits from the Palestinian presence, especially after 1970.

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[52] Kubursi theorized that the domination of the service sector was the result of an "extensive intersection of interest" between Maronite bureaucrats and Sunni trading families. He used the term "confessional economy" to describe this Maronite-Sunni condominium. The idea of a confessional economy explains heavy public-sector involvement in the building of infrastructure such as communications networks, trade routes, ports, airports, and warehouses. It also explains the government's pro-business attitude, which called for minimal government interference, no income or profit taxes, bank secrecy laws, and a free foreign-exchange market. Kubursi also maintained that the exchange rate was overvalued in the interest of the trading families in order to keep imports cheap.

[53] After the establishment of the State of Israel and the consequent Arab embargo, traffic that had normally used Haifa Port rerouted to Beirut.

The War Years: 1975-1990

Lebanon's economic problems were mitigated, at first, by the beginning of a manufacturing boom and by external factors, most notably remittances from Lebanese expatriates.[55] Initially the government was fortunate: it was still in a position to collect custom revenues and to benefit from the thriving Palestinian economy in Lebanon. As the war dragged on, however, remittances began to decline, help from other states dried up, the Palestinian economy was driven away (with PLO relocation to Tunis following the 1982 Israeli invasion), foreign reserves dwindled, and instability encouraged the flight of both capital and human resources.[56] As the "war system" consolidated, the militias effectively appropriated most sources of government revenue, contributing to a mounting deficit and rapid inflation. The gross domestic product (GDP) decreased steadily. Estimates place the destruction of infrastructure at over 50 percent of the country's total productive capacity. The high emigration level of professionals meant that the remaining workforce was less skilled with little opportunity to become skilled. As the government became increasingly paralyzed, public services all but ceased to exist, with the gaps being filled by profit-seeking militias and non-profit humanitarian organizations (local and international). By 1985, Lebanon's economy was devastated.[57]

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[54] The Gulf countries had not yet developed their infrastructure, health, educational, or human resources. Lebanon, with its well-developed literacy rates, as well as entrepreneurial and professional talents, became the Gulf states' service centre for transportation, education, health, banking, contracting, and tourism.

[55] Boutros Labaki estimated that remittances accounted for approximately 12 percent of the gross national product in 1975, increasing to 40 percent by 1980. Participants agreed that, prior to 1983, these injections helped to sustain the Lebanese economically, masking the damage to the economy. Participants also noted that remittances are particularly sensitive to Lebanon's internal political situation and to regional influences. For example, Khatmeh Osseiran-Hanna noted that the Gulf War resulted in the loss of approximately $20 million per month (remittances from some fifty thousand Lebanese working in Iraq and Kuwait).

[56] Estimates suggest that 60 percent of all Lebanese professionals have emigrated since 1975, leading to serious losses in productivity and a plunge in the real incomes of unskilled workers.

Militia Domination and the Parallel Economy

The militias' military domination of Lebanese politics and society during the war yielded great monetary rewards and resulted in the creation of a "parallel economy."[58] Militia coffers were filled initially by looting private properties, the Port of Beirut, and various banks.[59] As their control increased, the militias turned to other sources of income, including rents for properties they "protected,"[60] taxes (estimated at approximately $500 million per year for a total of $7.5 billion over fifteen years), speculation on the Lebanese pound and bank embezzlement (totalling $2 to $3 billion), the drug trade, smuggling, toxic waste, and piracy (all totalling approximately $500 million per year), along with weapons seized from the Lebanese army (approximately $500 to $700 million). In addition to contributing to the enormous personal wealth of militia leaders, these assets were used to pay their fighters, to build a huge civilian infrastructure, to finance media outlets, and to invest extensively inside the Lebanese economy (for example, in banking and industry). The militias also received money and armaments from outside powers, estimated to equal $15 to $20 billion over the fifteen years.

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[57] Corm noted that the chaotic environment of the war encouraged the growth of illicit, but highly profitable (for some) economic activities, such as the drug trade. Estimates in 1988 for income generated through the production of prohibited crops were in the range of $100 million, for an export value of approximately $1 billion. These figures are generally not factored into calculations of Lebanon's domestic income.

[58] This term describes the militia-run economic activities that usurped monies normally accruing to the state.

[59] Corm also pointed out the "agreement" among rival militias concerning both the appropriation and division of these resources. For example, inter-militia shooting was used as a cover while Beirut was looted, with the militias then dividing the spoils among themselves (the LNM and the PLO on one side, the Phalange and the National Liberal Party militias on the other).

[60] Corm estimated that rent monies, combined with assets looted from properties, totalled approximately $5 billion.

Corm estimated that total militia income (including armaments and supplies) from both foreign and domestic sources came to approximately $30 to $40 billion. With control of at least one-third of Lebanon's national income, they could influence state policy considerably.

The economic effect of militia domination has been the impoverishment of both state and people. Indeed, many Lebanese became dependent upon the militias for the provision of basic services such as water, electricity, and telecommunications, as well as social aid and even salaries. The militias in effect became the collecting agencies for most available revenue, thereby taking this money away from the government. In order to compensate, the government was forced to borrow and print money, a situation that led to increasing budget deficits and rising inflation.

The militias also contributed substantially to the forced internal displacement of large numbers of Lebanese from their region of origin to unisectarian enclaves. Kubursi argued that these enclaves served to further fragment an already segmented market system especially following the Israeli occupation. The southern security zone developed into a captive market for Israeli products and a source of cheap labour and fresh water, whereas the Bekaa Valley and the north became more tied to Syria. Similarly, the "Christian enclave" separated even more from the rest of Lebanon, while Palestinian groups dispersed into yet smaller subdivisions. One result was an increase in transaction costs of exchange and production and the compromise of efficient production units.[61]

Economic Indicators

Participants used several indicators to gauge the impact of the war on the financial performance of the Lebanese economy, including the balance of payments, exchange rates, inflation, capital investment, public debt, and the dollarization of the economy. Nasser

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[61] By contrast, one participant argued that Lebanon did not consist of small, independent enclave markets. Instead, economic activity had become more decentralized, which had a positive effect in creating local rural employment.

Saidi estimated losses from the war at approximately $45 billion (this figure includes actual losses plus opportunities forgone).

Samir Makdisi explained that between 1975 and 1982, the overall balance of payments was generally in surplus and movements of the exchange rate were moderate. The rate of inflation, however, was high -- about 18 percent. The government faced a growing public deficit resulting from its inability to collect taxes and its lack of proper control over public expenditure. According to Makdisi, the budgetary deficit rose from 28 percent of total government expenditure in 1978 to 80 percent in 1982. Deficits were primarily financed by borrowing from the Central Bank, thus increasing the money supply, raising inflation, increasing the cost of government operation, and further raising the deficit.

After 1982, the financial performance of the economy took a downward turn. Makdisi argued that the two principal causes were a continued rapid, uncontrolled growth in the government deficit and pessimism about Lebanon's political future because of the war. The public debt actually decreased in 1983 to 65 percent as a percentage of total government expenditure because of an increase in tax receipts. By 1984, however, the deficit rose to 82 percent and in 1988 it stood at 89 to 90 percent. Kubursi noted that interest payments are now larger than government revenues from normal sources. Fear of worsening financial conditions induced the transfer of deposits abroad or their conversion from Lebanese pounds into foreign currency, leading to a depreciation of the Lebanese pound and higher consumer prices. The rate of inflation rose to 18 percent in 1984 and continued to accelerate rapidly: 64 percent in 1985, 104 percent the next year, and 403 percent in 1987. At the same time, the pound depreciated from an average of LL 4.52 per US dollar in 1983 to LL 496.69 in 1989. In November 1990, it stood between LL 690 and 730 per US dollar.[62] Another troubling trend, particularly since 1987, has been the gradual "dollarization" of the economy, a process that refers either to the settlement of transactions in US dollars or the use of the dollar as the unit of account when effecting payment in Lebanese pounds.[63]

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[62] In 1974, Lebanese per capita income equalled $1,800. By 1989, per capita income had fallen to $250 (Kubursi).

Approaches to Economic Reconstruction

During the course of discussions, participants expressed a variety of opinions on the shape of the future Lebanese economy. Théodore Arcand argued in favour of a laissez-faire system with little government intervention,[64] although most participants did not agree that the best road to economic recovery *and* long-term stability in Lebanon was via an "unbridled" classical liberal system. Recounting the regional and social inequities which destabilized the situation before 1975, and noting the massive physical, social, and human problems wrought by the war, many participants argued that Lebanon's recovery will require a certain amount of "social engineering" by the state, particularly in the beginning phase of reconstruction. A majority of participants recommended, however, that a mixed economy should be the eventual goal of the state.

Sbaiti, while favouring a laissez-faire economic system, argued that Lebanon's weak government and lack of economic planning resulted in a disorganized and inefficient bureaucracy that produced policies devoid of social objectives and controls. Agreeing that reform of public institutions is an urgent priority, Makdisi nevertheless cautioned that reform will require the political will and ability to initiate essential changes. In addition, long-term reform and modernization of the public sector will be achieved only through the "rehabilitation" of human resources, by instituting retraining programmes and placing highly qualified personnel in senior administrative posts.[65] Makdisi gave high priority to the government's development of educational, vocational, and technical institutions, a viewpoint echoed by other participants.

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[63] Kubursi noted that current deposits in Lebanese banks equal approximately $4 billion, $3 billion of which is held in US dollars.

[64] Arcand suggested that inflation can be stopped only through "a tough fiscal and judicious monetary policy" and recommended strategies to reattract foreign investment. While the absence of controls on foreign capital facilitated its flight during the war years, this policy was also one of the key elements behind the development of Beirut as a financial centre in the 1960s. Arcand recommended, therefore, that few barriers be placed on the movement of capital to and from the country.

Those who agreed on the need for greater state intervention in order to ensure Lebanon's overall stability emphasized the need for policy coordination and the rationalization of public expenditure: "Authorities must plan how to mobilize financial revenues from both internal and external sources, acknowledge the limits for total expenditures, and decide on the distribution of those expenditures."

Participants stated that fiscal policy must play a revitalized role in extracting traditional sources of revenue and in tapping potential new sources, for example, capital gains. Two participants raised the need for direct taxation, especially on the wealthy, while another suggested a 10 to 15 percent personal income tax for all Lebanese, provided it is collected effectively.

Pointing out that Lebanon will not likely regain its prewar role of regional "service centre," Sbaiti stressed that the country will need to develop its internal resources. Makdisi reminded participants of the vital role played by the private sector in averting complete economic collapse during the war. He emphasized the need for governmental "support and encouragement of private-sector enterprise within the framework of planned national economic and social objectives," with the implication that should a conflict arise between public and private-sector interests, the public sector must prevail. Institutional development within the private sector is also essential as many businesses have not kept abreast of technological and scientific advances.

It was proposed that the Lebanese domestic debt be restructured and rescheduled; part could become perpetual, another part could be rescheduled on a fifteen-to-twenty-year term. Although one participant considered the burden of debt too small to preoccupy the agenda, others were worried that it would continue to grow. Saidi argued that the trade deficit would be very large during the reconstruction period, and that the debt-to-GDP ratio would be in excess of 80 to 85 percent. It was suggested that as much of the debt as possible be consolidated.

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[65] One participant strongly urged that sectarian considerations no longer determine eligibility for the public sector: employees should be chosen on the basis of loyalty to the state and the government of Lebanon, not to the sect.

Saidi advocated a four-pillar strategy for reconstruction stressing that all four pillars should be pursued concurrently. This "new national plan" includes political reform and democratization, social and regional policies, an international protocol that recognizes Lebanon's independence and provides a loan package, and economic reconstruction. He also described the monetary and banking policies that would be required.

Saidi emphasized the necessity of reducing Lebanon's 25-percent interest rates as quickly as possible in order to reduce the burden on interest payments of the public debt and pressure on the pound. This strategy would attack the problem of dollarization and would prevent the short-term speculative investment that high interest rates can lead to. He cautioned against a radical appreciation of the pound because his research indicated that this would lead to a decline in Lebanese competitiveness.

Saidi further recommended banking reforms to increase capital requirements, merge smaller high-risk banks, and supervise the banking sector. He also suggested that the aim of the Central Bank should be price and exchange-rate stability to keep inflation in check, adding that the Central Bank should maintain its independence rather than becoming a reconstruction and development bank. Instead, he proposed the creation of a separate development bank called the Lebanon Fund. He also argued that excessive dependence on gold reserves was dangerous; these could be gradually converted into an international bond portfolio through a new agency.

Infrastructure

Lebanon's physical and social infrastructure urgently needs reconstruction and development. Sbaiti reported on some of the sectors in urgent need of attention (listed in order of funds to be allotted) including housing, electric power, water and irrigation, health, waste management, transportation, telecommunications, and industry.[66]

Housing -- It is estimated that some 100,000 to 150,000 housing units (about 50,000 of which were in Beirut) were completely destroyed or rendered uninhabitable between 1975 and 1987. Sbaiti's statistics indicated an additional 20,000 units destroyed during the fighting in 1989 and 1990. There is an urgent need for housing not only for the existing population, but also to welcome returning Lebanese. Several agencies were created during the war years to channel funds to the public for housing needs, but Sbaiti contended that they did not function well, partly because of a lack of funding.

Sbaiti suggested that Lebanese government policy should be to increase the housing stock as quickly as possible, generate a market that will offer a broad array of affordable housing units, and ensure that development occurs in a manner that respects both the environment and the cultural traditions of the people. As much as possible, the policy should rely on the private sector, government intervention limited to ensuring adequate financing, land, services, and utilities.

Saidi proposed that the current policy of rent control be gradually removed because it impedes new house construction. He also suggested the imposition of a one-time capital gains tax on earnings from housing to subsidize low-cost housing and fund mortgages.

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[66] Sbaiti's paper provides a detailed needs assessment for all of these sectors and outlined strategies for reconstruction and development as well as cost estimates. He proposed that donors could assist in training, performing studies, demonstrating new techniques, and providing equipment. The following sector-by-sector analysis is only a summary of Sbaiti's work.

Transportation -- There is a great need for the rehabilitation of roads, ports, railroads, airports, and other transportation links. Although not directly damaged from the war, existing roads are badly in need of maintenance. Ports suffered damage to warehouses, equipment, and telephone and power lines. There has been no new railroad construction since Lebanon's independence. At the airport, $12 million of equipment was destroyed and urgently needs replacing. Sbaiti proposed the creation of a Ministry of Transport (at the moment no specialized ministry for transportation exists) and he further recommended that the Ministry of Public Works and Transport be reorganized and training programmes implemented.

Water Supply -- Although Lebanon has an abundance of water resources, these are not fully utilized, and the maintenance and development of water supply systems and irrigation projects have been hampered by sixteen years of war. Sbaiti proposed that a National Water Authority be created in order to fix tariffs and finance the execution of various projects.

Participants agreed that efforts to conserve water resources were crucial; one person suggested that a Ministry of Water Resources could coordinate the seventy-three odd water offices across the country, a project where Canada could possibly assist. Another participant emphasized the importance of regaining control of water resources in South Lebanon.

Electricity -- Since 1989, the supply of electricity has been sporadic and sparse because of a number of problems including the shortage of fuel and spare parts as well as damage to equipment. In addition, the Lebanese electricity authority, Electricité du Liban, has had difficulties with theft and with the collection of revenues. Sbaiti pointed out that from 1989 until recently, most of Beirut was without electricity for about eighteen hours a day; people in the south survived with even less. He proposed that Hydro-Québec or Ontario Hydro assist in harnessing water resources for electricity generation.

Waste Management -- This is another area that has suffered neglect during the war years. The sewer system is badly maintained, and basic sanitation requirements are not being met. Participants expressed concern about the volume of garbage that piled up on the streets of Beirut, and the possibility of the spread of disease.

Industry -- The industrial sector has been showing growth since the 1950s, although this was interrupted by decline and stagnation during periods of warfare. Sbaiti's figures indicated that the fighting of 1975-76 caused the industry some $165 to $230 million in direct losses, and between $325 and $725 million in indirect losses. The 1982 Israeli invasion either completely or partially destroyed many plants in South Lebanon, Beirut, and suburbs. Severe damage also occurred during the period 1989 to 1990, and industrial production in 1990 is estimated to have declined by 30 to 40 percent from 1989 levels. This figure reached 80 percent in areas of warfare.

The industrial sector suffers from the import of cheap products against which local industry cannot compete, lack of credit facilities, and bankruptcy, leading to non-creditworthiness. One positive note is that the decline in the Lebanese pound has made industrial exports much more competitive. Sbaiti suggested finding a mechanism that would allow industry to tap into the resources of commercial banks. He also recommended the modernization and reconstruction as well as the creation of industries that might exploit new opportunities, particularly in the field of agriculture.

Agriculture -- Malek Basbous proposed Lebanon's agricultural industry as one area of comparative advantage that could be developed. The suggestion was based on his experience with the Lebanese government's "Green Plan," an agricultural development strategy established in 1964. He is convinced that a revitalized Green Plan could play a special role in a peaceful Lebanon, establishing useful social and economic priorities and facilitating job creation.

Basbous named four major objectives: to extend the agricultural area through terracing; to decrease the cost of production through farm mechanization; to maximize production (through modern irrigation techniques, water conservation, a survey of underground water reservoirs, the development of new nurseries to produce the most profitable fruits, fertilization programmes, plant protection, greenhouses, and hydroponics);[67] and to market with the highest profit, possible only by integrating small farms into cooperatives.

Social Consequences of the War

The violence and devastation of the war have caused major transformations in Lebanese society. Participants discussed some of these changes and the implications for Lebanon's future stability, as well as the effect of the war on children. The war has spanned the formative years of an entire generation, with potential long-term consequences for Lebanon's future.

Demographic Change

Saidi detailed the decline in Lebanon's expected population growth during the war years. In addition to an estimated 150,000 war casualties, this decline was a function of a lowered national birthrate[68] and a considerable increase in the rate of emigration. He noted that the fall in growth rate may be permanent, or it may increase as Lebanon stabilizes: "Reconstruction planning will need to take account of this possibility."

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[67] Basbous urged Canada to share its expertise in hydroponics with Lebanon.

[68] Saidi observed that the declining birthrate was most notable in the Shi'ite community, which before the war had the highest birthrate of all Lebanese communities. This decline, which has meant a narrowing of the differential birthrate among Lebanon's communities, may be a positive element for future stability, especially if the communal political system is maintained. As mentioned earlier, the uneven growth rates among communities before the war created shifts in the population distributions, calling into question the "democratic" fairness of the system.

Labaki noted that although Lebanese emigration is a very old phenomenon, it rose considerably after 1975.[69] During the period 1975 to 1989, between 35 and 40 percent of Lebanon's base population (approximately nine hundred thousand people) left the country. The volume of this outflow fluctuated according to the political situation. Many who left during the first two years of war returned after the situation calmed down. Following the events of 1982, however, the rate of emigration accelerated because of a loss of confidence in the future, an increase in the numbers of those forcibly displaced from their homes, the economic crisis (post-1984), and the violence of 1989-1990.

Labaki described the changing profile of Lebanese emigrants over the years. Trends include a marked increase in family emigration (previously, unemployment was the main reason for emigration); a change from a predominantly Christian to an overall Lebanese emigration;[70] and a diversification of the economic and professional status of emigrants (before 1975, most emigrants were students; now they include all trades and professions).

Emigration after 1975 had both an economic and political impact domestically. In economic terms, Lebanese emigration has resulted in a shortage of skilled labour (a brain drain),[71] an exodus that has seriously affected the quality and availability of services in both the education and health sectors. The loss of engineers has been especially significant: in 1982, only 42 percent of American University of Beirut engineering graduates worked in Lebanon. In political terms, emigration lowered the number and force of young potential challengers to the political establishment. For the educated but unemployed, emigration represented the chance for social promotion. As such, it acted as an economic "safety valve," but also helped to keep the establishment in power.

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[69] In addition to political and military factors, migration accelerated because of war-induced unemployment (from 5 percent in 1970 to more than 30 percent in 1990), and the decline in economic activity and living standards (per capita GNP dropped from $1,400 in 1974 to $900 in 1984 to $800 in 1990).

[70] Data from 1975 indicated that 75 percent of all emigrants were Christian, a percentage that decreased to 60 percent in 1981-82 and to 40 percent in 1989.

[71] It may seem ironic that Lebanon suffers from both 30 percent unemployment and labour shortages. Labaki explained that these shortages have occurred in specific sectors, and many unemployed do not possess the necessary skills for jobs abandoned by emigrants.

Labaki pointed out that Lebanese communities overseas often reflect the social structure of the home country; that is, emigrants tend to form village, family, sectarian, or political groupings. The ongoing wars in Lebanon have reinforced the psychological segmentation of the diaspora. Some emigrants directed considerable financial and political support to Lebanese militias and, as a result, contributed to the divisiveness of the Lebanese state and society.

Internal Displacement and Sectarian Enclaves

A particularly troubling consequence of the war has been the forced internal displacement of large numbers of Lebanese. Internal migration has been a long-standing feature of Lebanese society, but before 1975, changing residence tended to be for economic or social reasons. After 1975, however, many Lebanese were forced to flee their homes for security reasons, often the same family moving several times to escape the fighting (which occurred in different regions at different times).

Because of logistic difficulties in gathering data, statistics vary on how many Lebanese have been forcibly displaced. One estimate placed this figure at one-third of the entire population (approximately one million people). Labaki estimated that one hundred thousand Lebanese have been displaced multiple times.

André Beaudoin presented an interim report of a study of the displaced inside Lebanon.[72] The study revealed that approximately 20 percent of the population had been "permanently" displaced, raising the question of how to "renormalize" their situation. Beaudoin's preliminary results indicated that the displaced population is relatively worse off socioeconomically than those who have never been forced to move. For example, the displaced suffered from greater illiteracy and were overrepresented in blue-collar jobs; many were forced to change occupations. In addition, one-third of these households were categorized as "poor," either as a result of displacement or their prior status. The return or compensation of the displaced is a pressing question for the national authorities, raising questions about property rights and highlighting the urgent need for adequate and affordable housing.

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[72] *The Displaced Populations of Lebanon (1975-1987)*, André Beaudoin (Laval University, Canada), Selim Abou (St. Joseph University, Beirut).

In addition to causing untold hardship at the grassroots level, internal migration severely altered Lebanon's geographic pluralism: before 1975, large areas enjoyed communal heterogeneity; intercommunal "mixing" was especially prevalent in urban centres. Participants remarked, however, that much of the violence during the war was aimed at the forced creation of homogeneous sectarian enclaves (that is, Muslims were compelled to flee their homes in so-called Christian sectors and vice versa).

Khalaf called the result of this ghettoization a "geography of fear," sharpening communal loyalties and heightening intercommunal fears. Some participants thought that these intercommunal barriers would diminish rapidly with the dissolution of the war system and the opening up of the country. For example, the severe intracommunal fighting of recent years prompted a remigration of people to their place of origin: earlier in the war, Christians from the south sought refuge from the fighting by fleeing to East Beirut; in 1989-90, when intra-Christian fighting ravaged East Beirut, many of these internal refugees decided to return to their home villages, thereby enabling the different communities to intermingle after a long period of living in sectarian enclaves.

Khalaf agreed that this return migration was a positive development, noting that current socioeconomic indicators are much higher in plural than in non-plural areas. He added, however, that the intercommunal suspicions born of the war should not be easily dismissed: "The will to live together is there, but will not likely result in blissful intercommunal relations overnight. For sixteen years we have experienced not only the destruction of a polity but the disengagement and dismemberment of a society. The most elemental social ties of trust and loyalty have been shredded. To create a political culture of tolerance, every Lebanese will have to change his perception of the 'other'."

el-Hoss noted that the political gulf between sectarian leaders has always been greater than intercommunal divisions at the grassroots level, and suggested that the "remixing of the country will contribute substantially to the future unity of the country."

Decentralization and "Reverse Rural Migration"

As already noted, one of the ills contributing to Lebanon's explosion was the increasing centralization of its economic and social life in Beirut at the expense of regional development. Ironically, one "beneficial" aspect of internal displacement was the redirection of population movements from the centre to the periphery largely because of the destruction of urban centres. Comparisons of the population distribution in 1975 and 1985 show the population of the Greater Beirut area dropping from 46 to 40 percent, that of the Mount Lebanon area from 15 to 7 percent, while the south witnessed an increase from 12 to 17 percent.

Charif noted that this "reverse rural migration" resulted in the forced development of regional areas and the revival of traditional subsistence agriculture: "Regional urban centres developed local resources in response to increasing local needs created by lack of access to the centre and the sudden increase in population.... The explosion of Beirut and its surroundings resulted in de facto decentralization of social and economic activities and of the public administration and services. This trend resulted in noticeable growth and relative prosperity of regional urban centres that were stagnating, even dwindling before the war."

This repopulation of the periphery is not necessarily detrimental, and could be beneficially exploited for enhanced regional development: "This experience indicates that the prewar concentration of activities was neither justifiable nor unavoidable in the future.... The regional revival during the war years yields fruitful lessons that can be incorporated in schemes to knit together the new social structure in Lebanon."

The Next Generation: The War's Effect on Children

Saidi noted that 60 percent of the current Lebanese population is under the age of twenty-one. If Lebanon is to regain stability, the needs of this war generation must be addressed.

Although reliable data are difficult to obtain, Amal Shamma' estimated that twenty to forty thousand children below fifteen years of age were killed during the war, and at least three to four times that number injured. According to some surveys, 15 to 26 percent have lost at least one family member because of death, kidnapping, or forced disappearance. Children have also suffered immensely from the forced displacement of families from their homes. An estimated 50 to 55 percent of families have experienced war-induced poverty, causing hardships for children in the areas of nutrition, medical care, and education.[73]

Studies indicate that because of the war, up to 50 percent of Lebanese children suffer from emotional and psychological damage, as well as difficulty in making moral choices. Direct exposure to violence, fear for the safety and integrity of the family, and the poor role models provided by militia combatants have caused children to experience intense fears, insecurity, anxiety, depression, regressive behaviour, increased aggressiveness, overdependence, poor school performance, a fascination with the act of killing, and a casual attitude towards the taking of life.

Several steps are necessary to redress effectively the problems of the war generation. These include directing political and economic support towards rebuilding the family unit (displaced families must be allowed to return to their homes, others must receive immediate aid to rebuild damaged housing); combatting poverty through economic self-sufficiency programmes for families and regions; rehabilitating government programmes for health and education services; addressing the special needs of orphaned children, working children, and the disabled or handicapped.

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[73] Many were unable to attend school because of cost or the need to work to supplement family income.

Echoing Khalaf, Shamma' advocated the implementation of government and private educational programmes to help Lebanese children and youth bridge the gaps between communities created by fears and displacement. She emphasized the importance of collecting accurate data in order to plan effective intervention and coordination between governmental, non-governmental, national, and international agencies concerned with children.

In the short term, programmes already in place can be expanded and available information and resources pooled. The government can work through existing non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and UN agencies to initiate and coordinate urgently required services.

Selected Social Services

Education -- The war severely impaired education, causing extensive physical damage to educational institutions and interrupting schooling for both security and economic reasons. For example, Sbaiti pointed out that many students from lower and middle schools left to join the militias for economic reasons. Some participants argued that it was the government's responsibility to undertake extensive reforms to the educational system in order to promote social cohesion and future stability.[74]

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[74] Tuéni described a recent wise move taken by the current Minister of Education, Boutros Harb, to legislate children back to school.

According to Sbaiti, public schools suffer from an "alarming shortage of qualified teachers," a situation exacerbated by the accelerated emigration of professionals during the war. The result was "an already heavily burdened education system with non-qualified teachers in the public schools [left] to cope with an influx of students running away from the private schools because of financial reasons." Ma'an Ziadé added that most public schools faced critical shortages in services and equipment, with most of their budget going toward salaries.

Sbaiti cited a 1978 study identifying some of the major issues that need to be addressed: the lack of government planning and financing, the high proportion of unqualified teachers, inadequate classroom space and facilities, the need to upgrade and supervise curricula, and the non-supervision of private schooling by the government.

There was considerable discussion about the role of private schooling. Historically, Lebanon has relied heavily on private-sector schooling.[75] The quality of public schools is generally considered lower than that of private schools, but because of the expense, less affluent Lebanese attend public schools (or more affordable private schools). The economic levelling effect of the war, however, has meant that by 1985-86 many families switched their children to public schools for financial reasons. Many participants agreed that although the private schools offered superior education, they also contributed to social divisiveness: most are run by confessional groups, and their curricula are thought to promote the development of a "confessional mentality."[76] One participant pointed out the lack of curriculum regulation, with the result that different schools teach different histories of Lebanon (for example, some emphasize Lebanon's Phoenician ties; others stress its ties to the Arab world). Ziadé noted that the school system further divided along sectarian lines during the war, especially because of militia control of many of the public schools.

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[75] Sbaiti noted: "Despite considerable expansion of the public school system from the mid-1960s onwards, about 64 percent of students attended private schools in 1987-88 as opposed to 36 percent in public schools."

[76] Participants agreed that foreign missionaries, who founded many of the private schools in Lebanon, played a significant role in alienating Christian Arabs from their Eastern culture, by teaching them to "reidentify" with Western Christianity. In Lebanon, this encouraged the "Western versus Arab" divisiveness.

Among other reforms, Ziadé advocated a standard curriculum for all schools in Lebanon, particularly in history and civic education. Some participants disagreed on the premise that standardization compromises the diversity of ideas. Corm commented that education did not need to be a vehicle for constructing a national identity, but that it should foster social adherence to the minimal rules of civility within a state.[77] Participants agreed on the pressing need to ensure equal educational opportunities throughout the country and to strengthen vocational training.

Health -- Although there have been no reliable data on the national health status since 1965, until 1975 (and even as late as 1985) health conditions in Lebanon were considered the best in the Middle East. Sbaiti stressed, however, that this generalization masks significant regional disparities in the health status and availability of health services. Moreover, at least 50 percent of the health sector is provided by a profit-seeking private sector. Although the Lebanese did create a Ministry of Public Health (MPH) in 1950, its ability to function has been seriously compromised because of political pressures, the predominance of the private sector, and more recently by dislocations caused by the civil war. As a result, the MPH has been unable to carry out its regulatory, review, and coordinating responsibilities.

As in other sectors, the war has caused many qualified professionals to emigrate, often leaving sophisticated medical equipment unmaintained and without qualified operators. In addition, major physical damage has been inflicted on the medical infrastructure.

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[77] Joe Hak suggested the educational system of the province of Alberta as a model for Lebanon: "Although there are private schools and public schools, the curriculum is unified with everyone learning basically the same thing."

Socioeconomic Recovery: Perspective

In summarizing the discussion, Kubursi pointed to economic prosperity as an important ingredient of political stability. Participants agreed that the general framework for reconstructing the country should feature a greater role for the public sector in the planning and provision of social services and economic activities. Most participants acknowledged that lack of government involvement contributed to the prewar regional imbalances, and that greater government involvement is necessary for the restoration of long-term socioeconomic stability. Lebanon should still rely on private initiative and entrepreneurship, but the reconstruction effort requires government leadership.[78]

Some participants thought that Lebanon could once again become the key provider of services for the region. Others, were less optimistic, but conceded that Lebanon could still develop a comparative advantage with respect to its tourist and banking industries. Sbaiti also advised Lebanon to better exploit its internal riches, including its human capital, agricultural potential, and growing industrial sector.

Tuéni and others urged Lebanon to begin now to prepare itself for peace in the region. If the peace process in the Middle East is irreversible, then Lebanon as well as other Arab states must learn how to compete with Israel on an economic front -- by making full use of scientists, engineers, and other highly skilled professionals. Recognizing that any transfer of money from the United States to Lebanon will likely come in the form of a package deal for the region, Saidi proposed a regional economic scheme that would include Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel among others, in order to benefit from the flow of Western monies into Israel. Participants agreed that a scheme for regional economic cooperation was important, but most denounced Israel's participation for both political and economic reasons. Many believed that Lebanon is not yet equipped to compete economically with Israel. Salem observed that Lebanon's support of Kuwait during the Gulf War has improved Lebanese-Gulf relations, which may result in future economic benefits: "It is the Gulf, not the West, where Lebanon's economic future lies. The Gulf is where the Lebanese can sell the most products and services, and from where any potential Marshall Plan will be launched."

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[78] The Lebanese government created the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) in 1977. Its purpose was to establish a general framework for the reconstruction effort and to channel external funds and coordinate expenditures.

Finally, Charif recommended specific government initiatives that would facilitate the reunification of Lebanese society: production of mass media programmes that promote public awareness of the whole of Lebanon; reactivation of professional societies and unions that will bring together members across factional and regional lines; encouragement of interregional and cultural benevolent societies; organization of and support for country-wide cooperative and competitive activities (for example, sports and cultural events); and organization of inter-regional tours throughout the school system.

V RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE

Saidi expressed the general view that reconstruction should balance economic efficiency with social and political equality as well as a perceived fair distribution of available resources. He added that the effort to rebuild Lebanon should act as the single most important unifying factor for the nation. Reconstruction must be consistent with Lebanon's role in the Middle East: policy planners should recognize that the country's economic fate is integrally tied to that of its neighbours. He estimated a need for a total investment of somewhere between $26 and $37 billion in the first ten years.[79]

Many participants emphasized the view that reconstruction should not necessarily imply rebuilding a given sector to its previous, possibly inadequate status, but should seek to alter and improve its condition. Sbaiti proposed a comprehensive reconstruction and development programme,[80] estimated at a total cost of $17 to $20 billion to the public sector. He assumed that 80 percent of the cost could be financed by external sources: Arab and regional funding institutions, the Arab governments, industrial countries, the World Bank, the European Community (EC), and the European Investment Bank.[81]

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[79] Saidi presented both high- and low-growth scenarios. The first would attempt to reach prewar growth rates and would require heavy investment, most of it from the private sector. Government investment should be limited to 20 percent of the total investment to allow for normal spending on services. The GDP growth rate would average 17.6 percent per annum, with a rate of 30 percent for the first year. The low-growth scenario assumes that government investment is limited to 11 percent of total investment.

[80] Sbaiti's programme is based on a number of factors, including the CDR's 1983 Project, the 1983 World Bank programme, recent damage, his own personal experience with reconstruction efforts, and rough estimates of fresh damage incurred, especially in 1989 and 1990. There are three prerequisites for his proposals: the war has ceased forever, the government is able to procure necessary funds, and the government will develop certain policies and institutional measures to facilitate the implementation of the projects.

[81] This programme presupposes three conditions: the CDR can spend $1.7 billion annually; the Lebanese possess a strong absorptive capacity; and the programme of spending can be sustained for ten years. Sbaiti noted that Lebanon's ability to repay its debts is a precondition for receiving monies.

Means of delivery

Two principal schemes were proposed for channelling aid to Lebanon. Sbaiti suggested that the CDR be revitalized to channel external funds and coordinate expenditures. His analysis assumed the restoration of political stability.[82]

The CDR's guidelines, in Sbaiti's opinion, are still valid for current and future projects:

- the public sector will provide the framework for economic activities, although the majority of these activities will continue to originate in the private domain;
- private initiative will be encouraged and supported indirectly and directly by government;
- high priority will be given to "meeting the basic needs of the populace, achieving regional balance in the reconstruction process, and improving the living and working conditions in rural areas";
- activities are to be viewed within a long-term perspective of national development;
- reconstruction will be based largely on external loans and grants, with 20 to 25 percent of funds provided by the Lebanese government.

The CDR plan was expected to take eight years to implement and assigned a larger-than-ever role to the public sector. In the past, war hampered this and other reconstruction attempts, diverting attention away from reconstruction in favour of simple maintenance of facilities, undertaken by line ministries. Many projects begun in 1983 are still under construction.

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[82] Most participants agreed that the most important prerequisite for reconstruction was peace in the country. Also, funding from overseas will be dependent upon the level of confidence that Lebanese expatriates have in the state, its politicians, and the administration.

Some participants questioned the track-record of the CDR. On examining expenditures between 1977 and 1987, one participant lamented the lack of social planning in the CDR's economic programme. He pointed out that very little money had been devoted to social services such as health, education, and housing assistance. Other participants wondered whether the re-invigorated CDR would be able to live up to its potential.

Saidi proposed the creation of a Lebanon Fund, whose purpose would be to allow the separation of funding disbursement from those implementing and executing projects. The fund's Board of Directors would comprise representatives of donor countries and possibly of large commercial enterprises that are putting together loan packages for Lebanon, as well as representatives of the Lebanese government. The fund would have two divisions: a public wing consisting of a reconstruction agency such as the CDR, which would finance public projects of national infrastructure or regional development; and a private wing consisting of the National Merchant Bank (whose monies would come from the Lebanon Fund as well as from private banks), which would fund private or semipublic projects such as agriculture or low-cost housing.

Reconstruction Assistance: Roles for Industrialized Countries

Participants agreed that Lebanon should look to industrialized countries as a key source of reconstruction funding, not only from the governments but also from Lebanese expatriates.[83]

Corm proposed that the Lebanese government create a fund whereby industrial countries would contribute money to buy zero-coupon bonds, as has been done in

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[83] Several participants stressed the need for a return of expatriate Lebanese. Lebanon requires skilled professionals to assist with reconstruction, and their numbers should be considered in planning housing, social amenities, and taxation. Also, expatriate investment in Lebanon would greatly facilitate the reconstruction process: "Little outside help will be forthcoming until the Lebanese themselves take the initiative to reconstruct their society."

Mexico.[84] This fund would act as collateral for the debt. As a parallel effort, the Lebanese state could remove its gold reserves from the country and use them as collateral for zero-coupon bonds of other governments. The gold could generate an estimated $400 million in interest (based on cumulative interest rates). This suggestion won wide support from other participants, since such a plan would be easy to finance and would be a sign that the international community was sincere in its desire to assist Lebanon.[85]

Canada has enjoyed a close cultural, economic, and political relationship with Lebanon. Since 1975, it has provided $25 million in aid through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), $18 million of which was targeted for humanitarian assistance. Now that Lebanon is more politically stable, CIDA would like to reorient its aid programme towards rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance, build on existing partnerships and cooperating with Lebanese Canadians. CIDA will also continue to work through its Industrial Cooperation Programme, which encourages linkages between Canada's private sector and partners abroad. David Viveash cautioned that the aid envelope has significantly diminished and that the agency may not be able to assist Lebanon as much as it had hoped. Leyla Raphael noted that, because Lebanon has been removed from the emergency funding list, it now faces much stiffer competition for aid dollars.

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[84] The plan to convert Mexico's external debt into Mexican Treasury Bills was announced in December 1987. Mexico bought twenty-year zero-coupon bonds (which have no redeemable annual interest until cashed at maturity) from the US Treasury. The American bonds guaranteed the Mexican bonds, which Mexico in turn would sell to international creditors. The bonds were offered to creditors at a variable rate of one and five-eighths over the London inter-bank rate and at a higher rate than that of the debt held against Mexico. In brief, the Mexican government invited creditors to swap, in whole or in part, their claims against the guaranteed bonds. *Ramses 89 Rapport Annuel Mondial sur le système économique et les stratégies*, Paris: Dunod, 1988, pg. 239.

[85] It was also suggested that Lebanon use its gold reserves as collateral against the sale of reconstruction bonds outside the country. This programme would target Lebanese emigrés in particular, who would like to contribute to the reconstruction of their homeland. The bonds would also be attractive to non-Lebanese because of their tax-exempt status.

It was proposed that Canada assume leadership in establishing a fund for the development of Lebanon. The availability of matching grants from the Canadian provincial or federal governments should not be overlooked. Georges Karam suggested that the Canadian government present an aid plan for Lebanon to the G7 nations.

Arcand recommended that for purposes of trading, Lebanon use its close connections with France to apply for membership to the EC. Others suggested that the United States, especially, could play a major role in the restabilization and reconstruction of Lebanon. Participants were hopeful that the United States would reclassify its assistance monies from "emergency relief" to "reconstruction and development."

Roles for Regional Governments and Funding Institutions

Participants expressed concern that Arab Gulf states would be reluctant to contribute, since much of what they have given in the past was slipped into "private" pockets[86] or invested in reconstruction projects subsequently destroyed in the war. A number of participants commented on the need for checks and balances to avoid future accusations of "corruption." Two participants argued that Arab countries were using corruption as an excuse for failing to assist Lebanon, and that these nations should assist willingly, especially with housing needs.[87]

Sbaiti's presentation on Arab and regional funding sources identified eleven institutional funding bodies (which pattern themselves after the World Bank in processing loan applications) with a cumulative total of close to $27 billion in available funds. Responding to earlier comments on corruption, Sbaiti stressed that the agencies use a series of checks and balances to guard against the misuse of funding dollars. In addition, their activities are coordinated through a central committee and international bodies.

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[86] It was alleged that tens of millions of dollars donated previously for construction had gone to the private accounts of businessmen and officials, including some key former ministers and a former president.

[87] One participant strongly urged Lebanon to seek claims for war damages, particularly from the Israelis, who have twice invaded the country. Arab countries also "owe" Lebanon assistance because of its role in sheltering Palestinians.

Because of internal unrest and enormous public debt, Lebanon is not a prime candidate for funding dollars: competition is fierce and instability is a serious disadvantage. Makdisi agreed, pointing out that funding from international institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is usually conditional on the situation inside the requesting country.

Makdisi stressed that should stability return to Lebanon, the national authority and funding institutions will need to establish a process to ensure effective use of monies. He argued that reconstruction planning must be under domestic control and cannot be imposed -- it must come from within. Funding institutions, however, should provide the framework for financing, defining the checks and balances to ensure the appropriate use of funds.

The Ta'if Accord provided for the creation of the International Fund for the Reconstruction of Lebanon in 1990, with $2 billion pledged by donor countries (mostly the Arab states). Little, if any, of this money has been transferred to Lebanon. During the final workshop in November 1991, Sbaiti announced that the Arab Fund and the Kuwait Fund had recently concluded two loan agreements with Lebanon for $110 million. Following up on its contribution of $100 million in 1990, the Saudi Arabian government delivered $60 million of promised aid to the Lebanese government for reconstruction projects in Beirut and for the Lebanese Army.

The World Bank has considered funding emergency projects in Lebanon, and in December 1991 held a meeting of funding institutions to begin reconstruction activities. Finally, international consultants have issued a report on an emergency recovery programme for rebuilding six sectors of Lebanese society: electricity, water and sewage, housing, health, telecommunications, and education.

Roles for NGOs

Raphael and Osseiran-Hanna highlighted the vital role of NGOs in providing economic and social services to the Lebanese. Before the war, Lebanese NGOs had few ties to international organizations -- funding was provided by benevolent donors. After the outbreak of hostilities, however, there was a spontaneous creation of many organizations to deal with the tremendous number and range of needs that resulted from the destruction and devastation.

Because of the war, the government's ability to provide basic services deteriorated. NGOs have helped to fill this void, providing many of the urgently needed emergency, relief, health, and social services to the affected population. While some NGOs are non-partisan and non-confessional (that is, for all Lebanese), others primarily serve particular groups. Still others function as the "benevolent" arm of various militia orders. Osseiran-Hanna noted however, that the majority of non-militia NGOs, even those with sectarian-sounding names, do not limit their aid to a particular sect, but in principle are open to anyone in need. In practice, however, many ended up serving a particular sectarian community because they operated within circumscribed geographic areas that tended toward sectarian exclusivity because of the war system. Nevertheless, most NGOs have attempted to go beyond the regional-sectarian limitations imposed by the war system and some function throughout all of Lebanon.

NGO activities encompass both short-term relief efforts as well as longer-term developmental activities such as training, educational activities, institution building (schools, vocational centres, hospitals, dispensaries, libraries, facilities for rehabilitation and the handicapped), infrastructure construction, self-help projects, and projects involving sustainable economic development. NGOs have also taken an active role in promoting conflict resolution by developing and implementing peace education programmes as well as organizing activities that bring together people from the various Lebanese communities who have been segregated both psychologically and geographically because of the war.

Moghaizel said that the Lebanese Association for Human Rights (ALDHOM) is developing a comprehensive programme to address this issue.

Raphael's observation that NGOs in Lebanon are more dependent than ever on external funding prompted one participant to point out a difficulty: "International sources of funding have been directed to relief efforts and not to development. This has resulted in the population becoming dependent on handouts rather than acquiring the skills and experience to become self-sufficient." And participants who have been involved in NGO activities in Lebanon stressed the problems in garnering support for their work among expatriate Lebanese.

One participant emphasized the need to adopt a constructively critical approach when assessing the role played by NGOs. Especially in a governmental vacuum, NGOs sometimes become power centres that compete both with each other and with the government. This participant stressed that NGOs must work together to compliment the restoration of state authority.

Osseiran-Hanna agreed, pointing out that coordination between the Lebanese government and the many NGOs would be mutually beneficial. Since NGOs are already on the ground and have extensive access to the grassroots level, the government could use them to implement national programmes and strategies for providing social services as well as for reconstructing and developing the country: "For example, clinics currently operated by NGOs could be regulated to provide services according to government policy, thereby becoming part of a national government health plan." Many NGOs are keenly aware of the need for systematic coordination of their activities. Several recent conferences have addressed this need for coordinated planning and for pooling resources, expertise, and activities.[88]

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[88] In 1990, for example, two conferences were held: one in the Bekaa Valley on NGO coordination and strategies for development, and one in Paris under the auspices of UNESCO, which analyzed ways in which NGOs could cooperate in peace-building and development.

Roles for UN Agencies

John Hendra observed that many UN Agencies have been active in the development of Lebanon for over forty years, although the war caused a slowdown in UN activities. With the current stabilization of the country, the UN security rating was lowered from "general evacuation" to "precautionary status with limited restrictions." In 1990, the General Assembly passed Resolution 45/225 requesting the Secretary-General to continue and intensify his efforts to mobilize all possible assistance within the UN system to help Lebanon in its reconstruction effort.

Until May 1991, the UN's response was limited to emergency assistance. In July 1991 however, the UN sent an Inter-Agency Needs Assessment Mission to Lebanon to assess the reconstruction and development requirements and to make recommendations for effective and coordinated action of UN bodies. Hendra outlined four major roles that the UN system can undertake to promote Lebanon's socioeconomic recovery and development.

- continued provision of humanitarian and emergency assistance;
- assisting the government with resource mobilization;[89]
- provision of financial assistance through the World Bank, the IMF, and the International Fund for Agricultural Development;[90]

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[89] Hendra noted that in 1984, a request by the Lebanese government prompted the Secretary-General to issue an appeal for international humanitarian assistance. In 1989, the Secretary-General made a similar appeal, with donor responses totalling $100 million. The report from the 1991 Inter-Agency Mission is expected to serve as the basis for another UN appeal that will be coordinated with the activation of the Ta'if-initiated International Fund, the planning of the CDR, and donor initiatives undertaken through the World Bank group. Indu Chacravartty proposed reactivating the UN Trust Fund for Lebanon. Established in 1978, this fund was to be a vehicle through which the international community could channel reconstruction assistance. Although it fell apart after 1982, the fund currently contains approximately $ 104,000.

[90] By coordinating with international financing institutions, UN agencies ensure that the advantages of financial assistance are maximized. For example, the World Bank was a participant in the Inter-Agency Mission, currently undertaking to reactivate its lending programme in Lebanon.

- provision of technical cooperation and assistance in coordination with the government's objectives for development.[91]

The most efficient role for the UN system in Lebanon is to use its limited resources as "seed money" for preinvestment activities that will attract follow-up financing, to provide technical assistance in support of key infrastructural investment priorities, and to assist in the design and implementation of critical national programmes.

Hendra identified four areas of priority for future UN agency action in Lebanon.

- **support for the development of a medium to long-term development plan** -- The United Nations Development Programme and World Bank are currently working together to develop a macroeconomic planning framework for Lebanon's future reconstruction and development. In addition to providing guidelines for sound national economic, monetary and fiscal policies, the UN will assist in the establishment of a national statistical database.

- **support for social and human development needs** -- UN agencies will coordinate their efforts to assist in the areas of health and nutrition, building technical capacity, and reducing poverty.

- **support for management development programmes and reform of the civil administration** -- UN agencies plan to assist the government in assessing public sector management needs, formulating programmes to address these needs, and providing management training.

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[91] Although UN financing to Lebanon is limited because of the country's relatively high per capita income and low population, the coordinated expertise of UN specialized agencies equips the UN system to provide comprehensive leadership in Lebanon's reconstruction and development. Reactivation of UN programming also will provide a symbolic boost to attract international capital back to Lebanon.

- **provision of direct technical assistance** -- In addition to specific rehabilitation assistance (for example, telecommunications, electricity, water supply and sewage, housing) UN organizations are capable of designing and implementing programmes that would promote the recovery of the private sector.

Noting the critical importance of indigenous Lebanese NGOs in the areas of human rehabilitation and development, Hendra suggested that UN agencies should support NGO activities through programmes of management and institutional support and by promoting closer cooperation among NGOs.

VI THE LEBANON OF THE FUTURE: CHALLENGES TO STABILITY AND PEACE

Lebanon's Domestic Scene

Recent events have been somewhat encouraging, although participants expressed the belief that internal peace in Lebanon would eventually be subject to the "regional calculus" -- that is, relations between Syria and Israel as well as the situation of the Palestinians. Participants agreed, however, that the "breathing space" provided by the Ta'if Accord should be exploited to forge better solidarity among the Lebanese and to begin to redress some of the domestic ills in the system: "There is growing appreciation in Lebanon that there will be no military solution to the conflict and that Lebanon's unity should be preserved.... The Lebanese need to grasp this opportunity to make themselves active subjects in the making of their history."

National Unity

One participant expressed welcome surprise at the capacity of the Lebanese people to forget their "sectarian fears" now that the fighting has stopped: "The Lebanese are commuting from one region to the next without fear." In addition, it appears that most militia leaders are ready to relinquish their warring ways in exchange for a piece of the political pie. As discussed above, participants believed that the Lebanese must work diligently to effect a true sense of national unity; a unified, national stance will be the key to minimizing the impact of foreign influence (including Syria's) and will enhance the international credibility of Lebanese demands for international aid dollars and for the implementation of Resolution 425.

Daoud Khairallah stressed that, despite appearances, Lebanese national unity is not yet a reality: "Whatever semblance of normalcy, stability or recovery Lebanon enjoys at present, is the direct consequence of the Syrian government's determination, in a suitable international environment, and cannot be attributed to the spirit of reconciliation the Ta'if agreement is presumed to have produced among the Lebanese."

Strategies to enhance national allegiance can take many forms. Participants noted the importance of the following elements: better provision of public services to all areas of Lebanon, strategies for regional economic development (including decentralization), reforms to the educational system, reforms to family law, democratic reforms (including electoral reform) that will enhance the representativity of Lebanon's government, holding elections, moving towards a deconfessionalized political system, and the full return of Lebanese sovereignty.

Government Reactivation

An element vital to the forging of national unity will be the effective reactivation of government institutions and services and control of Lebanese territory. The successful deployment of the Lebanese Army and the disarming of the militias has been an essential step in this process.

Participants discussed the nondemocratic way in which the Ta'if Accord provided for the reactivation of government by appointing deputies to fill the vacant seats. Participants conceded that, given the circumstances, this procedure may have been warranted, but many wondered whether the Lebanese lost a chance to enhance representative democracy. One participant contended that the Lebanese did not object to the *process* of appointments so much as to those who were in charge of the selection. According to Norton, the Lebanese missed an extraordinary opportunity in not demanding the international supervision of by-elections to fill the empty seats: "This would have actively engaged international interest in Lebanon and in the stabilization of Lebanon." He recommended that the Lebanese pursue this international attention by calling for UN supervision of municipal elections.

Rizk viewed Ta'if's provisions for electoral reform as a positive step toward democracy. The larger confessionally mixed districts of the Mohafazat could help to reduce the electoral manipulation of sectarian identity. This beneficial development, however, is dependent upon the return of displaced residents to their districts. Most participants agreed that, short of deconfessionalization, the most positive democratic reform would be to make all of Lebanon into one constituency. Participants wondered whether free and fair elections were possible, fearing Syrian and possibly Israeli meddling, even if both countries withdrew from Lebanon.

Participants stressed that a major stumbling block to efficient government reactivation has been the prevalent sectarian squabbling among the current "troika" leadership, who have been turning to Syria as a mediator. Participants feared that Syria was being involved more closely in Lebanese internal affairs than the regional powers would like, and also noted that the leadership's preoccupation with sectarian issues was compromising the government's ability to address Lebanon's severe economic needs.

Economic Revival and Development

The Ta'if Accord specifically highlights the need for regional development and the decentralization of infrastructure and services. Charif expressed dismay at the absence of policies to facilitate this process: "Administrative centralization and corruption remind many observers of prewar practices that led to the eruption of revolts and hostilities." A number of participants thought that reconstruction efforts focussed on the business centre of Beirut, rather than on more "public" forms of infrastructure.[92] Citing the positive potential of the regional revival, Charif recommended a number of strategies to ensure regional integration with equity, including the development of national transport networks connecting regional urban centres to each other and to Beirut, of national communication networks, and of the ports in Tripoli and Sidon. He also suggested providing incentives to entrepreneurs to operate away from the centre, to encourage residency in regional urban centres, and to revive Lebanon's agricultural production (for example, subsidies to small farmers).

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[92] Corm expressed serious reservations about the current construction plans for downtown Beirut which call for the state to abdicate control of the development in favour of private companies.

National Security

The Palestinian military threat appears to be more or less under control; there is, however, an urgent need for Lebanese and Palestinian leaders to develop a long-term plan for Palestinian residents in Lebanon. Syria is currently the undisputed "guarantor" of Lebanon's stability, which helps to insulate Lebanon somewhat from regional interference by other actors, but also poses a potential threat to true Lebanese independence and sovereignty. Corm stressed in the first workshop that the arbitrator of a peace agreement for Lebanon should not be a party to the agreement. Ta'if and the Syrian-Lebanese treaty appear to have positioned Syria as the arbitrator of both Lebanon's internal and external affairs. This situation disturbed some participants more than others, although most agreed that it would be reassuring to have greater involvement by the Tripartite Arab Committee (especially with regard to the renegotiation of the status of Syrian troops in Lebanon), as well as the continued attention of the international community.

Participants agreed that the Lebanese do have latitude to influence Syrian-Lebanese relations, but this will require the forging of genuine national unity and developing a strong Lebanese Army. Achieving both of these objectives will also give added credence to Lebanon's call for Israeli withdrawal from the south.

The Unresolved Problems of the South

All agreed that Lebanon's healing process will be seriously compromised if the situation in the south is not stabilized and if genuine efforts are not undertaken to integrate it into the rest of the country. The problem is twofold: the Israeli occupation and internal domestic difficulties. Abukhalil observed that all too often the Lebanese have focussed on the Israeli dimension of the problem, ignoring Lebanese responsibility for the socioeconomic disenfranchisement and neglect of the people of the south, a neglect relevant to this day: "This is a government that still has a Ministry of Tourism and yet it cancelled the symbolic Ministry of the South."

Participants agreed that although the south had been greatly underdeveloped before the war, the considerable economic levelling since 1975 demands that the situation be reevaluated according to these new realities. Nonetheless, southern residents face massive socioeconomic and political difficulties. As well as the exigencies imposed by the Israeli presence and the escalation of Israeli bombing sorties, the people are basically without essential services. Mahmoud Ayoub observed that there is only one, badly maintained road linking the whole of the south to Beirut: "It takes hours to travel between Beirut and Sidon although the distance is less than twenty-five miles."

The consensus was that the Lebanese government must develop a comprehensive plan for the development of the region,[93] taking into account its needs following Israeli withdrawal: "While the Lebanese state calls for the withdrawal of troops from South Lebanon, there are no plans for the south after withdrawal. They have plans for the uninhabited, downtown area of Beirut, but they don't have any plans for a post-Israeli South Lebanon." Such a plan should include the study of water-resource needs, the reactivation of essential government services, and planning for the eventual status and rights of the Palestinians.

Toward the Depoliticization of Identity: The Path to the Third Republic

Many participants considered Ta'if an acceptable basis for Lebanon's "Second Republic," providing it does not become a frozen formula and it leaves open the possibility of making constitutional amendments in the future. But there was general agreement that the Ta'if process has not yet taken firm steps towards deconfessionalization, making only cosmetic changes to the system of sectarian balances.

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[93] One aspect of such a scheme would develop the area's potential for hydroelectric power: the water could be used in irrigation to revive southern agriculture, which is critical for cash crops, exports, and employment.

As el-Hoss stated: "Being basically still a sectarian, hence a discriminatory regime, the Second Republic does not embody the aspirations of enlightened Lebanese." Participants discussed their vision of the Lebanon of the future, as well as their hopes for achieving a truly democratic "Third Republic."

Daoud Khairallah stated that the fragility of the Lebanese political system was the root cause of Lebanon's eruption in 1975, and argued that it will continue to make Lebanon vulnerable to outside influences. Most participants concurred that Lebanon's fixation with its confessional communities has compromised the rights of the individual and has created barriers to equal opportunity. Although participants saw nothing wrong with confessional affiliation as a social phenomenon, they agreed that problems arise when confessionalism becomes politically institutionalized and exploited.

Ayoub argued that the secularization of Lebanon must not be equated with its Westernization: "We must recognize how religion is understood in the Middle East. The rights of the individual should be safeguarded, but as an individual who belongs to a group." Most participants disagreed, arguing that confessionalism has destroyed both the communities and individuals it is supposed to protect. In addition, it excludes some Lebanese from full participation in society. Participants generally agreed that people should not be slotted into a communal mould, but should have a choice: "The community should not limit the rights of the individual. If the Lebanese are to live as equals in a society, the rule of civil law must supersede the rights of the community."[94] Expanding on this point, Takla and Moghaizel stressed the need to deconfessionalize family law (personal status law). Khairallah also addressed this point: "Commercial, civil and criminal laws apply to all Lebanese without distinction... however with respect to the law governing the family...each of the sects is sovereign, has its own laws and courts and does not tolerate any competition by the State." All three participants agreed that sectarian jurisdiction over this area results in different standards of human rights among Lebanese and enhances sectarian identification, as well as perceptions of inter-sect inequalities. Past attempts to address this issue have met considerable resistance. Nonetheless, many participants argued in favour of the adoption of a personal status law, which would be optional -- that is, it could be freely chosen by Lebanese of any sect. Moghaizel noted that such a law was drafted by the Democratic Party. Takla said: "*Il n'a besoin que d'une mise à jour.*"

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[94] As one participant lamented: "I do not feel that the Maronite label encapsulates all of my identity, and all of my views on issues."

The majority of participants advocated the need to deconfessionalize Lebanon's political system through gradual and pragmatic reforms -- from equal representation to deconfessionalization to secularism. Some, however, called for immediate and rapid deconfessionalization, in order to "cure Lebanon of the main cause of its traditional political disease."

el-Solh noted that achieving objective deconfessionalization, presupposed a political vehicle through which to neutralize subjective confessionalization (as a politicized identity). He stressed that the transformation away from a confessionally based society will require carefully wrought intermediary steps. As Rizk stated: "The question before us is how to allow for a political majority to appear and develop in a country of confessional minorities."

Participants concurred that a secular system cannot simply be imposed on Lebanon. el-Solh observed the Arab world's lack of success in this regard, where regimes espousing secular ideologies have become despotic once in power: "Such imposition destroys the intermediary associations that allow individuals to freely choose their structure of government, and prohibits the emancipation of the individual." Most participants agreed with this view. As el-Hoss stated: "We do not want secularism to become another sect in Lebanon. Progress towards secularization must be done through democratic reform and persuasion, to encourage people to share this conviction."

Participants optimistically recalled that in the 1970s many Lebanese were developing, more or less, a nonconfessional political outlook. As Nawaf Kabbara explained: "Parties were coming to the fore, the recruitment into trade unions had increased tremendously, the middle class was trying to express itself more freely than other social classes as exemplified by the Lebanon Democratic Party. But the war turned back the clock on these developments, and those forces representing communal associations acted to forcefully reshape the conflict into purely confessional terms." Agreeing that the war had greatly enhanced confessional outlooks and politics, participants recognized the immense challenge ahead, as well as the necessity for democratic change to be insulated from the vested interests of communally based associations. el-Hoss pointed out that Ta'if addresses the need for deconfessionalization, providing for the establishment of a committee to develop the means to abolish sectarianism by phases. Others observed that the current administration has not yet addressed this provision and called for its implementation.

According to el-Hoss, "Life in Lebanon is not yet ready for political parties," but he did outline some concrete processes that would help in the transition from the discriminatory Second Republic to a more democratic Third Republic. These include the enactment of an election law proclaiming the whole of Lebanon a single electoral district,[95] the proclamation of party politics, and the separation of cabinet membership from parliamentary membership.[96] In addition, the president should be given broad, well-defined powers for which he is accountable; the president should be elected by direct public ballot without regard to religious affiliation; referendums should be adopted for decisions on major issues; and political secularization of the system could be enhanced through a nonsectarian election law and a well-conceived antidiscrimination policy.

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[95] This would encourage the emergence of political parties with national platforms: MPs would need to be representative of the whole of Lebanon.

[96] "When these two posts are held together, it enhances the influence of executive authority among the deputies, weakening the government's accountability to Parliament."

The International Community

Participants identified areas in which the international community could play a constructive role in facilitating Lebanon's stability, reconstruction, and development.

Political Support

Continued support for the Madrid process would be welcome. It is doubtful, however, that lasting peace in the Middle East and in Lebanon will be achieved through an incrementalist, step-by-step approach. A more fruitful approach would be to develop a framework that recognizes both the interrelatedness of the problems in the Middle East and the need to deal with these on a linked basis. The CSCE may be an appropriate model to emulate.

The international community has a responsibility to ensure the implementation of UN Resolution 425. An interim step would be to call for partial Israeli withdrawal in return for a suspension of anti-security zone attacks. This proposal could be strengthened by a reinvigorated and more effective UNIFIL. One participant pleaded for the United States to make a "confidence-building measure" out of Lebanon: "If the US were to use its power and influence to remove the Israelis from Lebanon, it would greatly restore its credibility throughout the Middle East." [97]

Participants also requested moral and political support for Lebanon's internal situation. Some urged the international community to press for internationally supervised elections in Lebanon, to ensure that they are free and fair.

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[97] Participants said that the United States experienced difficulty in Lebanon because of its one-sided intervention in the 1980s, which completely neglected the situation inside the country and caused great resentment among many Lebanese. Most Lebanese, however, are now willing to forget that period, and would welcome international support.

Reconstruction and Development Assistance

The international community should take an active role in the country's reconstruction. In addition to funding specific projects and providing technical and training assistance that will revive Lebanon's economy, international donors could help to ensure Lebanon's equitable regional development. Charif noted that assistance could be channelled to support the building of state-wide infrastructure and services, to target projects in rural areas and regional centres, especially in the south and to support regionally located joint-ventures with the private sector. Participants also hoped that the international community would actively shoulder greater responsibility for Lebanon's Palestinian population.

Lebanese Expatriates

Labaki and Saidi called for solidarity among Lebanese expatriates to facilitate reconciliation within Lebanon, and to encourage the international community to take united action (both political and financial) in Lebanon's favour. Their call for solidarity sparked a vigorous discussion. Many of those who have been active in trying to stimulate cross-communal cooperation in the diaspora emphasized the existence of tremendous barriers.[98] Despite such skepticism, one participant suggested that there is a desire among the Lebanese to contribute to the rebuilding of the country: "Perhaps what is required is a viable organization.... If Canada were to take a leadership role in establishing a fund for Lebanon, I am sure that many Lebanese would contribute." Expatriate solidarity is also essential for mobilizing positive responses from foreign governments: "There are many competing demands for aid money around the world. One critical requirement for assessing the distribution of those dollars is the sense of solidarity. A unified appeal will be ten times more powerful."

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[98] **Labaki noted that during the war, Lebanese expatriates often supported the various militias, adding to the intractability of the conflict. Another participant commented: "It is not easy to bring together the Lebanese who are residing outside the country. Their polarizations are very strong and have become more entrenched. There are plenty of groups that conduct fundraising for Lebanon and many attempts have been made to bring these groups together to coordinate their activities. But even this limited goal has proved to be very difficult. Many Lebanese send money home, but this is on a very individualistic basis [for example, to families, parishes, neighbours]."**

Labaki offered a number of practical recommendations. In countries where there has been a major recent inflow of immigrants, the Lebanese communities should be encouraged to engage in public activities that reflect a commitment to peace, unity, and reconstruction; technical and financial support for reconstruction and development should be solicited;[99] and programmes to assist in the voluntary repatriation of Lebanese should be implemented.[100]

A number of participants described the "responsibility of intellectuals" in encouraging and directing positive change in the Middle East. For example, they must convince policy makers that short-term approaches will not lead to a long-term settlement. One participant warned that opinion leaders -- especially Lebanese leaders -- must be wary of "elitism" and must make a greater effort to communicate the political agenda directly to the people. Continuing on this vein, Grégoire Haddad reminded conferees of the urgent need for practical thinking, for "a fundamental restructuring of relationships such that the levels of real life, the economy, and the elites can work together to rebuild Lebanon." Important domestic audiences -- especially in the United States -- must be informed that the basic principles of law and justice are being contravened in the Middle East.

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[99] Expatriate influence on Lebanon's internal political and economic situation can be considerable because of their growing wealth, increasing numbers, and improved communications and transport facilities. Makdisi suggested that the savings of Lebanese living abroad (as much as $8 billion) is a potential source of external revenue that could finance certain reconstruction projects.

[100] Labaki noted that the desire for repatriation would be considerably enhanced by three elements: the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty over all of Lebanon; the return of the internally displaced to their homes (many Lebanese emigrated because of internal displacement); and systematic efforts at reconstruction. One participant was sceptical about the desire of expatriates to return to Lebanon, given doubts about the country's future stability. In addition, a question was raised about "potential migrants" (that is, those Lebanese ready to take advantage of any form of assistance that would help them to leave the country): "What form of assistance should the international community be providing to Lebanon, if we do not want to encourage further out-migration of human resources from the country?"

Participants realized that the old Lebanon could never be reconstructed. Instead, the Lebanon of the future should strive to achieve both economic prosperity and social justice; to become a country where democratic institutions and values are given the highest priority.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Glossary

Alawite

A sect of Shi'ite Islam.

Amal ("Hope")

A Shi'ite militia founded in 1975 as the military arm of the political movement *Harakat al-Mahrumin* (Movement of the Deprived) by Shi'ite leader Imam Musa Sadr. Currently headed by Nabih Berri. Rival Shi'ite organization is Hizballah.

Arab Deterrent Force

An inter-Arab force created in 1976 at the Riyadh and Cairo Summits to enforce the cease-fire in Lebanon. Syria was the primary contributor.

al-Asad, Hafez

President of Syria since 1971. Seized power in 1970.

Aoun, Michel

Appointed commander of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in 1984. Appointed as Interim Prime Minister by Amine Gemayel in September 1988. Controlled the majority Christian army units. Rival of Salim el Hoss who also claimed position of prime minister during this time. Backed by Iraq, he declared a war of liberation against Syrian troops in Lebanon. Following the ratification of the Ta'if Accord, and the election of President Elias Hrawi in 1990, Aoun was routed by Syrian and Lebanese Army troops and eventually fled to France.

Arab League or League of Arab States

A regional organization founded in 1945. Membership currently includes 21 Arab states and the PLO. Lebanon was among its founding members. The aims of the League are to strengthen and coordinate the political, cultural, economic and social programmes of members and to mediate inter-Arab disputes. In 1990, members signed an agreement on joint defense and economic cooperation. Currently based in Cairo.

Arafat, Yasser

Chairman of the Executive of the PLO and leader of the mainstream Palestinian movement al-Fatah.

Berri, Nabih

Leader of Amal militia since 1980. Served as Minister in Lebanese governments since 1984.

Cairo Accord

Signed in November 1969, this accord aimed to coordinate Lebanese-Palestinian relations and regulate the Palestinian armed presence and activity in Lebanon.

Camp David Accords

Refers to two agreements between Egypt and Israel in 1978, signed under the auspices of the United States. The first was an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The second was a framework for peace in the Middle East.

Chamoun, Camille

Veteran Maronite leader and President 1952-58. Founder of National Liberal Party and its militia, The Tigers. Member of Lebanese Front.

Confessional system (also **Sectarian system)**

A system of government based on the principle of fixed proportional sectarian representation. The confessional principle is applied to all levels of government in Lebanon: highest political positions, members of parliament, administrative services, armed forces, and the judiciary. In Lebanon, positions were assigned according to the proportional size of each religious community as determined by the 1932 census. Some of these quotas have been modified by the Ta'if Accord. See also **National Pact.**

Confessionalism

A system in which the identity of citizen is defined by sectarian membership.

Document of National Understanding

See **Ta'if Accord.**

Druze

Closely-knit Muslim sect (off-shoot of Shi'ite Ismaili sect) residing in the regions of Mount Lebanon, southern Syria and northern Israel. At outbreak of civil war, traditional leader was Kamal Joumblatt who was assassinated in 1977. Succeeded by his son Walid. According to the 1932 census, comprised approximately 9.7 per cent of total Lebanese.

al-Fatah

Main grouping within the PLO, led by Yasser Arafat.

Fedayeen

In this report, refers to Palestinian guerrillas.

Frangieh, Sulieman

President of Lebanon (1970-1976) and author of the 1976 Constitutional Document. Leader of northern Maronites.

French Mandate (1920-1943)

Refers to period of French rule in Lebanon, legalized in 1920 by The League of Nations San Remo Conference. Prior to this time, Lebanon was the Ottoman province of Mount Lebanon. In 1926, French authorities annexed four Syrian administrative units to Mount Lebanon and declared the founding of the Republic of Greater Lebanon (modern day borders).

Geagea, Samir

Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Lebanese Forces since 1986. Led revolt in 1985 with Elias Hobeiqa against Phalange party leadership and President Amine Gemayel for what he saw as excessive bending to Syrian influence. Removed Hobeiqa as Commander of the Lebanese Forces in 1985 for the former's participation in the Tripartite Accord. Appointed as Minister of State in Omar Karame's government.

Gemayel, Amine

Youngest son of Pierre Gemayel. Elected President (1982-1988).

Gemayel, Bashir

Eldest son of Pierre Gemayel. Former commander of the Phalange militia and of the Lebanese Forces (umbrella group). Assassinated in 1982 prior to his inauguration as President.

Gemayel, Pierre

In 1936, founded the Phalanges Libanaises, the largest Maronite-dominated political and paramilitary organization. Led the organization until his death in 1984. Member of Lebanese Front.

Government of National Reconciliation

Thirty-man cabinet -- split evenly among Christians and Muslims -- announced 24 December 1990 by prime minister Omar Karamé. This cabinet, the largest in Lebanon's history, includes militia leaders who were appointed as ministers of state.

Greek Orthodox Christians

Christian sect which, according to the 1932 census, comprised approximately 9.6 per cent of Lebanese population.

Haddad, Sa'd

First leader of the Israeli-backed South Lebanese Army (SLA).

Hizballah (Party of God)

Umbrella grouping of pro-Iranian Shi'ite Muslim groups and militias. Emerged in 1982 after the Israeli invasion. Views former Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini as spiritual leader.

Hobeiqa, Elias

Former Commander of the Lebanese Forces 1985-86, overthrown by Samir Geagea in 1986. Leads splinter group of Lebanese Forces loyal to Syria.

el-Hoss, Salim

Prime Minister from 1976-1980. Minister of Labour and Education in Rashid Karamé's government. Following Karamé's assassination in 1987, was interim Prime Minister and President of the Council of Ministers in 1989. Resigned in 1990, succeeded by Omar Karamé.

Hrawi, Elias

Elected President in 1989, following the assassination of President-elect Rene Mu'awwad.

Joumblatt, Kamal

Former traditional leader of Druze community in Lebanon. In 1949 founded the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) which also maintains an armed militia. Founded and led the Lebanese National Movement. Assassinated in 1977 and succeeded by son Walid.

Joumblatt, Walid

Head of Progressive Socialist Party since 1977 and son of Kamal Joumblatt. Has served as a minister in the government since 1984.

Karamé, Rashid

Sunni leader from Tripoli and Prime Minister several times: before the civil war, from 1975 to 1976 and from 1984 until his assassination in 1987.

Lebanese Çivil War (Two-Year War, 1975-76).

The two main blocks were, on the one hand, leftist Lebanese National Movement (allied with the PLO), and, on the other, the right-wing Lebanese Front.

Lebanese Forces

An umbrella group of rightist, Christian militias formed in 1976 to combat the PLO and its leftist Lebanese allies.

Lebanese Front

Coalition of conservative Christian groups and personalities formed in 1976. Original Command Council included Sulieman Frangieh, Camille Chamoun, Pierre Gemayel, Father Kassis of Order of Lebanese Monks.

Lebanese National Movement

A wide coalition of reformist and left-wing political parties -- both Muslim and Christian -- established by Kamal Joumblatt in 1975. Its agenda included the elimination of confessionalism, proportional parliamentary representation, and the development of democratic reform.

Maronites

An eastern Catholic community, and the largest Christian sect in Lebanon. According to the 1932 census, represented the largest communal grouping in Lebanon (approximately 29 percent of the population). More recent figures indicate Maronites comprise less than a quarter of the population.

National Pact

An unwritten agreement reached in 1943 between the Sunni leader Riad el-Solh and the Maronite leader Bechara el-Khoury. The pact calls for the distribution of political power in Lebanon along confessional lines: power is proportioned according to the demographic importance of each sect based on the 1932 population census. (Approximate census figures of main communities: Maronites -- 29 percent; Sunnis -- 23 percent;

Shi'ites -- 19 percent; Greek Orthodox -- 9 percent; Druze -- 7 percent). The Pact calls for a Maronite Christian President, a Sunni Muslim Prime Minister. The distribution of positions in the civil service and seats in the National Assembly are also distributed along confessional lines.

Occupied Territories

Refers to areas occupied by Israel during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and after. Currently includes the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights as well as the "Security Zone" in South Lebanon which was occupied in 1978.

Operation "Peace for Galilee"

Refers to 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Stated goal was to secure Israel's northern border with Lebanon, in order to end PLO raids into Israel. This invasion, however, went all the way to Beirut, resulting in Israeli occupation of the capital, and the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut. Prime Minister Menachem Begin also succeeded in establishing a Lebanese government that was pro-Israeli.

Palestine Liberation Army (PLA)

Regular army of the PLO (not a guerrilla organization) technically under the command of Yasser Arafat. Units are stationed in Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt.

Phalange

Founded in 1930s as a Christian youth movement by Pierre Gemayel, and modelled after paramilitary organizations operative in Italy at that time. Predominantly Maronite, the Phalange militia joined with the Lebanese Front in the late 1970s.

PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization)
Created in 1964 by the Arab League, the PLO is an umbrella organization for Palestinian political and military factions. Mainstream grouping is al-Fatah under the command of Yasser Arafat who is also the Chairman of the PLO. From 1970 to 1982, was headquartered in Beirut and constituted a virtual state-within-a-state. Following 1982 Israeli invasion, PLO headquarters moved to Tunis.

Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)
A movement for social reform created in 1949 by Kamal Joumblatt, and now headed by his son, Walid. PSP once played a leading role in the leftist Lebanese National Movement, but now has a predominantly Druze following and seeks to protect Druze communal interests. The PSP militia is Druze dominated and allied with Syria.

Sabra and Shatila
Following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Phalangist militiamen, with Israeli acquiesence, massacred in excess of 1,000 Palestinian and Shi'ite residents of the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps located in the suburbs of Beirut.

Sa'iqa (Lightning)
Syrian-backed Palestinian guerilla group. Member of PLO.

Salam, Saeb
Sunni leader who was Prime Minister several times between 1953-1973.

Sarkis, Elias
President of Lebanon from September 1976 until 1982. Author of a fourteen-point plan for national reconciliation.

Shehab, Fouad
Commander of Lebanese Army 1943-1958 and President 1958-1964. Undertook a major programme of social and economic reform following the 1958 civil war.

Shi'ites

The second largest Islamic sect (next to the Sunnis). In Lebanon, most Shi'ites belong to the "twelver" branch of Shi'ism that prevails in Iran. The group predominates south of Sidon, and in the northern Bekaa Valley. At the time of the 1932 census, Shi'ite population comprised approximately 20 percent of the population. More recent estimates suggest Shi'ites are now the largest community, at 33 percent.

el-Solh, Riad

Sunni politician who was Prime Minister 1943 to 1945 and again from 1947-51. One of the creators of the National Pact.

South Lebanon Army (SLA)

Israeli-controlled militia which operates in the Israel's self-declared "Security Zone" in South Lebanon.

Sunnis

The orthodox and largest sect of Islam. The 1932 census placed Sunnis as the second largest community in Lebanon, comprising approximately 23 percent of the population. More recent estimates suggest that they are now outnumbered by the Shi'ites. The population tends to reside mostly in urban areas (Tripoli, Sidon and Beirut).

Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party

A political and military organization founded in 1932 by Greek Orthodox Antoine Sa'adah. Founders called for unification of Greater Syria (i.e., Arab countries of the Fertile Crescent). Factional in-fighting in recent years.

UN Resolution 425

Resolution passed by the Security Council in 1978 which called upon Israel to "immediately cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory;" and called for the creation of a UN force to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restore international peace and security and assist the Government of Lebanon to return its effective authority to the area. Israel has never complied with the resolution.

UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon)

The UN force created through resolutions 425 and 426. Operations began in March 1978. **See also UN Resolution 425.**

War of the Camps

Refers to the besiegement of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon from May 1985 through 1987 by the Amal militia (with Syrian backing).

War of Liberation

General Aoun's battle against the Syrian forces in Lebanon launched in March 1989. Fighting was concentrated in East Beirut. Following the election of President Elias Hrawi (through the Ta'if process) the Lebanese government requested Syrian assistance to oust General Aoun. Aoun took refuge in the French Embassy, later moving to France.

Appendix B: Chronological Landmarks 1970 - 1991

1970-71

Jordanian army defeats Palestinian armed organizations. Many Palestinian civilians and leaders flee to Lebanon.

1973

Fighting between the PLO and the Lebanese Army.

Fourth Arab-Israeli war.

1975-1976

A series of incidents -- government repression of a labour strike; rightist attacks on Palestinians in Beirut -- trigger clashes between the Lebanese National Movement and the Lebanese Front.

Syria sends PLA troops into Lebanon. Syrian foreign minister, Abdul Halim Khaddam, arrives in Beirut to try to arrange a compromise.

Frangieh announces a programme of limited reform (1976 Constitutional Document).

Lebanese Army disintegrates.

Syrian troops enter Lebanon at the request of President Frangieh to prevent a victory by the LNM.

Saudi Arabia calls for an Arab summit (Riyadh Conference) to discuss Lebanon; Riyadh resolutions passed at Cairo Summit, formally ending the Lebanese Civil War (Two Year War).

1977

Assassination of LNM leader Kamal Joumblatt.

Shatura Agreement between Lebanese President Sarkis, Syria and the Palestinians reviving the Cairo Accord of 1969.

1978

Clashes between Syrian troops and Lebanese Front.

Israel invades Lebanon, occupying the southern part of the country up to the Litani River. UN Security Council passes Resolution 425 calling upon Israel to withdraw from Lebanon. Israeli troops pull-back, but create a self-declared "Security Zone" along the border, placing the zone under the command of major Sa'ad Haddad and his Israeli-controlled rebel forces. UNIFIL forces take up positions in South Lebanon.

Syrians heavily bomb the Christian sector of East Beirut.

1979

Renewed fighting between Syrians and Phalangists.

Major Haddad shells UNIFIL forces and prevents a Lebanese army unit from reasserting control in the south.

Israel launches a number of air raids against Palestinian positions in South Lebanon.

1980

Syrians withdraw from Christian areas of Beirut.

Israel continues to launch raids into Lebanon.

President Sarkis develops fourteen point proposal for national reconciliation (not implemented).

Right-wing Phalange (Kata'ib) militia, under Bashir Gemayel, crush their former allies, the Chamounists.

1981

Haddad shells UNIFIL troops.

Fighting in Zahle between Phalangists and Syrian soldiers.

Israel shoots down Syrian helicopters. Syria installs SAM missiles in Bekaa; Israel demands their removal.

Begin wins Israeli elections.

Israel resumes heavy bombing of Lebanon. Palestinians engage in cross-border attacks into Israel. Israel bombards Beirut.

1982

Israel renews air strikes against Palestinian camps in Lebanon. PLO shells north of Israel. Israeli ambassador in London is shot.

Israel invades Lebanon, going all the way to Beirut. Following intense bombing of Beirut, PLO evacuates to Tunis. U.S Marines land in Beirut as part of the Multi-National Force (MNF). Syrian troops evacuate Beirut as part of the cease-fire agreement.

Bashir Gemayel is elected President. Troops of MNF withdraw from Lebanon. Bashir Gemayel is assassinated. Phalange militia conduct massacres of Palestinians at Sabra and Chatila refugee camps. US Marines ordered back to Lebanon. Inauguration of Amine Gemayel.

1983

US Embassy in Beirut bombed. US brokers May 17th Agreement between Israel and Lebanon; US naval vessels shell Souq al Gharb. US barracks bombed; MNF attacked.

1984

Shi'ites take control of West Beirut; US and MNF withdraw; Militant Islamic groups takes Western hostages.

Lebanese leaders meet at Lausanne and later Geneva. Abrogation of May 17th Accord.

1985

Israel announces three-stage withdrawal from Lebanon

Beginning of the "War of the Camps": Syrian-backed Amal militia besieges Palestinian refugee camps.

Syrian-sponsored Tripartite Agreement attempts to obtain political consensus among main militia leaders in Lebanon.

1986

Tripartite Agreement is repudiated; Samir Geagea ousts Hobeiqa from command of Lebanese Forces. Israeli bombardments of Palestinians refugee camps.

Syrian troops re-enter West Beirut for the first time since 1982.

1987

Fighting between Amal and pro-Arafat factions of PLO in West Beirut; Syrians increase military presence. Syria intervenes to end "War of the Camps."

Assassination of Prime Minister Rashid Karamé.

1988

Inter-Shi'ite fighting between Amal and Hizballah for control of Beirut's southern suburbs; additional Syrian troops deployed.

Following end of Gemayel's term, Lebanon fails to elect a new president. Rival governments established: General Aoun (appointed by Gemayel) in East Beirut; Salim el-Hoss in West Beirut (successor to Rashid Karamé).

Israeli air-strikes within 15 kilometres of Beirut.

1989

Continued fighting between the rival Shi'ite militias, Hizballah and Amal. Fighting in East Beirut between Geagea's Lebanese Forces and General Aoun's Army units. Aoun launches War of Liberation against Syrian armed presence in Lebanon.

Arab League Summit at Casablanca, establishing a Tripartite Arab Committee (chiefs of state of Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Algeria) to create a comprehensive solution to end the Lebanese conflict. Following a ceasefire, Lebanese parliamentarians assembled in Ta'if to finalize the Accord.

Ta'if Accord officially adopted. The UN Security Council voiced unanimous support.

1990

Deadlock between General Aoun (government centred in East Beirut) and Ta'if government of Elias Hrawi over the Ta'if Accord.

Continued Amal-Hizballah fighting. Renewed, intensive fighting between Geagea's Lebanese Forces and General Aoun's Army units in East Beirut. Continued Israeli shelling of targets in South Lebanon

Gulf Crisis erupts as Iraq invades Kuwait.

Lebanese parliament officially adopts Ta'if's constitutional amendments. Implementation of provisions begins. General Aoun declares the amendments null and void.

Hrawi government ousts General Aoun with Syrian military backing. Disarming of militias begins.

Amal and Hizballah sign peace treaty, brokered by Syria and Iran (although clashes continue through 1991).

1991

Implementation of Greater Beirut Plan continues. Lebanese Army continues process of re-establishing control over large parts of country. Formation of a new Cabinet (Government of Reconciliation), appointment of Deputies (including many militia leaders) to fill vacant seats and raise the number of deputies to 108.

Lebanon and Syria sign "Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination" establishing a formal structure for close relations between the two countries.

Israel steps up bombardment of Palestinian targets in South Lebanon. Assaults are the largest since the 1982 invasion.

PLO leader Yasir Arafat reaches agreement with Lebanese government concerning PLO armed presence. PLO fighters hand over military hardware to authorities.

Army troops round up pro-Aoun activists.

Lebanese Parliament approves General Amnesty Law (for war crimes except political murder and killings of diplomats and clergymen). Aoun leaves refuge in French embassy, departs for France.

South Lebanon erupts in violence as Hizballah forces strike against Israeli targets and Israel responds with massive bombing sorties.

Appendix C: The Ta'if Accord

National Reconciliation Charter

The following text is an unofficial English translation of the original Arabic version of the National Reconciliation Charter which is being provided for the convenience of the reader. In case of conflict, however, the original Arabic text shall prevail.

National Reconciliation Charter

First: General Principles and Reforms

1- General Principles

a. Lebanon is a sovereign, free, independent country; a final homeland for all of its citizens; a unity of people, land and institutions within its borders as defined by the Lebanese Constitution and recognized internationally.

b. Lebanon is of Arabic affiliation and identity; it is a founding and an active member of the Arab League and is bound by its charter; it is a founding and an active member of the United Nations and abides by its charter; and it is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. The Lebanese State manifests these principles in all fields and domains with no exception.

c. Lebanon is a democratic, parliamentary republic founded on the respect of public liberties, the foremost of which are the freedom of opinion and belief; and on social justice and equality in rights and in duties among all citizens without discrimination or distinction.

d. The people are the source of powers and the possessors of sovereignty which they exercise through the constitutional institutions.

e. The System is founded on the principle of separation of powers, their balance and their cooperation.

f. The economic system is a free system that assures individual initiative and private ownership.

g. The balanced, cultural, social and economic growth of the regions is a principal pillar of the pillars of unity of the state and of stability of the system.

h. To seek the realization of comprehensive social justice through financial, economic and social reforms.

i. The land of Lebanon is but one land for all Lebanese; and every Lebanese has the right to reside on any part thereof and to enjoy it under the supremacy of the law. No segregation of people on the basis of any affiliation whatsoever; no partitioning, no dividing and no settling.

j. No legitimacy to any authority which contradicts the charter of cohabitation.

2 - The Political Reforms

a. Parliament

Parliament is the legislative authority; it exercises comprehensive control over the policy of government and its affairs:

1 - The head of Parliament and his deputy are elected for the duration of the term of Parliament.

2 - Two years following the election of the head of Parliament and his deputy, and in the first meeting it holds, Parliament may, for one time only, withdraw its confidence from the head of Parliament or his deputy by a two - third majority of its members pursuant to a petition signed by at least ten deputies. Parliament must immediately in this case hold a meeting to fill in the vacant position.

3 - Each project law referred to Parliament by the Council of Ministers which is classified as urgent shall not be issued except, after being listed on the agenda of a regular session and read therein, after the passage of the time delay mentioned in the Constitution without being acted upon and after the approval of the council of ministers.

4 - The electoral unit is the Mohafazah.

5 - Until Parliament enacts an election law which is not based on religious affiliation records; seats in Parliament shall be allocated according to the following rules:

a. Equally between Christians and Moslems.

b. Proportionally among the sects of each of the two categories.

c. Proportionally among the region.

6 - The number of members of Parliament shall be increased to (108) divided equally between Christians and Moslems. The newly created positions based on the present Charter as well as the positions which became vacant prior to its declaration shall, for once and by exception, be filled in by appointment of the anticipated Government of National Reconciliation.

7 - Concurrent with the election of the first Parliament on a national rather than confessional basis, a Senate will be created wherein all spiritual families will be represented with its authority being confined to matters of destiny.

b. The President of the Republic

The President of the Republic is the head of the State and the symbol of the unity of the nation; he undertakes to secure the integrity of the Constitution and to preserve the independence of Lebanon, its unity and the safety of its land as mandated by the Constitution. He is the supreme commander of the Armed Forces which is subject to the authority of the Council of Ministers. The President exercises the following authorities:

1. He chairs the Council of Ministers at his discretion without voting .

2. He heads the Supreme Council of Defense.

3. He issues the decrees and requests their proclamation. He has the right to ask the Council of Ministers to reconsider any decision taken by it within a period of fifteen days from the time said decision is deposited with the Presidency. If the Council of Ministers insists on the decision taken, or if the delay has passed without the decree being issued or returned, the decree or the decision becomes imperatively effective and must be proclaimed.

4 - He issues the Laws as per the delays stipulated by the Constitution and requests their proclamation following their ratification by Parliament; and he has the right, following notification of the Council of Ministers, to demand the reconsideration of the Laws within the delays stipulated by the Constitution and in conformity with its mandates; and in the event the delays ended without their issue or return, the Laws become imperatively effective and must be proclaimed.

5 - He refers project laws, submitted to him by the Council of Ministers, to Parliament.

6 - He nominates the designated Prime Minister in consultation with the head of Parliament based on binding parliamentary consultations which he officially communicates to the head of Parliament.

7 - He individually issues the decree nominating the Prime Minister.

8 - He issues, in agreement with the Prime Minister, the decree constituting the Government.

9 - He issues the decrees accepting the resignation of the Government or the resignation of Ministers or their dismissal.

10 - He accredits ambassadors and accepts their credentials; and awards official State decorations by decree

11 - He assumes negotiation in entering into international treaties and their execution in agreement with the Prime Minister; which treaties do not become effective except after the consent of the Council of Ministers; and the Government shall, whenever national interest and safety of the State permit, presents them to Parliament. As to treaties comprising terms that are related to State finance and commercial agreements and other agreements which may not be abrogated on a year to year basis, must not be executed except by consent of Parliament.

12 - He addresses, when necessary, letters to Parliament.

13 - He calls Parliament, in agreement with the Prime Minister and pursuant to a decree, into holding extraordinary sessions.

14 - The President has the right to present to the Council of Ministers any emergency issue not included on the Meeting Agenda.

15 - He exceptionally calls the Council of Ministers, as he deems it necessary, in agreement with the Prime Minister.

16 - He grants private pardons by a decree.

17 - The President shall not bear the consequences of carrying out his functions, except when violating the Constitution or in the case of high treason.

c. The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister is the head of Government, he represents it and speaks on its behalf, and is considered responsible for the implementation of the general policy established by the Council of Ministers. He exercises the following authorities :

1 - He heads the Council of Ministers .

2 - He conducts parliamentary consultations to form the Government and signs with the President the decree for its constitution. The Government shall, within a period of thirty days, present its Ministerial Address to Parliament to obtain its confidence; and it shall not exercise its authorities prior to acquiring the confidence of Parliament, or following its resignation or being deemed resigned, except in the narrow meaning of carrying out business.

3 - He presents to Parliament the general policy of Government.

4 - He signs all decrees, except the decree designating the Prime Minister and the decree accepting the resignation of the Government or of being deemed resigned.

5 - He signs the decree calling for an extraordinary session and the decrees proclaiming the Laws and the request for their reconsideration.

6 - He calls on the Council of Ministers to convene and draws up its meeting agenda; and informs the President, A Priori, of the subjects included thereon as well as of the urgent matters which will be discussed, and signs the original minutes of meetings.

7 - He follows up the activities of the Departments and Public Agencies and coordinates among the Ministers, and gives general directives so as to ensure a proper flow of work.

8 - He holds, in the presence of the Minister concerned, working sessions with involved parties in the State.

9 - He is, imperatively, the deputy head of the Supreme Council of Defense.

d. The Council of Ministers

The executive power is vested in the Council of Ministers, and among the powers it exercises are the following :

1. Formulating the general policy of the State in all domains, drawing out project laws and decrees and taking necessary decisions for their implementation.

2. Overseeing the implementation of laws and regulations and supervising the activities of all State agencies with no exception, including departments and civil, military and security institutions.

3. The Council of Ministers is the authority which the Armed Forces are subject to.

4. Appointing State employees, dismissing them and accepting their resignation in accordance with the Law.

5. The right to dissolve Parliament pursuant to a request by the President if Parliament has abstained from meeting during the term of a regular or an extraordinary session extending for a period of not less than one month despite being called in for two consecutive times, or if it turns down the national budget in its totality for the purpose of disrupting government activities. The exercise of this right may not be repeated for the same reasons which resulted in dissolving Parliament for the first time.

6. If present, the President heads the meetings of the Council of Ministers.

The Council of Ministers convenes regularly in a specific quarter; and the legal Quorum for its meeting shall be two-third majority of its members; and it takes its decisions by consensus, and in the absence of consensus, they are taken by voting. Decisions are taken by simple majority of the attendants, except Major Issues which require the consent of two-third of the Council's members. The following subjects are considered Major Issues:

> The state of emergency and lifting it; war and peace; general mobilization; international treaties and agreements; the national budget of the State; comprehensive development and long range plans; appointment of the employees of the first category and its equivalent; reconsideration of administrative divisions; the dissolution of Parliament; elections law; naturalization law; personal statutes laws; the dismissal of ministers.

e. The Minister

The authority of the Minister shall be strengthened in line with the general policy of Government and the principle of collective responsibility, and he shall not be dismissed except by a decision by the Council of Ministers or by individually withdrawing confidence from him by Parliament .

f. The Resignation of Government, Deeming it Resigned and the Dismissal of Ministers.

1 - The Government shall be considered resigned in the following cases:

   a. If the Prime Minister has resigned .

   b. If it loses more than one third of the number of its members specified in the decree constituting it.

   c. Upon the death of its head.

   d. At the commencement of a Presidential term.

   e. At the commencement of a Parliamentary term.

   f. Upon loosing the confidence of Parliament as a result of the latter's initiative or by pledging it itself.

2 - The dismissal of a Minister shall be pursuant to a decree signed by the President and the Prime Minister following the approval of the Council of Ministers.

3 - Upon the resignation of Government or deeming it resigned, Parliament shall enter into an extraordinary meeting session until a new government has been formed and obtained confidence.

g. Political Deconfessionalization

Political deconfessionalization is a principal national objective which must be pursued in accordance with a transitional plan, and Parliament, which is elected on the basis of equal sharing by Moslems and Christians, shall take appropriate measures to achieve this objective and to form a national commission headed by the President and contains political, intellectual and societal personalities in addition to the head of Parliament and the Prime Minister. The mission of the commission is to study and recommend the means of eliminating confessionalism and to present them to Parliament and to the Council of Ministers and to follow up the implementation of the transitional plan.

During the transient stage, the following shall be achieved:

a. The rule of Confessional representation shall be abolished and qualification and specialization shall be adopted in public offices, in the judiciary, in the military and security establishments, in public and mixed agencies and in independent authorities as may be required to achieve National Reconciliation, except for first category positions and their equivalent positions therein which shall be equally shared by Christians and Moslems with no position being confined to either sect.

b. Abolishing the mention of religion and sect in the identity card

3 - Other Reforms.

a. Administrative Decentralization

1 - The Lebanese State is but one unified State with a powerful centralized authority.

2 - The authority of Governors and of Deputy Governors shall be extended and all the departments of the State shall be represented in the Administrative regions at the highest level possible so as to facilitate the provision of services to the citizens and to respond locally to their needs.

3 - Reconsidering administrative divisions so as to secure national fusion and to preserve cohabitation and the unity of land, people and institutions.

4 - Adopting maximum administrative decentralization on the level of small administrative units (Kada' and below) by way of electing a council for each Kada' headed by a deputy governor so as to insure local participation.

5 - Adopting a unified development plan encompassing the nation and able to develop the Lebanese regions economically and socially, and strengthening the resources of the Municipalities, the Unified Municipalities and the Municipality Unions with necessary financial means.

b- The Courts

a. In order to secure the submission of all responsibles and citizens to the supremacy of the Law and to secure the conformity of the Legislative and Executive authorities to the postulate of cohabitation and to the basic rights of the Lebanese citizens stipulated in the Constitution:

1 - The Supreme Council stipulated in the Constitution shall be formed with its mission being the impeachment of Presidents and Ministers. A special law devoted to the Council's legal proceedings shall be decreed.

2 - A Constitutional Council shall be established for the purpose of interpreting the Constitution and of monitoring the constitutionality of the Laws and to rule on all disputes and appeals relating to Parliamentary and Presidential elections.

3 - The following parties have the right to consult with the Constitutional Council regarding the interpretation of the Constitution and the monitoring of the constitutionality of the laws:

a.. The President of the Republic.

b. The Head of Parliament.

c. The Prime Minister.

d. Certain percentage of the members of Parliament.

b - To safeguard the principle of harmony between

Religion and State, the heads of the Lebanese factions shall have the right to consult with the Constitutional Council with regard to :

1 - Personal Statutes.

2 - The freedom of belief and practice of religious rites.

3 - Freedom of religious education.

c - To strengthen the independence of the Judiciary, a determined number of the members of the Supreme Council of Justice shall be elected by the Judicial body.

C - The Law of Parliamentary Elections

Parliamentary elections shall be conducted in accordance with a new election law based on the Governorate (Mohafazah) and which considers the principles that guarantee cohabitation among Lebanese and which insures the accuracy of political representation of the various categories of people and their generations and the effectiveness of such representation, after the reconsideration of administrative divisions within the framework of the unity of land, people and institutions.

d - The Establishment of the Economic and Social Council for Development.

A Social Economic Council shall be established to insure the participation of the representatives of various sectors in the formulation of the economic and social policy of the State through the offering of advise and suggestions.

e - Education and Instruction

1 - To put education at the disposal of people and to make it mandatory, at least in the elementary stage.

2 - To emphasis the freedom of education in accordance with the laws and regulations.

3 - To protect private education and to strengthen State control over private schools and the school textbook.

4 - To rehabilitate formal, vocational and technical education and to strengthen it and to develop it in such a manner so as to fulfill and to suite the developmental and constructive needs of the nation. To rehabilitate the Lebanese University and to support it, especially in its applied faculties.

5 - To review and to develop the curricula in a manner which strengthens national cohesiveness and fusion and spiritual and cultural openness, and to unify the textbook in the history and civil education courses.

J - Information

To reorganize all media under the Law and within the framework of a responsible freedom, and in a manner which serves the objectives of reconciliation and of ending the state of war.

Second: Reinstating the Sovereignty of the Lebanese State Over the Entire Lebanese Land

Whereas an agreement was reached among the Lebanese parties on the establishment of a strong and able state founded on national reconciliation, the government of national reconciliation shall draw up a detailed one year security plan aiming at gradually reinstating the authority of the Lebanese State over the entire Lebanese territory by means of its own forces, with its broad lines being characterized as follows:

1. Disbanding all Lebanese and non Lebanese militias and surrendering their arms to the Lebanese State within a period of six months starting after the ratification of the National Reconciliation Charter, the election of the President, the formation of the Government of national reconciliation and the adoption of political reforms in a constitutional manner.

2. Reinforcing Internal Security Forces through :

   a) Opening the door to all Lebanese , with no exception, to volunteer and to commence their training centrally and then to distribute them to the units in the Mohafazat, and to subject them to periodic and organized training programs.

   b) Strengthening the security system in such a way so as to be capable of controlling the entry and exit of persons across land, sea and air borders.

3. Reinforcing the Armed Forces:

   a) The primary duty of the armed forces is to defend the nation and, if necessary, to protect national order whenever the danger exceeds the capability of the Internal Security Forces to individually deal with it.

   b) The armed forces shall be used to support the Internal Security Forces in preserving security under the circumstances as may be determined by the Council of Ministers.

   c) The Armed Forces shall be unified, prepared and trained so as to be capable of assuming its national duties in facing Israeli aggression .

   d) The Armed Forces shall return to barracks at the time when the Internal Security Forces become ready to assume its security mission.

   e) The intelligence activities of the Armed Forces shall be reorganized to serve military purposes only.

4. Fundamentally solving the problem of the Lebanese immigrants by approving the right of every Lebanese immigrant, who emigrated since 1975, to return to the place from which he or she emigrated; passing the necessary legislations securing this right and providing the necessary means for reconstruction.

Whereas the aim of the Lebanese state is to reinstate its authority over the entire Lebanese territory by means of its own forces, which is represented primarily by the Internal Security Forces, and out of the brotherly ties which bind Syria to Lebanon, the Syrian Forces shall, with due thanks, assist the legitimate Lebanese forces to reinstate the sovereignty of the Lebanese State in a definite time period of a maximum of two years starting after the ratification of the National Reconciliation Charter, the election of the President, the formation of the Government of National Reconciliation and the adoption of political reforms in a constitutional manner; at the end of this period both governments, the Syrian Government and the Lebanese

Government of national reconciliation will decide on the repositioning of the Syrian forces in the Bekaa area and the access to western Bekaa in Dahr - Elbeidar up to the line of Hamana - Mdeirej - Ein Darah and, in case of necessity, in other points to be decided by a joint Lebanese Syrian military committee. Also an agreement shall be signed by both governments which determines the size and the duration of the presence of the Syrian Forces in the above areas and the relation of these forces with the Lebanese State authorities present in these areas. The Tripartite Supreme Arab Committee is ready to assist the two States in reaching this agreement, if they so desire.

Third: The Liberation of Lebanon From Israeli Occupation

Regaining the authority of the State up to internationally recognized Lebanese borders requires the following:

a) Pursuing the implementation of Resolution No. 425 and all Security Council's resolutions promulgating the total elimination of the Israeli occupation

b) Adhering to the Truce Agreement signed on March 23, 1949.

c) Taking all necessary measures to liberate all the Lebanese territory from the Israeli occupation , extending the authority of the State over all its land, deploying the Lebanese Army along the internationally recognized Lebanese borders and pursuing the reinforcement of the existence of the International Security Forces in Southern Lebanon so as to ensure the withdrawal of Israel and to allow for the return of law and order to the border zone.

Fourth: The Lebanese - Syrian Relations

Lebanon, a country of Arab affiliation and identity, is tied to all Arab States with true fraternal relations; and there exist between Lebanon and Syria distinguished relationships which draw their strength from the roots of kinship, history and common fraternal interests, which is the concept on which the coordination and cooperation between both countries are founded and will be manifested in agreements between them, in various domains, and in the manner which serves the interests of both countries within the framework of sovereignty and independence of each of them. Based on that, and because strengthening the bases of security provides the needed atmosphere for the development of these distinguished ties, Lebanon shall under no circumstances be made a source of threat to the security of Syria, nor Syria to the security of Lebanon. Therefore, Lebanon shall not permit itself to become a passageway or a dwelling to any force, state or organization which aims to undermine its security or the security of Syria. And Syria, which is keen on preserving the security, independance and unity of Lebanon and concurrence among its people, shall not permit of any act which may threaten Lebanon's security, sovereignty and independence.

Appendix D: Agendas of Workshops I-IV

WORKSHOP I

WHY NO PEACE? ATTEMPTS TO SETTLE THE CONFLICT SINCE 1975

Friday September 28, 1990

8:30 - 9:00	**Registration** (or night before)	
9:00 - 9:30	**Welcoming Remarks**	
9:30 -12:00	**Session I : 1975-1976**	
	Presenter	Hani **Faris**
	Discussant	Charles **Rizk**
	Chair	Bernard **Wood**
12:00-13:15	**Lunch** (at Institute)	
	Presentation by Ron **Fisher** and Roger **Hill**	
	CIIPS's Cyprus Project	
13:15-15:45	**Session II : 1976-1982**	
	Presenter	Nafhat **Nasr**
	Discussant	Ziad **Hafez**
	Chair	Ron **Fisher**
15:45-16:00	**Break**	
16:00-18:30	**Session III: 1982-TAIF**	
	Presenter 1	Khatchig **Babikian**
	Presenter 2	As'ad **Abukhalil**
	Discussant	Khatchig **Babikian**
	Chair	Nancy **Gordon**
19:00-19:30	Cocktails	
19:30-22:00	**Dinner** (at Minto Place Suite Hotel, Room: Earl Grey C)	
	Presentation by James **Jonah**	
	The UN and Lebanon: Past, Present and Future (?)	

Saturday, September 29, 1990

8:45- 9:00	Coffee	
9:00-11:45	**Session IV: TAIF**	
	Presenter	Joseph **Maila**
	Discussant	Issam **Naaman**
	Chair	Roger **Hill**
11:45-12:15	**Break** (hotel check-out)	
12:15-14:00	**Lunch** (at Casa Calarco Restaurant, 495 Somerset W)	
	Presentation by Clovis **Maksoud**	
	Lebanon and the Arab League	
14:00-16:30	**Session V: Evaluation**	
	Evaluators	Georges **Corm** Raghid **el-Solh**
	Chair	John **Sigler**

WORKSHOP II

WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION: CURRENT CONDITIONS AND FUTURE NEEDS

Thursday, December 13, 1990

18:00 *Dinner* - **Radisson Hotel, La Ronde Restaurant**

19:45 *Dessert* **at Institute**
Informal Discussion of Workshop I

Friday, December 14, 1990

8:30 - 9:00 *Coffee*

9:00 - 11:00 **Overview: Lebanon's Socio-Economic Dismemberment**
Atif **Kubursi: The Confessional and** *War Economy of Lebanon*
Georges **Corm:***Dominance of the Militias and the Re-establishment of the State*

11:00 -11:15 **Break**

11:15-13:00 *Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon's Economic Sectors: 1991 and Beyond*
Ahmed **Sbaiti**

13:00-14:30 **Lunch - Chaudière Room, Skyline Hotel,**
hosted by Marc **Perron**, Assistant Deputy Minister, Africa and Middle East Branch, Department of External Affairs and International Trade

14:30-17:45 **The Economy and Reconstruction**
Samir **Makdisi:** *The Lebanese Economy*

Break
Théodore **Arcand:** *Reconstructing Lebanon - The Principal Economic Issues*

19:00-19:30 *Cocktails* - **Le Cercle Universitaire**
453 Laurier East

19:30-22:00 *Dinner*
Amal **Shamma':** *Lebanon's Next Generation: An Analytical Overview of Needs and Resources*

Saturday, December 15, 1990

8:45- 9:00 *Coffee*

9:00-12:15 *Displacement and Emigration*
Boutros **Labaki** : *Emigration and Manpower*

Break
André **Beaudoin** : *Internal Displacement*

12:15-13:30 *Lunch* - **at the Institute**
Malek **Basbous:** *The Green Plan of Lebanon*

13:30-14:30 *Restoration of Peace and Order in Lebanon*
Joseph **Takla**

14:30-16:00 *From Relief to Reconstruction:*
Current Activities and Future Challenges for NGOs in Lebanon
Khatmeh **Osseiran**
Leyla **Raphaël**

16:00-16:15 *Break*

16:15-17:30 *Funding Reconstruction: Arab Sources*
Ahmed **Sbaiti**

WORKSHOP III
PEACE FOR LEBANON? OBSTACLES, CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS
7 - 8 June 1991

Friday 7 June 1991

8:30 GATHERING (Coffee, Continental Breakfast), REGISTRATION

9:15 WELCOME TO PARTICIPANTS, INTRODUCTIONS

9:45 SESSION I: OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT SITUATION

Opening Comments: **Hani Faris** (Lebanon and the Regional Context)
Michael Hudson (Lebanon and the Arab-Israeli Conflict)
Georges Corm (Discussant)

12:00 LUNCH (at the Institute)

13:00 SESSION II: THE PALESTINIANS, LEBANON AND THE LEBANESE

a. The Status and Future of the Palestinians in Lebanon
Presenter: Rosemary Sayigh (Lebanon)

b. Lebanon and the Palestinians: Where Next?
Presenter: Rex Brynen

SESSION III: ISRAEL, LEBANON AND THE LEBANESE

a. Israel's Foreign Policy Objectives in Lebanon
Presenter: Don Peretz

20:00 DINNER
Hosted at the Lebanese Embassy by H.E. ASSEM JABER

Saturday 8 June 1991

8:30 GATHERING (Coffee, Continental Breakfast)

9:00 SESSION III: ISRAEL, LEBANON AND THE LEBANESE (cont'd)

- b. The Lebanese State and Israel
  Presenter: A.R. Norton

- c. The Unresolved Problems of the South
  Presenter: Hassan Charif

12:00 LUNCH (at the Institute)

13:00 SESSION III: SYRIA, LEBANON AND THE LEBANESE

- a. Syria's Objectives and Role in Lebanon
  Presenter: Mahmud Faksh

- b. Lebanese State Relations with Syria
  Written Remarks: Joseph Maila
  Discussant : Hisham Melhem

- c. Lebanese 'Informal' Relations with Syria
  Presenter: As'ad Abukhalil

19:30 DINNER AT THE CHATEAU LAURIER
Keynote Address: H.E. SALIM EL-HOSS

WORKSHOP IV
FROM WAR TO PEACE: THE LEBANON OF THE FUTURE
November 3- 5, 1991

Sunday, November 3rd: CLOSED SESSIONS AT THE INSTITUTE

8:30	**WELCOME (Coffee, Continental Breakfast)**
9:00 - 10:40	**FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF WORKSHOPS I - III**
	A. Conflict Resolution : Hani Faris, Canada **B. War and Reconstruction : Atif Kubursi,** Canada **C. The Regional Environment : Georges Corm,** France
10:40 - 11:00	**Break**
11:00 - 12:30	**CULTURE, EDUCATION AND CITIZENSHIP**
	Panel: Ma'an Ziadé, Canada **Samir Khalaf,** United States **Discussant: Ghassan Tuéni,** Lebanon
12:30 - 14:15	**LUNCH (at the Institute);**
	Discussion Topic: RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP **Presenters: Mahmoud Ayoub,** United States **Raghid el-Solh,** UK
14:15 - 14:30	**Break**
14:30 - 16:30	**STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PARTICIPATION**
	Presenters: Charles Rizk, France **Joseph Moghaizel,** Lebanon **Jim Joyce, Amnesty International,** Canada
16:30 - 16:45	**Break**
16:45 - 18:30	**ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATION**
	Presenter : David Khairallah, United States **Discussant: Salim El-Hoss,** Lebanon

Monday, November 4:	**CLOSED SESSIONS AT THE INSTITUTE**
8:30	**COFFEE (Continental Breakfast)**
9:00 - 10:30	**NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY** **Presenter: Paul Salem**, Lebanon
10:30 - 10:45	**Break**
10:45 - 12:15	**LEBANON, ITS NEIGHBOURS AND THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES** **Presenter: Michael Varga**, U.S. State Department **Discussant: Michael Hudson**, United States
12:15 - 13:30	**LUNCH (at the Institute)**
13:30 - 17:00	**HELPING TO RESTORE LEBANON'S ECONOMIC LIFE** A. Regional Development and Integration **Presenter: Hassan Charif**, Jordan B. Priority Action Areas for Outside Actors **Presenters: Ahmed Sbaiti**, Arab Fund **Nasser Saidi, UK**

OPEN SESSION AT THE CONGRESS CENTRE,
55 Colonel By Drive
Capital Hall

18:15	**Registration**
19:00	**Welcome: Bernard Wood, CEO, CIIPS**
19:15	**Dinner**

Keynote Topic
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER IN THE MIDDLE EAST: LEBANON AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Keynote Speakers:

James Jonah, United Nations
H.E. Ghassan Tuéni, Lebanon

Discussant:

Richard Norton, United States

TO BE FOLLOWED BY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Tuesday, November 5

OPEN SESSIONS AT THE CONGRESS CENTRE,
55 Colonel By Drive
Congress Hall "A"

8:30 **REGISTRATION**

9:00 - 10:45 **FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF WORKSHOPS I-III**

- **A. Conflict Resolution : Hani Faris**, Canada
- **B. War and Reconstruction : Atif Kubursi**, Canada
- **C. The Regional Environment : Georges Corm**, France

10:00 - 10:45 **Questions and Answers**

10:45 - 11:00 **Break**

11:00 - 12:30 **INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON**

A. International and Arab Institutions, Industrial Powers
Presenter: Ahmed Sbaiti, Arab Fund

B. United Nations Bodies
Presenters: John Hendra, UNDP
Indu Chakravartty, UNARDL

12:30 **SPECIAL ADDRESS**
The Honourable Monique Landry

13:00 - 14:30 **LUNCHEON: RECEPTION AREA**

KEYNOTE ADDRESS
THE REQUISITES OF STATE-BUILDING FOR LEBANON'S THIRD REPUBLIC

H.E. Dr. Salim El-Hoss, Lebanon

Tuesday, November 5 (continued)

14:30-15:45 **INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON (CONT'D)**

A. **World Lebanese Community**
Presenter: **Nasser Saidi,** United Kingdom

B. **Canadian Lebanese Community (overview)**
Presenter: Georges Karam, Canada

15:45 - 18:30 **CANADA AND LEBANON: PANELS**

15:45 - 17:00 **PANEL 1**

i)	**Andrew Robinson**	External Affairs
ii)	**David Viveash**	Canadian International Development Agency
iii)	**Valerie Melnikoff**	Canadian Council for International Co-operation; Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Fund
iv)	**François Farah**	International Development Research Centre

17:00 - 18:30 **PANEL 2: Representatives of selected NGOs that are active in Lebanon**

Special Guest:

Nawaf Kabbara	Movement of Handicapped and Youth for Peace and Human Rights in Lebanon, Beirut

i)	**Leyla Raphael**	Carrefour des Cedres
ii)	**Edwin Epp**	Mennonite Central Committee
iii)	**K. Osseiran-Hanna**	Save Lebanon
iv)	**Joe Hak**	Canadians for Education, Development and Reconstruction in Lebanon

Appendix E: List of Workshop Participants/Liste des participant(e)s

NAME/NOM	*ORGANIZATION/ORGANISATION*	*CITY/VILLE*
ABUKHALIL As'ad	Colorado College	Colorado Springs
AOUN Sami	Radio Canada	Saint-Laurent
ARCAND Théodore	Canadian Ambassador to the Holy See	Rome
AYOUB Mahmoud	Temple University	Philadelphia
BABIKIAN Khatchig	Lebanese Parliament	Beirut
BASBOUS Malek	Natra Tech	Montreal
BEAUDOIN André	Université de Laval	Quebec City
BRYNEN Rex	McGill University	Montreal
CHAKRAVARTTY Indu	United Nations Aid for Reconstruction and Development in Lebanon	New York
CHARIF Hassan	ESCWA, United Nations	Amman
CHATILA Imad	American University of Beirut	Beirut
CIOIU Doina	Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security	Ottawa
COLLINGS Deirdre	Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security	Ottawa
CORM Georges	Cabinet Georges Corm	Paris
GRÉGOIRE DE BLOIS Denis	External Affairs and International Trade	Ottawa
EL-HOSS Salim	Former Prime Minister	Beirut
EL-SOLH Raghid	Centre for Lebanese Studies	Oxford
FAKSH A. Mahmud	University of Southern Maine	Cape Elizabeth
FARAH François	International Development Research Centre	Ottawa
FARIS Hani	University of British Columbia	Vancouver
FISHER Ron	Carleton University	Ottawa
GORDON Nancy	Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security	Ottawa
HADDAD Grégoire Mgr.	Mouvement Social	Beirut
HAFEZ Ziad		Washington
HAK Joe	Canadians for Education, Development and Reconstruction in Lebanon	Edmonton
HENDRA David	Regional Bureau for Arab States and Europe, United Nations Development Program	New York
HILL Roger	Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security	Ottawa
HUDSON Michael	Georgetown University	Washington
JONAH James	Office for Research and Collection of Information, United Nations	New York
JOYCE Jim	Amnesty International	Montreal
KABBARA Nawaf	Movement of the Handicapped and Youth for Peace and Human Rights in Lebanon	Beirut
KHAIRALLAH Daoud	Falls Church	Virginia
KHALAF Samir	Princeton University	Princeton
KUBURSI Atif	McMaster University	Hamilton
LABAKI Boutros	Lebanese Institute for Economic and Social Development	Jall El Dib
LICARI Wilfred-Guy	External Affairs and International Trade	Ottawa
MAILA Joseph	*Les Cahiers de l'Orient*	Paris
MAKDISI Samir	American University of Beirut	Beirut
MAKSOUD Hala Salaam		Washington

NAME/NOM	*ORGANIZATION/ORGANISATION*	*CITY/VILLE*
MAKSOUD Clovis	Arab League, United Nations	New York
MELHEM Hisham	"*al-Safir*"	USA
MOGHAIZEL Joseph	Association libanaise des droits de l'homme	Beirut
NAAMAN Issam	Gulf Legal Services	London
NASR Nafhat	Depauw University	Indiana
NASR Salim	Center for Peace and Reconstruction in Lebanon	Washington
NORTON Richard	International Peace Academy and West Point Military Academy	West Point
OSSEIRAN-HANNA Khatmeh	Save Lebanon Inc.	Washington
PERETZ Don	State University of New York at Binghamton	Binghamton
RAPHAEL Leyla	Carrefour des Cèdres	Montreal
RIZK Charles		Beirut
ROBINSON Andrew	External Affairs and International Trade	Ottawa
RODRIGUEZ Marcia	Editor	Ottawa
SAIDI Nasser	The Private Bank & Trust Company	London
SALEM Paul	Lebanese Center for Policy Studies	Beirut
SALIBA Najib	Worcester State College	Worcester
SAYIGH Rosemary	Hull University (U.K.), presently based in Beirut	Beirut
SBAITI Ahmed	Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development	Kuwait
SHAMMA' Amal	Berbir Medical Centre	Beirut
SIGLER John	Carleton University	Ottawa
TAKLA Youssef	Barreau de Beyrouth	Geneva
TANSLEY Jill	Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security	Ottawa
TUÉNI Ghassan	"*An-Nahar*"	Beirut
VARGA Michael	US State Department	Washington
VIVEASH David	Canadian International Development Agency	Ottawa
WANG Eric	External Affairs and International Trade	Ottawa
WOOD Bernard	Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security	Ottawa
ZIADÉ Ma'an	Institute for Islamic Studies, McGill University	Montreal

LIST OF GUEST SPEAKERS

NAME/NOM	*ORGANIZATION/ORGANISATION*	*CITY/VILLE*
Honorable Mary **COLLINS**	Associate Minister, National Defence	Ottawa
Honorable Monique **LANDRY**	Minister for External Relations and International Development, External Affairs and International Trade	Ottawa
Marc **PERRON**	Assistant Deputy Minister, Africa and Middle East Branch, External Affairs and International Trade	Ottawa

ADDITIONAL PANELISTS

(November 1991)

EPP Edwin	Mennonite Central Committee	Winnipeg
KARAM Georges	Union libanaise culturelle mondiale	Ville St-Laurent
MELNIKOFF Valérie	Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Fund, Canadian Council for International Cooperation	Ottawa